Economic effects of the external debt crisis for Pakistan by Anjum, Muhammad Iqbal
i 
 
Economic Effects of the External Debt Crisis for Pakistan
By
Muhammad Iqbal Anjum
BSc Econ (IIUI), MSc Econ (IIUI), MA Econ (KSU)
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy
Deakin University Australia
December 2012
ii 
 
 
DEAKIN UNIVERSITY
ACCESS TO THESIS - A 
I am the author of the thesis entitled ‘Economic effects of the external debt 
crisis for Pakistan’ submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
This thesis may be made available for consultation, loan and limited copying 
in accordance with the Copyright Act 1968. 
“I certify that I am the student named below and that the information 
provided in the form is correct.”
Full name:  MUHAMMAD IQBAL ANJUM
Signed:
Date: 6 June 2013
iii 
 
 
DEAKIN UNIVERSITY
CAMDIDATE DECLARATION 
I certify that the thesis entitled ‘Economic effects of the external debt crisis 
for Pakistan’ submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy is the result 
of my own work and that, where reference is made to the work of others, due 
acknowledgement is given.
I also certify that any material in the thesis which has been accepted for a 
degree or diploma by any university or institution is identified in the text.
“I certify that I am the student named below and that the information 
provided in the form is correct.”
Full name:  MUHAMMAD IQBAL ANJUM
Signed:
Date: December 2012
iv 
 
Dedication
This thesis is dedicated to my following relatives:
űMy honourable father Mr. Fazal Elahi Ajiz (Sufi poet of Urdu, Punjabi & Persian)
űMy honourable mother Mrs. Ayesha Begum
ű0y honourable paternal aunt Mrs. Irshaad Begum (Phoophi Ji Sehb)
űMy honourable uncle Hakeem Noor Muhammad Janjua
ű0\KRQRXUDEOHVLVWHUZareenah
űMy honourable wife Assistant Professor Mrs. Rukhsana Mir
ű0y honourable mother-in-law Mrs. Gulzar Begum
űMy honourable daughter Masooma Anjum
űMy honourable daughter Sidrah Anjum
űMy honourable daughter Haneen Anjum
űMy honourable daughter Zuha Anjum
űMy honourable son Muhammad Nabeel Anjum
űMy honourable son Muhammad Saneem Anjum
v 
 
Acknowledgements
“In the name of Allah, the Entirely Merciful, the Especially Merciful.”
“[All] praise is [due] to Allah, Lord of the worlds.”
(The Holy Qur’an:  Surat Al-)ƗWLƩDK, Translation of Ayaat 1-2)
I thankfully acknowledge the countless blessings of Allah (Subhanu Wa Ta’ala), the 
Creator of the entire universe, Who created me as a human being and blessed me 
with highly valuable blessings in the form of my life, my religion Islam, my perfect 
body, perfect health, peace, prosperity, light of knowledge, excellent education, the 
company of excellent family members and relatives, excellent amenities of life and 
facilities, and great opportunities for seeking knowledge from honourable professors 
in different parts of the world (in East and West). I offer my heartiest thanks to Allah 
(Subhanu Wa Ta’ala) from the core of my heart for enabling me to write this thesis.    
It is a matter of extreme pleasure and joy for me to duly heartily acknowledge, with 
my heart-felt special thanks, the highly generous and highly valuable supervisory
academic contributions of my all honourable doctoral dissertation supervisors, my 
Principal Supervisor Professor Pasquale M. Sgro, my Associate Supervisor Dr Prasad
Bhattacharya, and my Associate Supervisor Dr. Cahit Guyen regarding the timely 
completion of my thesis.  Particularly, I express my special thanks for Professor 
Pasquale M Sgro for being extraordinarily sincere, affectionate, generous and 
cooperative. He competently inspired, encouraged, taught, guided, advised, and 
facilitated me. He reviewed several drafts of my thesis, and provided extremely 
useful critical comments, insights, and comprehensive guidance, which culminated in
this final form of the thesis.  I also express my special thanks for Dr. Prasad 
Bhattacharya for his extraordinarily generous supervision of my thesis, for his highly 
valuable and constructive academic guidance/generous encouragement/highly useful 
comments on my thesis after reading several drafts of my thesis. I also heartily thank 
him for his participation in our joint academic meetings and for his encouragement 
for submitting this thesis as soon as possible.  Moreover, I express my special thanks
for Dr Cahit Guyen for his participation in our joint academic meetings and for his 
highly useful academic guidance. I express my heart-felts thanks for my honourable 
professors Sayyid Tahir, Chang, Ragan, Gormely, Asad Zaman, and Abdul-Latif 
Shafa’i for encouraging me to join a Ph.D. program.  I heartily thank academic 
support provided by academicians Hayat Khan, Chris, Mehmet, Ali Khan (John 
Hopkins), Dr. Mushtaq, Sifat, Abdul-Aziz, Hakim Syed Saharanpuri, Roger Horn, 
Tanya Castleman, Nava, Hamid Hasan, Nauman Ejaz, Anwar Shah, Arafin, Waqar, 
Saqib, Abdul Jabbar, Ishaq Bhatti, Pervez Janjua, and Mansoor.
It is a matter of immense pleasure for me to express my heart-felt thanks for my late 
honourable parents Mr. Fazal Elahi Ajiz and Mrs. Ayesha Begum, who expressed 
their highly valuable best wishes for me to excel in the arena of education.  I am also 
immensely pleased to express my heart-felt thanks for my late honourable paternal 
aunt Mrs. Irshaad Begum (Phoophi Ji Sehb) for her extreme affection, social and 
financial generosity, and altruism for me.  It is also a matter of immense pleasure for 
vi 
 
me to acknowledge the highly generous prayers, cooperation, and efforts of my 
honourable family members for my success.  While staying in Pakistan for 4 years in 
my absence, they experienced all kinds of financial/social/academic hardships. I 
express my special heart-felt thanks for my wife Assistant Professor Mrs. Rukhsana 
Mir for taking care of my family with her highly admirable patience, courage, and 
family-commitment.  I express my special heart-felt thanks for my dear children 
Sidrah Anjum, Haneen Anjum, Zuha Anjum, Muhammad Nabeel Anjum and 
Muhammad Saneem Anjum, who smilingly confronted numerous social, academic, 
and financial hardships. They prayed for my personal security, peace, and academic 
success in Australia. I express my heart-felt best wishes for their perfect 
health/security/peace/prosperity/academic success/professional excellence.  I heartily 
thank my Ph.D. program-fellows Abdul-Jabbar, Habibur-Rahman, Syed, Rejaul-
Karim, Muttakin, Tariq, Adil, Ranajit, Zohid, Anshu, Toni, Athula, Pablo, Rajesh, 
and Rashad for generous academic support.
vii 
 
Abstract
Pakistan experienced an external debt crisis in 1998 - a culmination of the process 
of fast accumulation of external debt of Pakistan since the 1980s. This debt crisis 
was followed by a fully-fledged economic crisis characterized by low rates of 
economic growth (debt overhang). There is robust evidence of the significant 
positive real GDP growth effects of the growth rate of real long-term external 
debt as well as the significant negative real GDP growth effects of the growth rate 
of total debt servicing as a percentage of exports signifying external debt 
overhang in the short and long-run.  
The effects of external debt growth variables on the growth rates of the real GDP 
shares of agriculture, industry, and services are also analysed. This empirical 
analysis confirms the lack of consensus on the external debt-growth relationship
in the literature.
The vector autoregressive impulse responses of the growth rates of real GDP and 
three sectoral shares to their own respective shocks, and to the individual shocks 
of the external debt growth variables are analysed.  There is empirical evidence of 
significant large temporary positive responses of the growth rates of real GDP,
agriculture’s real GDP share, industry’s real GDP share and the services’ real 
GDP share, which subsided and ultimately became zero in the short-run, to 
respectively their own individual positive shocks only.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and a brief history of the Pakistan economy
1.1 Introduction
The external debt crises of countries have been in the news for a number of years.  
Some argue that the modern history of these debt crises commenced when Keynes’s
policy recommendation of resorting to deficit financing successfully brought the 
sagging economies of the West out of the Great Depression of the 1930s. Ironically, 
the policy of deficit financing itself became a problem and was the cause of some of 
the external debt crises that have occurred since the 1970s. The recent violent 
protests in Greece amidst her worsening external debt crisis, which some fear will 
trigger sovereign debt crises in several other European countries, is just one example.
Keeping in mind a broad historical view of the global economy since the 1950s,
when theories of economic development envisioned a positive role for external 
capital and external debt in accelerating national economic growth rates, this thesis is 
fundamentally motivated by both the latest global shock waves from the most recent 
external debt crises, especially in European countries, and the alarming external debt 
crises of several third-world countries, which have effectively slowed down national 
and global economies via the process of external debt overhang.  The global 
dimension of the prominent sovereign external debt crises since the 1970s is evident 
in Table 1.1 below. 
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Table 1.1 A chronicle of world’s prominent national external debt crises
Serial Number Countries Years of debt crisis
1 Latin American Countries Late 1970s
2 Costa Rica 1981
3 Mexico 1982 & 1994
4 Thailand 1997
5 Indonesia 1997
6 Korea 1997
7 Brazil 1998
8 Russia 1998
9 Pakistan 1998
10 Turkey 2000
11 Argentina 2001
12 Greece 2010-2012
Sources: Bauer et al. (2011), Cunninggham (1993), Fishlow (1989), Hasan (1999), Imer (2008), 
Nafziger (2012), and Todaro and Smith (2009).
Because of the internationally integrated structures of contemporary national 
economies in the institutional framework of economic-cum-financial globalization, 
the above external debt crises have triggered national, regional and global recessions.
Pakistan also experienced an external debt crisis1, which was triggered by the 
international economic sanctions imposed against Pakistan in the aftermath of her 
nuclear tests in 1998.  While on the brink of sovereign debt default, Pakistan was 
forced by circumstances to receive additional external loans from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) subject to the conditions of implementing tough austerity 
measures along with the imposition of a general sales tax of 15%. It is interesting to 
                                                          
1 Sherani (2002) described Pakistan’s external debt crisis in the following words (Sherani, 2002,  pp. 
xi, 4):
“Pakistan experienced a rapid accumulation of debt and a mounting debt burden.  By the 
middle of the 1990s, the country was exhibiting many of the classical symptoms associated 
with a debt trap: falling rates of investment, declining development and social spending by 
the Government, and progressively lower rates of GDP growth… the outturn in Pakistan’s 
case is not inconsistent with that of other heavily-indebted countries... high levels of external 
indebtedness correlate with lower-levels of economic performance across a broad spectrum of 
countries.”  
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note that the nature and the economic aftermath of the current debt crisis in Greece 
and the 1998 debt crisis in Pakistan have remarkable similarities.  For example, the 
debt/gross domestic product (GDP) ratio in Pakistan, as well as in Greece, exceeded 
100% during their respective debt crises. Like Pakistan’s external debt/GDP, which 
exceeded 54% during her external debt crisis, Greece’s net external debt/GDP ratio 
exceeded 54% during her external debt crisis2. National external debt had been 
acting as a drag on the national economies of Pakistan, and Greece, and now both 
Greece and Pakistan desperately need fiscal consolidation and economic growth to 
help resolve their respective external debt crises. In this context, it is also important 
to acknowledge that the above similarities of the alarming external debt overhang of 
Pakistan, Greece, and the other developed countries need to be treated with great 
caution because the national economies of these countries have quite different 
underlying macroeconomic structures, institutional frameworks (for example, the 
European Union (EU) framework versus non-EU framework), and macroeconomic 
indicators (for example, unemployment rate and inflation rate). Within the set of 
comparable South-Asian developing countries, the unsustainable total external 
debt/GDP ratio was over 68% for Sri Lanka, over 65% for Bangladesh, over 38% for 
Pakistan, and over 36% for India in the late 1990s (Chaudhary and Anwar, 2000, pp.
552-3). Amongst the indebted countries, South-Asian countries experienced the 
highest debt servicing burden during the period 1970-1997 and Pakistan registered 
the highest debt servicing burden as compared to that of India, Bangladesh, and Sri 
Lanka in 1997 (Ahmed, Butt and Alam, 2000, 593).
                                                          
2 Hasan (1999) and Dias (2010). 
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Given the grave macroeconomic implications for the European Union, Greece’s 
external debt crisis has received a lot of attention, whereas the external debt crisis of 
Pakistan has not received as much. The lack of substantial and substantive research 
on the economic effects of Pakistan’s external debt crisis has motivated this thesis.  
Thus, this thesis aims at empirically determining the short and long-run aggregate 
and sector level growth effects of Pakistan’s external debt (that is, real total external 
debt stock, real long-term external debt stock, real short-term external debt stock, and 
total debt servicing as a percentage of exports). It is motivated by Pakistan’s 
unsustainable record high levels of external debt, especially in the late 1990s.  An 
alarming and salient feature of Pakistan’s 1998 external debt crisis was her external 
debt/GDP ratio of 54.3%, along with her total debt/GDP ratio of 102% in the fiscal 
year 1998/99 (Hasan, 1999). This empirical research may provide lessons for Greece 
and other European countries facing similar problems. 
This chapter briefly describes the evolution of Pakistan’s economy during seven 
distinct decades, from the late 1940s to the end of the 2000s.  It provides insights into 
its genesis, political economy, structural and sectoral change, fluctuating economic 
growth and external debt accumulation, and especially into the 1998-99 external debt 
crisis. It also highlights the macroeconomic background, nature, causes, and effects 
of Pakistan’s economic and external debt crises on rising inflation as well as 
unemployment.  It highlights the role of the manufacturing sector as the driver of 
economic growth and structural change in the economy of Pakistan.  Historically, 
Pakistan’s economic growth dynamics have been a clear manifestation of an external 
debt/aid-dependent macroeconomic growth regime.  As a result, Pakistan’s economic 
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growth has been vulnerable especially to the shocks of the external debt burden and 
growing costs of external debt servicing.   Consequently, Pakistan continues to be in 
the set of lower middle-income developing countries. Over time, the pendulum of 
economic policies in Pakistan has swung between the competing ideologies of 
capitalism, socialism, and an Islamic welfare state.  During the past sixty-five years 
of its existence, Pakistan has progressed from a low-income to a lower middle-
LQFRPHGHYHORSLQJHFRQRP\ņ3DNLVWDQ¶V*'3SHUFDSLWDLQFUHDVHGIURP86LQ
1980 to US$1,017 in 2010 according to the World Bank (2012).
Chapter 2 surveys both the partial and whole debt defaults on the part of several 
countries and the cyclical (repetitive) nature of their sovereign debt defaults, as well 
as the corresponding external debt crises of the defaulting countries.   The literature 
highlights the parallel between the debt crises of Pakistan and a large number of other 
countries since the 19th century.  It also indicates a remarkable similarity in the 
official policy responses, such as cuts in public expenditure on health and education, 
irrespective of whether they are developing countries like Pakistan or they are the 
developed countries such as the United Kingdom.  It documents the consensus of an 
overwhelming majority of Pakistani economists on the causes of Pakistan’s debt 
crisis in the second half of the 1990s.  These authors also argue that Pakistan’s 
chronic fiscal deficits, in the wake of very low rates of national savings and 
unsustainable huge balance of trade and balance of payments deficits, triggered 
Pakistan’s external debt crisis.  It has also been argued that the burden of external 
debt servicing has been a hindrance to the growth of the economy ņ a salient feature 
of Pakistan’s economy, one of the fundamental hypotheses of this thesis. The 
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literature indicates that the prospective solution to Pakistan’s external debt crisis lies 
in not only realizing significantly higher sustainable national saving and investment 
rates, sustainable budget surpluses, and sustainable balance of trade and balance of 
payments surpluses, but also in implementing effective austerity reforms. While this 
recommended solution to Pakistan’s external debt crisis is generally similar to the 
recommended solutions to the debt crises of other heavily indebted countries, the 
solution to Pakistan’s external debt crisis requires a simultaneous sustainable 
substantial increase in both her national saving and investment rates as well as a strict 
implementation of an effective austerity program of radical macroeconomic 
structural, institutional, constitutional, behavioural, fiscal, and debt reforms.
Chapter 3 presents estimation results of real GDP growth models and examines the 
real GDP growth effects of external debt growth variables for Pakistan in the era of 
external debt accumulation since 1981.  More specifically, it uses the unit root tests 
for nonstationarity, the method of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), OLS residual and 
stability diagnostics, and the Johansen’s multiple cointegration tests for empirically 
determining the short-run and long-run effects of the growth rates of real total 
external debt stock, real long-term external debt stock, real short-term external debt 
stock, and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports on the growth rate of real 
GDP.  In addition, the OLS-based double-log regression models of the dependent 
variable real GDP, and the explanatory external debt variables, are also estimated for 
determining the elasticities of the real GDP with respect to the explanatory external 
debt variables.  The main empirical result of this chapter is the robust empirical 
evidence of both a significant positive real GDP growth effect of the growth rate of 
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real long-term external debt stock, and a significant negative real GDP growth effect 
of the growth rate of total debt servicing as a percentage of exports, thus signifying 
external debt overhang in the short and long-run.  In general, the overall empirical 
results of these short-run real GDP growth models using three control variables (the 
growth rates of real workers’ remittances and compensation of employees received 
(that is, income of border/seasonal/short-term workers employed in a country
wherein  they are nonresidents and the income of residents employed by nonresident 
employers according to the World Bank’s World development indicators 2012), 
foreign direct investment net inflows, and money and quasi money) are robust to the 
inclusion of two additional control variables, the growth rate of the total labour force 
and the first-differenced growth rate of real capital stock.
Chapter 4 presents estimation results of models of the growth rates of the real GDP 
shares of agriculture, industry and services, and examines the effects of external debt 
growth variables on the growth rates of the real GDP shares of agriculture, industry, 
and the services in the era of external debt accumulation since 1981.  It also uses the 
unit root tests for nonstationarity, the OLS method, OLS residual and stability 
diagnostics, and the Johansen’s multiple cointegration tests for empirically 
determining the short-run and long-run effects of the growth rates of real total 
external debt stock, real long-term external debt stock, real short-term external debt 
stock, and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports on the growth rates of 
sectoral real GDP shares using control variables.  The main empirical results of this 
chapter are presented in Table 1.2 below.
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Table 1.2 Short-run and long-run effects of four external debt growth variables on the growth rates of the real GDP shares of 
agriculture, industry, and services sectors
Dependent
9DULDEOHĻ
Short -run 
significant 
effect of the
growth rate 
of real total 
external 
debt stock 
in the case 
of 3 control 
variables
Short-run 
significant 
effect of the
growth rate 
of real total 
external 
debt stock 
in the case 
of 5 control 
variables
Long-run 
significant 
effect of  the 
growth rate 
of real total 
external 
debt stock 
in the case 
of 5 control 
variables
Short-run 
significant 
effect of the 
growth rate 
of real long-
term 
external 
debt stock 
in the case
of 3 control 
variables
Short-run 
significant 
effect of the 
growth rate 
of real long-
term 
external 
debt stock
in the case 
of 5 control 
variables
Long-run 
significant 
effect of  the 
growth rate 
of real long-
term 
external 
debt stock 
in the case 
of 5 control 
variables
Short-run 
significant 
effect of  the 
growth rate 
of real
short- term 
external 
debt stock 
in the case 
of 3 control 
variables
Short-run 
significant 
effect of  the 
growth rate 
of real 
short- term 
external 
debt stock 
in the case 
of 5 control 
variables
Long-run 
significant 
effect of  the
growth rate 
of real 
short- term 
external 
debt stock 
in the case 
of 5 control 
variables
Short-run 
significant 
effect of  the 
growth rate 
of total  
debt 
servicing as 
a percent-
age of 
exports
in the case 
of 3 control 
variables
Short-run 
significant 
effect of  the
growth rate 
of total  
debt 
servicing as 
a percent-
age of 
exports in 
the case of 5 
control 
variables
Long-run 
significant 
effect of  the 
growth rate 
of total  
debt 
servicing as 
a percent-
age of 
exports in 
the case of 5 
control 
variables
The growth 
rate of  
agriculture’s
share of real 
GDP
+ + í í
í*
+***
+**
í***
The growth 
rate of 
industry’s 
share of real 
GDP
í + í + í
The growth 
rate of the 
services’ share 
of real GDP í + +
Notes: * in the cases of one cointegrating equation and two cointegrating equations; ** in the case of two cointegrating equations; *** in case of the three cointegrating equations.
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Here it is pertinent to note that the above empirical evidence, of certain mutually-
contradicting estimated significant positive, as well as negative effects, of any of the 
above four external debt growth variables on the growth rates of sectoral real GDP 
shares, confirms the lack of consensus on the external debt-growth relationship
observed by Siddiqui and Malik (2001).  Moreover, these results are not surprising 
since the sectoral real GDP share growth rates signify change in the sectoral-cum-
structural composition of the national economy. The sectoral changes occur in such a 
way that some sectoral real GDP shares increase and other sectoral real GDP shares 
decrease (for example, real GDP shares of industry and the services increase and the 
real GDP share of agriculture declines due to the transfer of labour from agriculture 
into industry and the services as a result of higher real wages in the industry and the 
services than in agriculture because of higher marginal productivity of labour in the 
industry and the services ņ a result of increasingly higher levels of capital formation 
and technological progress in industry and the services ņ than in agriculture during 
the course of countries’ economic development based on industrialization and 
expansion of the services.). The changes can be either due to natural changes over
time in the sectoral composition of the national economy or real GDP, or total 
external debt (in terms of long-term and short-term external debt), or because of the 
changing conditions and the fundamentals of national and global economies.  In this 
context, it is pertinent to note that the data set on sectoral real GDP shares reported in 
the State Bank of Pakistan’s Handbook of statistics on Pakistan economy 2010 has 
established the empirical fact of gradually decreasing real GDP share of agriculture 
and gradually increasing real GDP shares of industry and the services with the 
10 
 
passage of time, which is later illustrated in Figure 1.7.  Similarly, the occurrence of 
changes in sectoral real GDP shares in Pakistan’s economy due to the role of changes 
in real long-term external debt stock during the process of its industrialization is 
implied by the empirical evidence of both a robust short-run significant negative 
effect of the growth rate of real long-term external debt stock on the growth rate of 
real GDP share of agriculture and a short-run significant positive effect of the growth 
rate of real long-term external debt stock on the growth rate of real GDP share of 
industry, which is reported in Table 1.2.  These arguments also apply to the GDP
growth effects of certain external debt growth variables during the business cycle 
associated with Pakistan’s  external debt crisis in light of the following assertion of 
Ormerod and Campbell (1997, p. 88):
“The idea that the movements in GDP over the course of the business cycle 
are inherently unpredictable is not new in economics and some of the early 
quantitative thinking about the cycle, by for example Fisher (1925) and 
Slutsky (1937) in the 1920s and 1930s, advanced this as a hypothesis. The use 
of spectrum analysis confirms the validity of the hypothesis.”
Here it is also pertinent to note that certain negative real GDP growth effects as well 
as sectoral real GDP share growth effects are also consistent with the empirical 
finding of Iqbal (1994), that Pakistan’s real output growth decelerated due to the use
of structural adjustment loans in non-productive activities.
Keeping in view the above arguments, a significant negative short-run effect of the 
growth rate of real total external debt stock on the growth rate of real GDP share of 
industry and significant negative long-run effects of the growth rates of real long-
term external debt stock on the growth rates of real GDP shares of industry and the 
services reported in Table 1.2 may be due to factors such as the occurrence of several 
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recessions in Pakistan since 1998 and the use of external debt in unproductive 
activities. The above empirical evidence of existence of both positive and negative 
effects of the different external debt growth variables on the sectoral real GDP share 
growth rates is also consistent with the above argument of the inherently 
unpredictable movements of sectoral GDP shares because of a combination of the 
several aforementioned factors.  
Chapter 5 estimates four unrestricted Vector Autoregressive (VAR) models: Real 
GDP Growth VAR Model 11, Agriculture’s Real GDP Share Growth VAR Model 22,
Industry’s Real GDP Share Growth VAR Model 33, and Services’ Real GDP Share 
Growth VAR Model 44.  It also analyses the VAR impulse responses of the growth 
rates of real GDP and three sectoral shares to their own respective shocks, and to the 
individual shocks of the above four external debt growth variables.  There were 
significant large temporary positive responses of the growth rates of real GDP (in 
VAR Model 1), agriculture’s real GDP share (in VAR Model 2), industry’s real GDP 
share (in VAR Model 3), and the services’ real GDP share (in VAR Model 4), which 
subsided and ultimately became zero in the short-run, to respectively their own 
                                                          
1 Real GDP Growth VAR Model 1 consists of five stationary time series, namely, the growth rates of 
real GDP, real total external debt stock, real long-term external debt stock, real short-term external 
debt stock, and total external debt servicing as a percentage of exports. 
2 Agriculture’s Real GDP Share Growth VAR Model 2 consists of five stationary time series of the 
growth rates of agriculture’s share of real GDP, real total external debt stock, real long-term external 
debt stock, real short-term external debt stock, and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports. 
3 Industry’s Real GDP Share Growth VAR Model 3 consists of five stationary time series of the 
growth rates of industry’s share of real GDP, real total external debt stock, real long-term external debt 
stock, real short-term external debt stock, and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports. 
4 Services’ Real GDP Share Growth VAR Model 4 consists of five stationary time series of the growth 
rates of the services’ share of real GDP, real total external debt stock, real long-term external debt 
stock, real short-term external debt stock, and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports. 
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individual positive shocks.  In contrast, the above impulse response functions reflect 
that there are neither significant positive nor significant negative responses of the 
growth rates of real GDP (in VAR Model 1), agriculture’s real GDP share (in VAR 
Model 2), industry’s real GDP share (in VAR Model 3), and the services’ real GDP 
share (in VAR Model 4), respectively, to the individual shocks of the unexpected 
increases in the growth rates of real total external debt stock, real long-term external 
debt stock, real short-term external debt, and total external debt servicing as a
percentage of exports.
1.2 A brief history of the Pakistan economy 
This section chronicles a brief economic history of the Pakistan economy providing 
some insights into Pakistan’s external debt crisis, its sources and causes, and the 
subsequent responses to it.  Subsection 1.2.1 presents a brief history of last seven
decades (from the late 1940s to the end of the 2000s) of the Pakistan economy, and 
highlights the process of evolution of Pakistan’s economy during those decades.
Subsection 1.2.2 presents an overall snapshot of the entire history of Pakistan’s
economy.  Finally, Section 1.3 highlights the main conclusions. 
1.2.1 Evolution of the Pakistan economy
1.2.1.1 The Late 1940s:  Era of emergence of a new national economy
At its inception in 1947, Pakistan had a predominantly agrarian economy with the 
agriculture sector as its mainstay – agriculture contributed 53% of GDP in 1947, and 
13 
 
53.2% of GDP in 1949-505.  Pakistan had a population of 30 million in 1947 with 6 
million people living in urban areas, 65% of the labour force working in the 
agricultural sector, and agricultural output contributing 99.2% of exports6. Against 
this back ground, agriculture contributed about 90% of Pakistan’s foreign exchange 
earnings resulting from foreign trade (exports) of her agricultural output, which were 
later channelled into the industrial sector for accelerating industrialization and 
economic growth in Pakistan7. At the same time, the living standard of the citizens 
of Pakistan was low í Pakistan had an average per capita income of almost $360 
(1985 international dollars) in 19508, an initial literacy rate of 10%, and only 1,014 
registered doctors in 1948 for a population of 32.5 million9. Against this 
background, Pakistan needed to significantly improve the living standards of both her 
native population and her 7 million newly-arrived homeless immigrants, amidst a 
scenario of economic crises caused by the virtual absence of economic infrastructure, 
financial resources, and the requisite industrial base10.  Pakistan’s very small nascent 
private sector did not have the requisite capital, therefore, the Government relied 
heavily on the public sector for the task of building the economic-cum-industrial base 
                                                          
5 State Bank of Pakistan (2010), Husain (1999) and Zaidi (2005).
6 Husain (1999), Fasih-Uddin and Swati (2009) and Zaidi (2005).
7 Khan (2002). 
8 Khan (2002). 
9 Fasih-Uddin and Swati (2009), and Zaidi (2005). 
10 Indeed, there were small industries as well as few services, and there were almost no large-scale 
industrial units at all in 1947 [Husain (1999), Fasih-Uddin and Swati (2009), Zaidi (2005) and The 
World Bank (Undated)].
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of Pakistan11. In 1949-50, Pakistan registered a national savings rate of 2%, foreign 
savings rate of 2%, and an investment rate of 4%12. Pakistan’s resources in its two 
constituent territorial domains, East Pakistan and West Pakistan, were an immense 
reservoir of natural resources in the form of land, and at least five major mineral 
resources such as natural gas, crude oil, coal, limestone, and marble13. In 1947, 
estimates of poverty incidence ranged from at least 55% to 60% in the West 
Pakistan14. In the late 1940s, Pakistan implemented a policy of imports-substituting 
industrialization to try and achieve economic self-sufficiency – especially self-
sufficiency in the cotton textile industry15. Later, the implementation of policy of 
imports-substituting industrialization resulted in fast growth in the industrial sector, 
diversification of industrial production, increased foreign exchange earnings by 
means of exports, increased dependence on imports, greater effective protection of 
domestic industries, and increased economic inefficiency in industrial production16.
In 1949-50, the manufacturing sector contributed 7.8% of GDP and the 
services/trade/other sectors together contributed 39% of GDP.   Pakistan’s trade 
balance of payments was in deficit by 66 million Rupees during 1949/50-1950/5117.
                                                          
11 Fasih-Uddin and Swati (2009), and Zaidi (2005).
12 Hasan (1997). 
13 Fasih-Uddin and Swati (2009). 
14 Hasan (1997) and Hasan (2004, p. 63). 
15 Hussain (2003), Husain (1999), and Hasan (1997).
16 Khan (2002). 
17 Zaidi (2005). 
15 
 
1.2.1.2 The 1950s: Era of a traditional economy in transition
The 1950s was the first decade of planning, which aimed at enabling the public sector 
to establish industries for building the industrial foundation of Pakistan and then 
transfer them to the private sector against the background of the fact that almost all of 
the large-scale industries at the time of partition of British India were situated in 
those territories which became part of the newly established independent India and, 
therefore, then Pakistan’s economy had a negligibly small industrial base18. After 
launching the Colombo Plan in 1951, Pakistan instituted not only a series of Five-
Year Plans during the period 1955-1998 but also a Ten-Year Perspective Plan 
alongside a rolling Three-Year Development Plan19. While acknowledging the 
contrast between Pakistan’s vast natural resources and her industrial backwardness, 
Pakistan continued its policy of imports-substituting industrialization during the 
1950s20.  During the Korean War (1950-1953), Pakistan’s public and nascent private 
sector thrived on spectacular merchant profits, which were quickly transformed into 
industrial capital that fuelled the process of industrialization as well as accelerated it 
during and after the Korean War boom period 1950-5221. Pakistan completely 
banned the imports of cotton textiles and luxury goods in 1952 and regulated 
virtually all imports in 1953 via the implementation of trade policies of over-valuation of 
                                                          
18 Zaidi (2005), Khan (2002), and Hasan (1997). 
19 Fasih-Uddin and Swati (2009). 
20 Hasan (1997), Husain (1999), and Zaidi (2005).  
21 Merchant profits referred to the profits realized from the Korean War-induced dramatic growth in 
exports of raw materials to the war-panicked countries, which were then piling up raw materials 
during the war [Zaidi (2005), Papanek (1996), and Hussain (2003)].
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the Rupee relative to other currencies, quantitative controls on imports of luxuries and 
consumption goods, lower tariffs on imports of intermediate goods and capital goods, tight 
controls on the imports of luxuries and consumption goods, and a rigid system of import 
licensing, which included the export bonus scheme of distribution of the ownership of import 
licenses among the exporter22. Consequently, Pakistan emerged as one of the most 
rapidly growing countries of the world in the 1950s mainly due to a decade-long 
implementation of the strategy of imports-substituting industrialization regime23.
This regime protected and promoted local infant industries via the provision of high 
rates of effective protection, low-cost credit supplied by government financial 
institutions (for example, Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation and 
Pakistan Industrial Finance Corporation), cheap agricultural goods as industrial 
inputs, fiscal incentives which caused market distortions and industrial inefficiency24,
and an over-valued exchange rate ņ which enabled Pakistani industrialists to import 
machinery at lower prices and, thereby, reduced their costs of industrial production 
ņ, thereby significantly raising the rates of their profits, investment, and industrial 
output growth25. Particularly, Pakistan’s overvalued exchange rate regime worked 
against the small open economy hypothesis.  In contrast, anti-agriculture policy 
biases and anti-agriculture terms of trade between industry and agriculture caused the 
annual growth rate of agriculture to decline from 2.6% in 1949/50-1950/51 to 1.9% 
                                                          
22 Hasan (1997), (Khan, 2002), and (Zaidi, 2005). 
23 Zaidi (2005) and Husain (1999). 
24 Khan (2002). 
25Pakistan’s average annual rate of growth of her large-scale manufacturing sector was 23.6% per 
annum during 1950-1954 in contrast to her small-scale manufacturing sector’s average annual growth 
rate of 2.3% per annum [Zaidi (2005), Husain (1999), and Hussain (2003)].
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in 1957/58-1958/5926.  After realization of self-sufficiency in the arena of cotton 
textiles in the late 1950s, the objective of export development assumed vital 
significance, and to help achieve this objective, Pakistan devalued the Rupee in 
195527.  The national savings’ performance of Pakistan in the 1950s was primarily 
due to the inflow of the US military and economic aid of US$500 million during 
1955-5828.  Consequently, Pakistan conspicuously entered a new phase of foreign 
aid-dependent economic growth in the 1950s29.
Until 1958, Pakistan’s economic policies had been merely ad hoc policy responses to 
the then erupting short-term economic crises30.  This fact is confirmed by the 
following observation of Khan (2002, p. 17):
“A careful review of the economic policy during this phase shows a series of 
ad hoc reactions to internal and external crises.” 
For example, Pakistan’s controversial policy decision of not devaluing her currency 
in 1949, in the wake of devaluation of the pound sterling and Indian Rupee in 194931,
was meant to ensure the independence of her trade policy regime from the foreign 
                                                          
26 Even negative growth rates in the DJULFXOWXUDO VHFWRUZHUHREVHUYHGņ WKDW LV -9.1% in 1950/51-
1951/52 and -0.8% in 1953/54-1954/55.  With the then 75% of the population of Pakistan living in the 
rural area, the prolonged stagnation of the agricultural sector in the 1950s restricted further growth in 
the manufacturing sector (Zaidi, 2005).
27 Hasan (1997). 
287KLV86DLGíDUHVXOWRI3DNLVWDQ-United States Mutual Defence Pact signed in íUHGXFHGWKH
heavy burden of public expenditure on the budget of the public sector (Hasan, 1997).
29 Nafziger (2012) and Hussain (2003). 
30 Husain (1999).
31 Khan (2002). 
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influences32.  This policy decision culminated in the end of the then existing customs 
union between Pakistan and India as a result of a reaction of her traditional trading 
partners (for example, India and Britain) against the above policy decision of 
Pakistan and, therefore, it was no more possible for Pakistan to export jute and raw 
materials to the huge target markets in India and Britain33.  However, later Pakistan 
accidently discovered new target markets for the exports of her raw materials due to 
the unexpected eruption of the aforementioned Korean War boom34.  Similarly, in 
contrast to the expectations about the prospective devaluation amidst a balance of 
payment crisis in 1952 in the aftermath of a decrease in the prices of raw materials in 
the world market, Pakistan implemented policies of stringent direct controls on 
exchange, exports and imports instead of resorting to the policy of devaluation35.
While high tariffs and indirect taxes played a minor role in the promotion of 
industrialization, an over-valued exchange rate and other direct quantitative controls 
played a dominant role in determining the relative prices as well as incentives, which 
accelerated the process of industrial growth in the 1950s36.  In the late 1950s and the 
1960s, the usage of massive foreign-aid as a source of cheap credit, which was 
rationed through the national banking and financial institutions among the investors 
of the private sector, played a key role in accelerating the sectoral growth rates of 
industry, agriculture and the services as well as the aggregate growth rate of the 
                                                          
32 Zaidi (2005). 
33 Zaidi (2005). 
34 Khan (2002) and Zaidi (2005). 
35 Zaidi (2005). 
36 Zaidi (2005). 
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economy especially in the 1960s37.  Moreover, the policies of arbitrarily neglecting 
agriculture and setting the pro-industry terms of trade, which favoured industry and 
damaged the agricultural sector, culminated in stagnation of agriculture in the 
1950s38.
,QíDIWHUILUVWPLOLWDU\FRXSG
pWDWLQ, the martial law regime implemented 
a new trade policy of imposing indirect controls ņ in the forms of introduction of 
export bonus scheme (also known as a scheme of bonus vouchers, which were treated 
as import licenses) and free list of the goods, which could be imported without 
having any import license ņ on the domestic prices of goods including imports39.
But, Pakistan’s balance of trade deteriorated from -831 million Rupees in 1950/51 to 
-1043 million Rupees in 1959/60 due to sharp decrease in exports from 1,038 million 
Rupees in 1950/51 to 763 million Rupees in 1959/60 against the background of 
disappearance of Korean War boom, export taxes, and the devaluation of Rupee, 
which reduced the Rupee prices of exports thereby creating disincentive for 
exporters40. Pakistan registered an agricultural sector growth rate of 1.6% per annum 
and an overall manufacturing sector growth rate of 7.7% per annum in the 1950s41.
In 1959-60, West Pakistan’s Per Capita GNP was Rs.355 in contrast to the East 
                                                          
37 Zaidi (2005). 
38 Fasih-Uddin and Swati (2009) & Zaidi (2005). 
39 That is, an official list of items allowed to be freely imported without any requisite license [Hasan 
(1997) and Zaidi (2005)]. 
40 Hasan (1997), Zaidi (2005) and Fasih-Uddin and Swati (2009). 
41 Fasih-Uddin and Swati (2009). 
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Pakistan’s Per Capita GNP of Rs.26942. In anticipation of trickle-down effects of 
economic growth, the above regional economic disparity was partly deliberately 
caused by the then military regime’s discriminatory regional development policies,
which concentrated both financial resources and industrial development processes in 
West Pakistan at the expense of East Pakistan43. Against this background, there 
persisted differences between the growth performances of East Pakistan and West 
Pakistan ņ for example, the growth in the economy of East Pakistan was slower than 
the growth in the economy of West Pakistan in the period 1959-71 (During the period 
1960-1970, East Pakistan’s real GDP growth rate was 4% and West Pakistan’s real 
GDP growth rate was 6.7%)44.  Moreover, foreign exports (trade) were not allowed to 
function as a driver of industrial and economic growth in East Pakistan because the 
foreign exchange earned by means of jute exports originating from East Pakistan was 
not transferred to East Pakistan’s industrialists as the aforementioned foreign 
exchange earnings were being made available to West Pakistan’s industrialists to be 
used as a driver of industrial growth in West Pakistan45.
1.2.1.3 The 1960s: Era of economic growth
Amidst massive foreign aid flows resulting from Pakistan’s strong strategic alliance 
with the USA, the decade-long period of the first martial law regime ensured long-
term political stability, which enabled Pakistan to sustain high rates of economic 
                                                          
42Thus, the West-East Disparity Ratio was 1.32 (Zaidi, 2005).   
43 Husain (1999), Khan (2002) and Zaidi (2005). 
44 Khan (2002) and Hasan (1997). 
45 Khan (2002).  
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growth in the 1960s46.  In addition, Pakistan was a member of the Central and South 
East Asian Treaty Organization and had signed the World Bank-sponsored Indus 
Basin Treaty in 196147. According to the earliest available formal data in the early 
1960s, figures of poverty incidence ranged from 54% in 1963-64 to almost 50% in 
the early 1960s in Pakistan48. In the 1960s, Pakistan achieved an agricultural growth 
rate of 5% per annum as a direct consequence of policies of achieving significant 
private and public sector investments in water resources, increased incentives for 
farmers, mechanization of agricultural production processes, increased usage of 
chemical inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides, and the increased cultivation of 
high yielding varieties of rice and wheat49. As the growing domestic agricultural 
sector supplied cheaper raw materials as the requisite industrial inputs used in the 
then fast growing industrial production as a result of the official policy of imports-
substituting industrialization, the above agricultural growth, in turn, constituted the 
foundation of further industrial growth ņDFontinuation of general trend of the 1950s 
ņ Ds well as exports growth in the 1960s.  These successful policies of achieving
high rates of growth by means of the Green Revolution-based industrialization seem 
to be different from the growth policies of the 1950s, which focused on fast industrial 
development and neglected the then stagnating agriculture50.  This change in policy 
occurred due to the change in political regime in the form of the establishment of the 
                                                          
46 Chenery and Strout (1966), and (Papanek (1996).
47 Hasan (1997). 
48 Hasan (1997) and Hasan (2004, p. 63).  
49 Husain (1999) and Hasan (1997).
50 Hasan (1997), Zaidi (2005) and (Khan, 2002). 
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martial law regime, which acknowledged the importance of development of 
agriculture for accelerating industrial growth and development and, therefore, 
launched a Green Revolution by investing a part of the significantly increased 
inflows of foreign aid and loans in agricultural development projects (for example, 
large dams) as well51.  The increased availability of foreign aid and loans was due to 
the military regime’s strategic alliance with the Western capitalist powers in the era
of Cold War52. These factors enabled the large-scale manufacturing sector to grow at 
a rate of 16% per annum in the period 1960/61-1964/65 due to both the substantial 
protection of domestic industry from imports and the substantial subsidies for 
exporters53.
In sharp contrast to the stagnation of agriculture in the 1950s caused by then 
officially policy of neglecting the agriculture, the aforementioned significant 
practical official attention received by the agriculture since the advent of the martial 
regime culminated in Green Revolution, which in turn enabled the agricultural 
growth to further reinforce and accelerate the industrial growth in the 1960s54. In 
íDIWHUILUVWPLOLWDU\FRXSd'état in 1958, the martial law regime implemented a 
new trade policy of imposing indirect controls ņ in the forms of introduction of 
export bonus scheme (also known as a scheme of bonus vouchers, which were treated 
                                                          
51 Khan (2002), Zaidi (2005), and Hasan (1997). 
52 Zaidi (2005) and (Khan (2002). 
53 Hasan (1997). 
54 Zaidi (2005).  
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as import licenses) and free list of the goods, which could be imported without 
having any import license ņ on the domestic prices of goods including imports55.
In the wake of the Pakistan-India War of 1965 and subsequent reduced foreign 
economic assistance, the large-scale manufacturing sector grew at a lower rate of 
10% per annum in the period 1965-7056. Consequently, Pakistan achieved an average 
annual growth rate of 6.7% in GDP during the period 1960-197057. In 1969-70,
poverty incidence declined to 46% in Pakistan58. In 1969-70, West Pakistan’s Per 
Capita GNP was Rs.504 in contrast to the East Pakistan’s Per Capita GNP of Rs.314 
– indicating a widening of the regional economic disparity noted earlier as well as 
pointing to the failure of the economic growth in achieving the anticipated trickle-
down effects of economic growth and the desirable patterns of balanced regional 
economic growth across all regions in Pakistan, which could have been achieved by 
simultaneously implementing growth policies and distributive policies of taxation 
and transfer payments.
1.2.1.4 The 1970s: Era of socialism and its aftermath
Against the background of growing economic disparity between West and East 
Pakistan, East Pakistan revolted against West Pakistan and emerged as a new 
                                                          
55 That is, an official list of items allowed to be freely imported without any requisite license [Hasan 
(1997) and Zaidi (2005)]. 
56 Hasan (1997). 
57 Hasan (1997), Zaidi (2005), and Fasih-Uddin and Swati (2009). 
58 Hasan (1997). 
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independent country (Bangladesh) on the global map in 197159.  After this strategic 
debacle, the martial law authorities handed over the reign of the national government 
in the remaining territorial domain of Pakistan to the socialist Pakistan People’s
Party, which instituted socialism amidst very difficult macroeconomic 
circumstances60. For example, at that time, poverty incidence rose to 55% in 
Pakistan in 1971-7261, there was an increase in Pakistan’s import bill due to the 
October 1973 world oil price shock, a serious post-1973 global recession during 
1974-77, failures of cotton crops in 1974-75, pest attacks on crops, and massive 
floods in 1973, 1974, and 1976-7762. Pakistan experienced her history’s worst 
inflation in the period 1972-77 during which prices increased by 15% per annum63.
During the period 1973-77, Pakistan’s annual average fiscal deficit/GDP ratio was 
                                                          
59 East Pakistan’s socialist party, Awami League, won the overall majority of the parliamentary seats 
of the entire Pakistan, and West Pakistan’s socialist political party, Pakistan People’s Party, won only 
the majority of the parliamentary seats belonging to West Pakistan in the military regime-sponsored 
general parliamentary elections in 1970 (Zaidi 2005).  After the refusal of the then ruling military to 
hand over the reign of the Government of Pakistan to the victorious Awami League, Pakistan lost East 
Pakistan on 16 December 1971 in the wake of her military defeat in the war of independence launched 
by Awami League in East Pakistan in 1970. Due to the loss of East Pakistan, Pakistan suffered huge 
economic losses in the form of foregone opportunities for 50% of West Pakistan’s goods previously 
directed to the former East Pakistan and in the form of foregone foreign exchange previously obtained 
from its prime exports RIMXWHDQGWHDíRULJLQDWLQJIURP(DVW3DNLVWDQ>/DQVIRUd (2012),  and Zaidi 
(2005)].  Yet, Pakistan doubled its foreign exchange earnings in just one fiscal year 1972-73 by means 
of devaluation of the Rupee – Pakistani currency note – by 120% during May 1972 [Zaidi (2005) and 
Zakaria (2012)].  
60 Socialism was instituted via the nationalization of private industries, banks, educational institutions 
and via implementation of socialist reforms in the land tenure system [Husain (1999), Zaidi (2005), 
and Hasan (1997)].  
61 Hasan (1997). 
62 Hasan (1997) and Zaidi (2005). 
63 Hasan (1997). 
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8.1%64.  Pakistan’s trade balance deficits were US$337 million in 1970-71 and 
US$1,184 million in 1976-7765.  A military coup d'état against the socialist regime 
occurred on 5 July 1977, and the martial law regime gradually implemented more 
liberal policies of denationalization, deregulation, and privatization in the post-5 July 
1977 scenario66. The interest payments on the public debt amounted to almost 1% of 
Pakistan’s GDP in the 1970s67.
Against the above background of very high incidence of poverty in Pakistan, it is 
pertinent to note the existence of a positive relationship between the level of poverty 
and the rising debt servicing burden of interest payments on public debt in Pakistan 
amidst a debt crisis in light of the following argument of Kemal (2001, p. 267):
“Whenever a country is in debt crisis, a large proportion of public expenditure 
and the foreign exchange earnings are absorbed by debt servicing.  Increasing
debt servicing requirements in the absence of debt relief leaves the following 
three choices to the government of the debtor countries, viz., taxation of 
capital, taxation of consumption, and reduction in public expenditures. Each 
of these has significant implication for an increase in the poverty rates.”
                                                          
64 High fiscal deficits were financed primarily by means of inflationary money creation in the 1970s.
65 Zaidi (2005) 
66 Coup d'état occurred in the background of a significant decline in the popularity of the ruling 
socialist party caused by both the high inflation and the nationalization policy when the ruling socialist 
party won the general elections of 1977 with merely a simple majority amidst the opposition’s 
accusations that the general elections were rigged. Then, the leaders of the opposition launched an 
anti-socialist regime political movement, which culminated in Pakistan’s second military coup d'état. 
The martial law regime launched an effective program of realizing very high rates of economic growth 
via a massive inflow of both the foreign remittances and the foreign aid from the Western countries led 
by the USA in the wake of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 [(Zaidi, 2005), (Lansford, 2012)].   
67 Hasan (1997). 
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Pakistan registered an agricultural sector growth rate of 2.4% per annum and a large-
scale manufacturing sector growth rate of 5.5% per annum in the 1970s68.  While the 
large and medium-scale private manufacturing units contributed 75% of the value-
added and 70-80% of the total investment in the arena of manufacturing in the 1970s, 
the remainder of the 25% of the value-added (as well as 20-25% investment, 30% 
exports, and a large number of jobs) was contributed by the small-scale 
manufacturing sector69.
1.2.1.5 The 1980s: Era of revival of economic growth
One of the hallmarks of the 1980s was the revitalization of both the investment 
climate for the private sector as well as private investment ventures as part of the 
process of reversal of the nationalization regime of the 1970s70.  Another hallmark of 
the 1980s was the revival of private sector’s industrial investment, which led to high 
rates of economic growth in the 1980s71. Poverty incidence (poverty headcount ratio 
at national poverty line expressed as a percentage of population) declined to 29.1% in 
1986-8772. Unemployment rate declined from 3.7% in 1980 to 2.6% in 199073.
During 1985-88, the Government of Pakistan tried to implement the Islamic interest-
free banking system, which was based on the concept of sharing profits as well as 
                                                          
68 Fasih-Uddin and Swati (2009). 
69 World Bank (Undated).
70 Husain (1999) and Fasih-Uddin (2008). 
71 Fasih-Uddin (2008). 
72 Fasih-Uddin and Swati (2009). 
73 World Bank (2012), World development indicators 2012. 
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losses74. The government and the State Bank of Pakistan gradually promoted Islamic 
banking as a competitor of the conventional banking, introduced a number of Islamic 
modes of financing (for example, PLS deposits ņ bank deposits-based on profit and 
loss sharing), and established Mudaraba (a cooperative business partnership between 
entrepreneur and the owner/provider of capital based on the principle of sharing 
profits as well as losses) and leasing companies. Against the background of the 
persisting constitutional barriers in the way of the anticipated establishment of a 
fully-fledged Islamic banking as a viable Islamic alternative to the conventional 
banking in Pakistan, Islamic banking registered slow and steady progress and 
succeeded to ensure the establishment of private Islamic banks, their survival as well 
as resilience, and their branching out in several cities of Pakistan.   Consequently, 
Islamic banking has succeeded in creating a prominent niche for itself in a highly 
competitive market for banking services in Pakistan.  This reality is depicted in the 
following appraisal of the experiment of Islamic banking in Pakistan (Fasih-Uddin 
and Swati, 2009, p. 95):         
“Despite the availability of a number of instruments consistent with Shari’ah 
like leasing, hire-purchase, profit and loss sharing instruments etc., lending 
continued to be dominated by mark up and interest.  In compliance with the 
verdict of the Supreme Court Shari’ah Appellate Bench of 1999, a number of 
steps have been taken.  The State Bank has adopted a Shari’ah compliance 
framework, set up a separate regulatory infrastructure along with an Islamic 
Banking Department to focus on all Islamic banking issues. (The State Bank 
is promoting Islamic banking as a parallel system as opposed to the 
recommendations of the Council of Islamic Ideology for having only one 
system of Islamic banking.)   The Banking Companies Ordinance 1962 has 
also been amended and the State Bank has issued detailed guidelines for 
establishing Islamic commercial banks.  Two Islamic banks and 62 Islamic 
banking branches have started operations.  The total assets of Islamic banks 
                                                          
74 Nafziger (2012). 
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have increased from Rs. 12.9 billion in June 2003 to Rs. 200.4 billion in 
March 2008.  They contributed about 4% in bank assets and deposits in 
March 2008.”       
Pakistan achieved a national savings/GDP ratio of 16% in 1986-87 amidst massive 
inflows of worker remittances from the Middle East75.  However, Pakistan continued 
to experience the problems of negative public savings and declining public 
investment/GDP ratio throughout the 1980s and used a large portion of the additional 
national savings to finance the enlarged fiscal deficits in the same period76.  Fiscal 
deficits were the result of both the steep growth in the public sector’s non-
development expenditures – especially interest payments – since the 1980s, and the 
tendency of the tax revenue/GDP ratio to decline against the background of the 
failure of the federal government to mobilize the requisite tax revenues for financing 
defence and other non-development expenditures (for example, subsidies and 
expenditures on civil administration)77. For example, the Government of Pakistan’s 
tax revenue was 272.0 billion Rupees, total revenue was 344.8 billion Rupees, 
current expenditure was 376.3 billion Rupees, development expenditure was 128.3 
billion Rupees, and fiscal deficit was 150.3 billion Rupees during 1985-9078.
Pakistan financed her increasingly enlarged budget deficits in the early 1980s mainly 
via non-bank domestic borrowing (for example, national savings schemes), which 
postponed inflationary outcomes79. Pakistan’s domestic debt grew from Rs.58 
                                                          
75 Hasan (1997), Husain (1999) and Zaidi (2005). 
76 Hasan (1997). 
77 Fasih-Uddin and Swati (2009). 
78 Debt Reduction and Management Committee of the Government of Pakistan (2001). 
79 Hasan (1997). 
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billion in mid-1981 to Rs.521 billion in 198880.  Consequently, the public debt/GDP 
ratio was 77.1% in 1988, 81.9% in 1989, and 82.6% in 199081. This explosion of the 
domestic debt resulted in large interest payments, public expenditure, and fiscal 
deficits82.  Democracy was restored in 198583.  In the period 1980-1990, Pakistan’s 
average annual growth rate of GDP was 6.3%84. A manufacturing exports’ boom 
occurred in the 1980s, with an annual large scale manufacturing sector growth rate of 
8.8% per annum and an annual growth rate of 5.4% in the agricultural sector85.
1.2.1.6 The 1990s: Era of debt crisis
In the 1990s, Pakistan confronted the problems of declining worker remittances and 
rising external deficits86. In the wake of declining growth rates of GDP, Pakistan 
experienced her history’s second worst inflation period in the 1990s87.
Unemployment rate initially sharply increased to 5.9% in 1991 and then sharply rose 
                                                          
80 Hasan (1997). 
81 Fasihuddin (2008). 
82 Hasan (1997). 
83 After both the dismissal of this democratic government by the President of Pakistan in 1988 and 
general elections of 1988, the newly formed government was dismissed in 1990. General elections of 
1990 resulted in a new government.  This scenario depicts higher political uncertainties, fast changing 
economic policies, and higher economic risks for investors (Lansford, 2012). 
84 Pakistan’s average GDP growth rates remained higher than the average GDP growth rates of India, 
Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka for the periods 1960-1970, 1970-1980, and 1980-1990 [(Hasan,1997) and 
(Lansford, 2012)].
85 Hasan,(1997), Fasih-Uddin and Swati (2009).  
86 Hasan (1997). 
87 Prices grew at a rate of 12% per annum from mid-1993 against a backdrop of explosive growth in 
money creation for supplying credit to the public sector, especially during the period 1990-96 (Hasan,
1997).
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to 7.2% in 200088. Pakistan also financed the enlarged current account deficits via 
the sustained increases in her residents’ Foreign Currency Deposits (FCDs)89.  FCDs 
were based on the provision for anonymity of the source of the deposited sums and 
were capped at a percentage that varied with the maturities of FCDs, above the 
London Inter Bank Offer Rate.  Another attractive feature of FCDs was that the 
Government of Pakistan exempted both these deposits and the income stream 
generated by these deposits from the payments of wealth tax, income tax, and Zakat 
ņDQ,VODPLFILQDQFLDOREOLJDWLRQ90. Adult literacy was 39.6% in 1994-95.
In 1995, Pakistan’s external debt amounted to US$30 billion – her external debt 
tripled during the period 1980-199591.  Accordingly, the external debt/GDP ratio 
increased from 42% in 1980 to 50% in 1995, and the external debt/exports ratio 
increased from 209% in 1980 to 258% in 1995.  The period 1980-1995 was 
characterized by a sharp increase in the debt service ratio from 18% to 27%92. Along 
with the emergence of Pakistan’s seriously deteriorating profile of external liabilities
as the prime cause of her foreign exchange difficulties after the first half of 1996, her 
                                                          
88 World Bank (2012), World development indicators 2012. 
89 Hasan (1997). 
90 Khan (1996). 
91 Amidst this external debt fiasco, Pakistan met almost one-third of her foreign exchange gap via the 
use of volatile short-term liabilities in the form of the resident and non-resident foreign currency 
accounts (Hasan, 1997).  
92 That is, principal and interest payments/foreign exchange earnings ratio (Hasan, 1997). 
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domestic debt dramatically rose to a level of Rs.909 billion, and the domestic 
debt/GDP ratio rose to 42%93.
The burden of interest payments on the public debt also rose to almost 6 per cent of 
GNP in the mid-1990s, in addition to the constant burden of interest payments on 
external debt, amounting to 1.2% of GNP in the mid-1990s94.  Pakistan encountered 
a serious debt problem in the late 1990s, when the public debt/GDP ratio rose from 
57.5% in 1975-77 to 102% in 1998-9995.  Similarly, the public debt/revenues ratio 
rose to 624% in 1998-99, interest payments/revenues ratio rose to 42.6%, and, 
therefore, the burden of the public debt became unsustainable96. Thus, the likelihood 
of Pakistan’s external debt default initially emerged in 1996, and later in 1998, due to 
economic sanctions imposed by the Western countries in reaction to Pakistan’s 
multiple nuclear tests on 28 May 199897.  These all-encompassing American and 
European economic sanctions triggered massive capital flight from Pakistan98. This 
debt crisis occurred despite an agricultural sector growth rate of 4.4% per annum and 
a large-scale manufacturing sector growth rate of 4.8% per annum in the 1990s99.
                                                          
93 Hasan (1997). 
94 Hasan (1997). 
95 Debt overhang caused a decrease in the rate of investment to 15% of GDP in 1998-99/1999-2000.  
In the wake of this debt crisis, the third coup d’état empowered the third military regime on 12 
October 1999 for the period 1999-2008.  In spite of realization of some debt relief by Pakistan via her 
agreement with IMF regarding the rescheduling of her debt payments obligations, the possibility of 
her external debt default was not ruled out [(Hasan, 1999) and  (Lansford,  2012)].
96 Hasan (1999). 
97 Lansford (2012), Fasih-Uddin (2008) and Hasan (1999). 
98 Irfanul Haque (2010).
99 Fasih-Uddin and Swati (2009). 
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Poverty incidence (poverty headcount ratio) sharply increased to 30.6% in 1998-
99100.
1.2.1.7 The 2000s: Era of economic crisis
In 2001, the official Debt Reduction and Management Committee judged the 
increasingly high public debt as a major cause of the slowdown of the growth rate to 
less than 4 per cent per annum101.  Pakistan’s debt crisis of the 1990s was followed in 
the 2000s by an era of numerous macroeconomic crises102 í LQ VSLWH RI JUDGXDO
improvement in the growth rate until 2004-05 when the growth rate was 8.6%, the 
subsequent years were characterized by economic growth slowdown and low growth 
along with high inflation, energy crisis, and deterioration in both the fiscal position 
and the balance of payments position of Pakistan103. Again, poverty incidence 
(poverty headcount ratio) initially sharply increased to 34.5% in 2000-01 and then 
sharply decreased to 22.3% in 2005-06104.  Unemployment rate initially increased to 
                                                          
100 Fasih-Uddin and Swati (2009). 
101 Pakistan’s debt entrapped her in a vicious circle of high debt servicing, which caused stagnation in 
investment and growth as well as limited her capacity of debt servicing (Debt Reduction and 
Management Committee, 2001). 
102 Namely, a dire deterioration in the balance-of payments position in 2001, a reduced average annual 
economic growth rate of 2%, a negative trade balance alongside the signing of IMF’s standby 
agreement with an exceptionally tough conditionality amidst the looming prospect of default on 
external debt during 1998-2001, the failure of public and private sectors to effectively use the inflows 
of US$62.2 billion realized during the period 2002-2007 as a result of the increased strategic 
significance of Pakistan in the post-9/11 scenario for establishing a robust basis for sustainable 
growth, the sharp deterioration in Pakistan’s international investment position after the fiscal year 
2005, a rise in the fiscal deficit/GDP ratio to 4.3% in the fiscal year 2000, the increasing conspicuous 
consumption, and a steep hike in the import bill in the fiscal year 2008, which caused unsustainable 
trade deficits [(Irfan-ul-Haque, 2010) and (Zakaria, 2012)].   
103 Fasih-Uddin and Swati (2009).  
104 Fasih-Uddin and Swati (2009). 
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7.8% in 2002 and then sharply declined to 5% in 2008105. Adult literacy was 55% in 
2007-08. Pakistan experienced a fully-fledged economic crisis in 2008106 as well as 
the prime effect of global financial crisis in 2009-10107.  In 2009-2010, the inflation-
adjusted economic growth rate of Pakistan was a respectable 4.1%, the agricultural 
sector growth rate was 2%, industrial output growth rate was 4.9%, large-scale 
manufacturing sector growth rate was 4.4%, and the services sector growth rate was 
4.6%108.  In March 2010, the total public debt of Pakistan amounted to Rs.8,160 
billion with a total public debt/GDP ratio of 56%, while the foreign-currency
denominated debt/GDP ratio was 25%109.
1.2.2 An overall snapshot of the Pakistan economy
The above macroeconomic history confirms that Pakistan has had fluctuating growth 
rates of real GDP, agriculture, industry, and services, as shown in Figures 1.1, 1.2, 
1.3 and 1.4, which measure, respectively, the growth rates of real GDP, agriculture, 
industry and services on the vertical axis and indicate years on the horizontal axis110:
                                                          
105 World Bank (2012), World development indicators 2012. 
106 2008 was the year of transition from the military regime into a democratically elected Government 
of Pakistan. 
107 Irfan-ul-Haque (2010). 
108 Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan (2010). 
109 Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan (2010). 
110 Hasan (1997) and Naqvi (2007). 
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Figure 1.1
Data Source: State Bank of Pakistan 2010, Handbook of statistics on Pakistan economy 2010.
Figure 1.2
            Data Source: State Bank of Pakistan 2010, Handbook of statistics on Pakistan economy 2010.
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Figure 1.3
          Data Source: State Bank of Pakistan 2010, Handbook of statistics on Pakistan economy 2010.
Figure 1.4
Data Source: State Bank of Pakistan 2010, Handbook of statistics on Pakistan economy 2010.
The troughs and peaks in the above graphs of the four growth rates signify the 
weaknesses and strengths of the economy of Pakistan at different points in time.   As 
can be seen in Figure 1.1, the first as well as the worst trough of the entire real GDP 
growth history of Pakistan occurred during 1951-52. It was due to the Korean War-
driven set back of falling world prices of Pakistan’s major exports of cotton as well 
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as jute, and declining export revenues and profits, which had substantial adverse 
effects not only on the industrialization process but also on the growth rates of real 
GDP, agriculture, industry, and the services.  These sector-level adverse growth 
effects are observed at various times during the first half of the 1950s, as seen in 
Figures 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4, respectively.    
Here it is pertinent to note that 1951’s 3% growth rate of real GDP deteriorated to -
1.9 % in 1952 due to the fall in world market prices of cotton and jute, and the 
resultant deterioration of the balance of payments caused by the Korean War.  The 
Korean War boom that enabled Pakistan to realize her history’s exceptionally highest 
10.2% growth rate of real GDP in 1954, as shown in Figure 1.1, was due to the over-
valued exchange rate, and pro-imports-substituting industrialization policies of 
simultaneously promoting agricultural goods’ production, to be used as industrial 
inputs, as well as keeping the prices of agricultural inputs of industrial production at 
quite low levels. These policies boosted profits of industrialists and accelerated 
industrialization as a result of the massive domestic investment of massive profits 
earned by Pakistani traders from their cotton and jute exports during the Korean War.  
This exceptional economic growth was achieved by the contributions of agriculture, 
industry, and services, which achieved real growth rates of 15.2%, 12.10%, and 
3.6%, respectively, in 1954 as shown in Figures 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4.  
Later, Pakistan realized reasonably high annual real GDP growth rates varying from 
5.5% to 9.8% in 28 fiscal years during the period 1955-2010, as shown in Figure 1.1.  
This was primarily due to inflows of the massive external aid/debt during almost 
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decade-long stable undemocratic martial law regimes111.  In contrast, shorter and less 
external aid/debt-recipient democratic regimes generally achieved lower real GDP 
growth rates than those achieved by martial law regimes.  With few exceptions, 
annual real GDP growth rates varied from 5.5% to 10.2% in 29 fiscal years during 
the period 1951-2010, as shown in Figure 1.1.   Average annual real GDP growth rate 
was 3% for the 1950s, 6.7% for the 1960s, 4.8% for the 1970s, 6.1% for the 1980s, 
4.4% for the 1990s and 5.6% for the period 1999-2007112.  The overall average 
annual real GDP growth rate was 5.12% for the period 1951-2010113. While the 
general long-term trend for the growth rate of real GDP is upward, as seen in Figure 
1.1, this long-term upward trend is dominated by wider fluctuations around it. This 
upward trend is more pronounced during the period 1951-1970 than during the later 
period. 
In general, fluctuations in the growth rates of real GDP have also been caused by a 
combination of factors such as discoveries of more efficient production techniques 
and inputs of production, such as the use of high yield varieties of rice seeds.  Also 
important were revolutionary systemic changes of policy regimes under the influence 
of competing global ideologies, fluctuations in foreign aid inflows, the fast-growing 
external debt as well as the external debt servicing burden, and political stability of 
long martial law regimes as well as political instability associated with the frequent 
                                                          
111 State Bank of Pakistan (2010) and Zaidi (2005). 
112 Fasih-Uddin and Swati (2009). 
113 State Bank of Pakistan (2010) 
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dismissal of democratic governments.  The scarcity of water, recurrent electricity 
crises, cotton crop failures, and floods were also contributing factors114.
However, the highly vulnerable foreign capital-dependent Pakistan economy has 
been practically addicted to foreign capital (foreign aid, external debt, overseas 
Pakistanis’ remittances, and Pakistani residents’ foreign currency deposits)115.
Therefore, the upward and downward fluctuations in inflows of foreign aid consisting 
of external debt as well as grants, fast growth in external debt service burden, and 
variations in overseas Pakistanis’ remittances have been the prime causes of 
fluctuations in the growth rate of real GDP of Pakistan116.  This point of view is 
backed up with the empirical facts of the severely hit economic growth performance 
of Pakistan due to disrupted foreign aid during both the second half of the 1960s and 
the 1990s.  Simultaneously, the economic growth performance of Pakistan was 
severely hit due to the decline in the inflows of overseas Pakistanis’ remittances from 
the then stagnating oil exporting countries of the Middle East amidst the Gulf War of 
the 1990s117. In addition, the excessive external debt service burden of at least 
US$5.2 billion amidst the imposition of crippling Western economic sanctions, as 
well as the precautionary policy regime of freezing the Pakistani residents’ foreign 
currency accounts in the aftermath of Pakistan’s May 1998 nuclear tests, also played 
their part.
                                                          
114 Zaidi (2005) and Hussain (2003) 
115 Husain (1999). 
116 Zaidi (2005).  
117 Husain (1999). 
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With the exception of Pakistan’s highest real growth rate of agriculture (15.2%) in 
1954, the real growth rate of agriculture remained either negative (for example, -
9.1% in 1952) or low until 1960, due to the general official neglect of the imperative 
of developing the agricultural sector.  Later, the agriculture sector received greater 
attention and the reasonably high annual real growth rates of agriculture varied from 
5.0% to 11.7% in 18 fiscal years during the period 1955-2010118.  This increase was 
due to significant improvements in irrigation facilities, land reforms, better planning, 
promotion of high yield varieties of wheat and rice seeds, and the provision of loans 
and subsidies to the agricultural sector since the advent of the first martial law regime 
in Pakistan119.  In the post-1970 era, the occasional low or negative real growth rates 
of agriculture have been occurring partly due to intermittent disastrous floods, water-
logging and salinity of agricultural land, acute shortages of water and electricity, 
insufficient dams and deteriorating irrigational infrastructure.  Average annual real 
growth rate of agriculture was 1.6% for the 1950s, 5.1% for the 1960s, 2.4% for the 
1970s, 5.4% for the 1980s, 4.4% for the 1990s and 2.8% for the period 1999-2007120.
The overall average annual real growth rate of agriculture was 3.43% for the period 
1951-2010121. While the general long-term trend for the annual real agriculture 
growth rate is upward, as seen in Figure 1.2, this long-term upward trend is less 
pronounced and is dominated by fluctuations around it.
                                                          
118 State Bank of Pakistan (2010). 
119 Zaidi (2005) and State Bank of Pakistan (2010), 
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It is evident that industrialization has received the highest priority and patronage 
from the Government of Pakistan.  Therefore, the government launched fast-track 
industrialization programs of imports-substituting industrialization and export 
promotion122.  These programs were financed through the inflows of massive external
aid/debt especially during the almost decade-long martial law regimes123.  Under 
these programs, the Government of Pakistan has been providing industrialists with 
tax concessions (facilities of tax-free industrial zones), subsidies and export bonus 
schemes124.  The Government has also been protecting the Pakistani industries from 
foreign competition by means of tariffs and ensuring the availability of cheap 
agricultural inputs for industrial production.  In this context, the Government has 
been officially setting the prices of agricultural goods at artificially low levels125.
Consequently, Pakistan often achieved reasonably high annual real growth rates126
for industry varying from 5.1% to 18% in 35 fiscal years during the period 1955-
2010, as shown in Figure 1.3.  In contrast, all three negative real growth rates of 
industry in Pakistan were experienced only during the democratic regimes (-1.5% in 
1972 when Pakistan People’s Party ruled Pakistan after the territorial-cum-economic 
loss of East Pakistan in 1971, -0.30% in 1997 when Pakistan Muslim League ruled 
Pakistan, and -1.9% in 2009 when Pakistan People’s Party ruled Pakistan)127 While 
                                                          
122 Husain (1999), Hussain (2003), and Zaidi (2005).
123 Hussain (2003) and Husain (1999).
124 Zaidi (2005).
125 Husain (1999) and  Zaidi (2005).
126 State Bank of Pakistan (2010).  
127 State Bank of Pakistan (2010).
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the above negative growth rate of industry in 1972 was partly due to both the 
territorial-cum-economic loss of East Pakistan in 1971 and the recessionary effect of 
the 1972 devaluation-triggered increase in the cost of imported raw materials and 
industrial equipment, the negative growth rate of industry in 1997 was partly due to 
the seriously deteriorated national profile of external debt liabilities in 1996128. In 
this context, it is pertinent to note the following argument of Hasan (1997, pp. 358-
9):
“The slowdown of growth during 1970-75 was due in part to the separation of 
East Pakistan, oil price shocks, poor weather conditions, and technological 
problems which delayed the availability of Tarbela Dam waters.”
One plausible explanation of Pakistan’s aforementioned negative growth rate of 
industry partly caused by the loss of East Pakistan is the fact that the foregone foreign 
exchange earnings associated with the jute exports of East Pakistan, which were 
previously controversially transferred to the industrialists of West Pakistan, were no 
more available for investment in the remaining Pakistan after the establishment of 
Bangladesh in 1971.  This explanation is based on the following argument of Khan 
(2002, p. 19):
“Industrialization was encouraged in West Pakistan while East Pakistan 
remained an exporter of jute.  The transfer of foreign exchange, earned 
mainly by the jute exports from East Pakistan, to the industrialists in West 
Pakistan became an important source of the interregional conflict.”
Moreover, the negative annual real growth rate of industry in 2009 was partly due to 
both Pakistan’s own economic crisis and the prime effect of the global financial crisis
experienced in Pakistan in 2009.  Average annual real growth rate of industry 
                                                          
128 Fasih-Uddin and Swati (2009). 
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(defined as manufacturing sector) was 7.7% for the 1950s, 9.9% for the 1960s, 5.5% 
for the 1970s, 8.2% for the 1980s, 4.8% for the 1990s and 9% for the period 1999-
2007129.  The overall average annual real growth rate of industry was 7.16% for the 
period 1951-2010130. While the general long-term trend for the annual real industry 
growth rate is downward, as seen in Figure 1.3, this long-term downward trend is 
dominated by fluctuations around it.  This downward trend is more pronounced 
during the period 1980-2010 than during the earlier period.
According to Pakistan Statistical Year Book 2011, the services sector output share of 
transport, storage, and communication was 24.5%, the services sector output share of 
wholesale and retail trade was 32.9%, the services sector output share of finance and 
insurance was 8.14%, the services sector output share of ownership of dwellings was 
4.6%, the services sector output share of public administration and defence was 
10.1%, and the services sector output share of social, community and other services 
was 19.8% in the fiscal year 2009-10. As a by-product of the above industrial 
growth, Pakistan also achieved reasonably high annual real services’ growth rates,
varying from 5.0% to 14.4% in 33 fiscal years during the 45-year period 1955-2010,
due to the same factors above which caused high industrial growth in Pakistan, as 
shown in Figure 1.4131.  In contrast, Figure 1.4 implies that the number of the low 
real growth rates of services Pakistan achieved during less external aid/debt-recipient 
democratic regimes, was generally larger than the number of low real growth rates of 
                                                          
129 Fasih-Uddin and Swati (2009). 
130 State Bank of Pakistan (2010) 
131 State Bank of Pakistan (2010).  
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services Pakistan achieved during the excessive external aid/debt-recipient martial 
law regimes, because of the martial law governments’ decade-long effective policies 
of accelerating the growth of both the industries and services, as shown in Figure 1.4.   
Average annual real growth rate of services’ output was 3.61% for the 1950s132.
Similarly, the average annual real growth rate of services’ output was 6.7% for the 
1960s, 6.3% for the 1970s, 6.7% % for the 1980s, 4.6% for the 1990s and 6.2% for 
the period 1999-2007133.  The overall average annual real growth rate of services’ 
output was 5.49% for the period 1951-2010134. While the general long-term trend for 
the annual real services growth rate is upward, as seen in Figure 1.4, this long-term 
upward trend is dominated by fluctuations around it.  This downward trend is more 
pronounced during the period 1951-85 than during the later period.
Associated with the aforementioned adverse aggregate and sector-level growth 
effects, the set-back due to the Korean War is the only significant trough in the graph 
of real GDP observed during the first half of the 1950s, as shown in Figure 1.5 which 
measures respectively the real GDP in millions of Rupees on the vertical axis, and 
shows years on the horizontal axis.
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133 Fasih-Uddin and Swati (2009). 
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Figure 1.5
Data Source: State Bank of Pakistan 2010, Handbook of statistics on Pakistan economy 2010.
The real GDP series exhibits a very smooth upward general long-term trend, as seen 
in Figure 1.5, displaying a number of cyclical fluctuations around it.  This upward 
trend has steepened significantly in the 2000s. In spite of certain visible minor 
cyclical oscillations in the graph of real GDP in Figure 1.5 corresponding to cyclical 
oscillations in the graph of real GDP growth rate in Figure 1.1 (for example, 
stagnation of real GDP and the corresponding decline in real GDP growth rate in the 
early 1950s), the general long-term upward trend for real GDP in Figure 1.5 complies 
with the general upward long-term trend for the growth rate of real GDP in Figure 
1.1.
Pakistan experienced slow growth in real GDP generally, coupled with a fast-
growing population.  The population increased from 30 million in 1947 to 124.45 
million in 1994, and to 166.52 million in 2010.  Against this background, Pakistan’s 
real per capita income, measured at constant factor cost, increased from 351 Rupees 
0
1,000,000
2,000,000
3,000,000
4,000,000
5,000,000
6,000,000
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05
Real GDP (Million Rupees)
45 
 
in 1950 to 35,219 Rupees in 2010, as shown in Figure 1.6, which measures real per 
capita income in Rupees on the vertical axis and shows years on the horizontal axis.  
Figure 1.6
Data Source: State Bank of Pakistan 2010, Handbook of statistics on Pakistan economy 2010.
The general long-term trend for Pakistan’s real per capita income is upward, as seen 
in Figure 1.6. Pakistan has experienced a transition from its previous status of a low-
income developing country to its current status of a lower middle-income developing 
country.  
Amidst the above growth dynamics, the Pakistan economy has, since its early years, 
been experiencing gradual structural transformation in the form of changes in its 
sectoral compositions, as shown in Figure 1.7, which measures GDP shares of 
agriculture, industry and services on the vertical axis, and shows years on the 
horizontal axis.
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Figure 1.7
Changing Sectoral Shares of GDP (%)
Data Source: State Bank of Pakistan 2010, Handbook of statistics on Pakistan economy 2010.
This structural transition included a sharp decline in GDP share of agriculture from 
53% of GDP in 1947 to 21.2% of GDP in 2010, a sharp increase in the GDP share of 
industry from at least 9.6% of the GDP in 1949-50 to 25.4% of GDP in 2010, and a 
dramatic increase in the GDP share of the services from less than 37.2% of GDP in 
1950 to 53.4 % of GDP in 2010135. The general long-term trend for GDP shares of 
agriculture is downward, as seen in Figure 1.7, and is characterized by cyclical 
fluctuations.  In contrast, the general long-term trends for GDP shares of industry and 
services are upward, as seen in Figure 1.7, and are characterized by cyclical 
fluctuations.
1.3 Conclusions
Pakistan experienced a 1998 external debt crisis – a culmination of the process of 
Pakistan’s fast accumulation of external debt since the 1980s and the aftermath of 
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economic and financial crises.  A brief history of the Pakistan economy portrayed the 
nature, causes, and economic effects of the 1998 external debt crisis for Pakistan.  
Amidst her persistent budget as well as balance of payments deficits, Pakistan has 
been experiencing the problems of an external debt crisis, which culminated in a 
fully-fledged economic crisis characterized by low rates of economic growth and 
debt overhang.  
The economic history of Pakistan also highlighted the key role played by the 
manufacturing sector, which has been effectively backed up with support of the 
agriculture and services’ sectors, in actually bringing about a remarkable structural 
change in the economy136. While confronting the challenging problems of poverty, 
unemployment, inflation, energy crisis and debt crisis during her past sixty-five years 
of existence, Pakistan progressed from its status as a low-income to a lower middle-
income developing country137. Growth enabled Pakistan to achieve her policy 
objective of poverty reduction138. This brief history confirms that the Pakistan 
economy is capable of realizing high rates of the growth of real GDP under a regime 
of responsible policies and in the absence of debt crises.  However, to achieve high 
rates of sustainable economic growth, it is important for Pakistan to not only 
significantly increase the national saving rate and the national investment rate but 
DOVR WR WU\ DQG DFKLHYH EXGJHW VXUSOXVHV í YLD WKH HIfective implementation of 
economic austerity measures for minimizing her domestic and external debt 
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137 World Bank (2011).
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burden139.  For sustainable growth, Pakistan also needs to have political stability to 
promote a healthy investment climate for domestic and foreign investors and high 
levels of investment in human capital.  The economy needs to be more open to 
international trade and private foreign investment140, which in turn will drive growth.
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140 Papanek (1996). 
49 
 
Chapter 2
Literature review of external debt crises 
2.1 Introduction
Debt crises have been an issue for numerous countries since the 1820s.  Currently, 
several countries of the first world, the Euro zone, and the third world, including 
Pakistan, are experiencing a debt crisis in general, and external debt crisis in 
particular.  
This chapter presents a literature review of these crises with particular reference to 
Pakistan. This literature review will cover the causes, macroeconomic effects and 
remedies of the past debt crises, both for Pakistan in particular, and for the other 
indebted countries in general.  For Pakistan, this literature review will concentrate on 
the external debt crises of the 1990s because the external debt crisis has been the 
focus of attention of Pakistan’s policy makers and economists since the 1990s, when 
Pakistan’s external debt grew at unprecedented massive rate due to which the burden 
of debt servicing and its adverse macroeconomic effect in the form of external debt 
overhang became unaffordable and the most worrisome problems for the 
Government of Pakistan1.  Against this background, a substantial sum of Pakistan’s 
external debt was rescheduled2.   It was also due to the above external debt crisis that 
                                                          
1 Ishfaq and  Chaudhary (1999) and Siddiqui and Siddiqui (2001). 
2 Siddiqui and Siddiqui (2001). 
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the establishment of Pakistan appointed a former Vice President of the World Bank 
Moeenuddin Ahmad Qureshi as the Interim Prime Minister of Pakistan for the period 
18 July–19 October 1993, a former Vice President of the World Bank Shahid Javed 
Burki as the interim Finance Minister of Pakistan (de facto) for the period 11 
November–17 February 1997, and an Executive Vice President of Citibank Shaukat 
Aziz initially as Pakistan’s finance minister for the period 6 November 1999–20
August 2004 and finally as the Prime Minister of Pakistan for the period 20 August 
2004–5 November 2007 especially for alleviating Pakistan’s ongoing external debt 
crisis.
In the literature on debt crises, there are two points of view about the prospective 
effects of public debt (defined as the sum of all past budget deficits and the external 
debt). The first point of view portrays public debt as a potential source of economic 
growth in cases where the marginal return on investment of loans is greater than the 
marginal cost of loans3. This point of view has some empirical support in the 
literature (for instance, Khan and Rahim (1993), Khan (1996), Siddiqui and Malik 
(2001), Wijeweera, Dollery and Pathberiya (2005), Fasih-Uddin and Sawati (2009),
Benmelech and Dvir (2011), Abdul-Wahab and Ahmed (2011), and Nafziger (2012)).
This point of view is pertinent to the present study as well.  The second point of view 
asserts that moderate levels of public debt, used for investment instead of 
consumption, augment economic growth and that high public debt slows economic 
growth when the funds are used for current consumption/corruption/unproductive or 
                                                          
3 Rosen (2002). 
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wasteful activities and not for investment purposes4. This view also has some 
empirical support in the literature (for example, IMF (1987), Berge and Sachs (1988), 
Eichengreen and Ports (1990), Klein (1991), Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1991), 
Nunnenkamp (1991), Cunningham (1993), Iqbal (1994), Burki (1996), Hasan (1999), 
Debt Reduction and Management Committee of the Government of Pakistan (2001), 
Kemal (2001), Siddiqui and Siddiqui (2001), Chaudhary and Anwar (2001), Romer 
(2001), Mundell (2001), Zaman (2001), Sherani (2002), Dijkstra and Hermes (2003), 
Zaidi (2005), Afzal, Hafeez-ur-Rehman and Jamshaid-ur-Rehman (2009), Todaro 
and Smith (2009), Ahmad (2011), Abdul-Wahab and Ahmed (2011), Ahmed and 
Shakoor (2011), and Rais and Anwar (2012)).
Following the line of reasoning of the second view, which is premised in Lerner’s 
view ņ which was the dominant view in the 1940s and the 1950s ņ, according to 
which the internal debt is not a burden for the future generations as a whole and the 
external debt used for current consumption is a burden for the future generations5, the 
literature on Pakistan’s debt crisis implies that external debt in general and the 
external debt servicing in particular have become an obstacle to the growth of the 
economy, because fluctuations in external debt have been causing fluctuations in the 
growth rate6.
                                                          
4Todaro and Smith (2009, pp. 676-679) and Sherani (2002, pp. xi, 4). 
5 Rosen (2000). 
6 Despite the positive correlation between capital inflows and growth rates and a period of political 
stability in the 1960s, a drop in external debt in the form of foreign aid was followed by a drop in the 
growth rate of Pakistan in the second half of the 1960s.  The external debt crisis hindered economic 
growth via its impacts on both cuts in development expenditure and excessive indirect taxation (for 
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2.2 Literature review
Keynes pioneered the idea that a government needed to deliberately implement a 
policy of financing its planned deficits7.  Some literature has duly acknowledged the 
real world phenomenon of the growth-augmenting role of the external debt – via its 
impact in the form of equal reductions in both the savings gap and the foreign 
exchange gap8.  In this context, the literature noted the assertion of the neoclassical 
growth model that the perfect mobility of capital boosts economic growth9.
Similarly, Rosen (2002) also recognized the public sector’s fiscal deficits, domestic 
debt, and external debt as a potential source of economic growth in the case of 
marginal returns on investment of loans being greater than the marginal cost of loans.  
This point of view is further reinforced by Gill and Pinto’s (2005) theoretical 
perception that sovereign debt helps a government achieve growth, via investment in 
both the requisite critical mass of infrastructure and the social sector, in a scenario of 
limited tax revenue.  Despite these arguments in favour of debt and external debt, 
numerous recent empirical analyses of the widespread debt crises in general and 
external debt crises of several countries in particular have increasingly led policy-
                                                                                                                                                                     
example, a 15% general sales tax), which caused inflation and, thereby, reduced the effective 
aggregate demand.
7 Pearce (1986, p. 99). 
8 For example, Nafziger (2012) and Chenery and Strout (1966). 
9 Siddiqui and Malik (2001).
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makers to be sceptical about the validity of the growth-augmenting role of debt in 
general, and external debt in particular10.
In light of the existing controversy regarding the prospective role of budget deficits in 
causing economic growth as well as a debt crisis, there have been a number of 
conflicting points of views on budget deficits in the literature.  The Keynesians argue 
that planned budget deficits are good, the neo-classicals argue that budget deficits are 
bad, and the Ricardians argue that the budget deficits are irrelevant11.   Adding to this 
debate is the point of view of new political economy, according to which inefficiently 
high levels of budget deficits are explained by the inherent deficit bias of fiscal 
policy12.
In this scenario, the World Bank and the IMF have regarded the fiscal deficit as the 
mother of all ills, especially in the majority of developing countries.  In this milieu, it 
is not surprising that not only the governments of developing countries like Pakistan,
but also the contemporary governments of the developed countries (for instance,
Australia, the United Kingdom and the USA) are resorting to policies of dramatically 
reducing their public spending to reduce their planned budgetary deficits, as well as 
sovereign external debt and are trying to eventually achieve budgetary surpluses for
alleviating the severity of their national sovereign debt.
                                                          
10 For instance, Dijkstra and Hermes (2003), Gill and Pinto (2005), Nafziger (2012), and Todaro and 
Smith (2009).
11 For instance, Romer (2001), Rosen (2002), and Bilquees (2003).
12 Romer (2001) 
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While the existing literature on the debt crises is quite extensive, a selective review of 
literature on the worldwide debt crises of several countries constitutes the subject 
matter of this chapter.
Some of the earliest and the more recent literature highlighted the occurrence of 
numerous debt crises in the history of several developing and developed countries 
since the 1820s13.  This literature highlights the centuries-old history of the 
widespread sovereign debt defaults of numerous nations. 
Keynes (1924) concisely summed up the centuries-old pervasive phenomena of 
sovereign external debt crises in the following words14:
“There is on the part of most foreign countries, a strong tendency to default
on the occasions of wars and revolution and whenever the expectation of 
further loans no longer exceeds in amount the interest payable on the old 
ones... Defaults, in fact, are worldwide and frequent. The Southern States of 
U.S.A, Mexico, all Central America, most of South America, China, Turkey, 
Egypt, Greece, the whole of the Balkans, Russia, Austria, Hungary, Spain, 
and Portugal have all defaulted in whole or in part at one time or another.”     
It is indeed ironic that after acknowledging widespread sovereign debt defaults in 
1924, later Keynes pioneered the aforementioned idea of planned deficit financing.  
Here it is pertinent to note that the economic history of several nations has confirmed 
the irony of the conflicting macroeconomic outcomes of the implementation of 
Keynes’s policy recommendation of deliberately financing national deficits.  On one 
hand, the validity of Keynes’s policy recommendation of deficit financing for a 
sagging economy was effectively established by the global recovery in the aftermath 
                                                          
13 For instance, Keynes (1924), Fishlow (1989), Sachs (1989), and Nafziger (2012). 
14 (Keynes (1924, p, 277).
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of the Great Depression in the 1930s.  On the other hand, the actual implementation 
of deficit financing, especially in the last three decades of the 20th century,
culminated not only in a morass of debt crises, sagging economies, and chronic 
recession in numerous countries of both the first world and the third world, but also 
contributed to the global recession in 2007 and the global financial crisis in 2008.  
The most recent, contemporary episodes of sovereign debt crises have been 
experienced by Eurozone countries (Greece, Ireland, and Portugal) due to demand 
side factors such as fiscal indiscipline and excessive deficit financing arising from 
excessive current public expenditures15. While acknowledging the lack of consensus 
on the specific causes of the contemporary debt crises of the Eurozone countries 
(Greece, Ireland, Portugal, etc.), Sawicki (2011) observed that the prime cause of the 
debt-laden Eurozone countries’ sovereign debt crises was their welfare state policy 
framework having a highly generous social safety-net program.
In the literature, applied econometric analyses [for example, Fishlow (1989) and 
Sachs (1989)] as well as general, descriptive empirical analyses provided great 
insights into the occurrence of numerous debt crises in the history of many
countries16.  In the wake of the fast growth of external debt of especially the less-
developed countries during 1970-1999, there is a lot of literature on the burning issue 
of nations’ sovereign debt crises in general, and external debt crises in particular 
since the 1970s17.
                                                          
15 Sawicki (2011). 
16 For instance, Nafziger (2012), and Todaro and Smith (2009).
17 This fact is evidenced by Nafziger (2012).
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Numerous authors explained the occurrence of debt crises in the developing countries 
as an aftermath of the international lending explosion triggered by the first-ever 
major oil price hike launched by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) ņ a supply side factor which triggered the aforementioned debt crises in the 
developing countries, and the subsequent world recession during the period 1974-
197918. In addition, some authors discovered that the debt crisis of the 1980s was 
primarily caused by the unexpected increase in interest rates and by the declining 
export volumes and export prices19. The literature also acknowledged the lack of 
access to credit, decreased export capacity, the collapse of prices of primary goods, 
over-valued national currencies, appreciation of the debt denominated in US dollars 
and substantial flight of capital, as well as large debt and low investment as amongst 
the other important causes of the debt crisis of developing countries20.
Unsustainable levels of external debt and debt servicing – a hallmark of the early 
1980s – are regarded as a cause of unsustainable economic growth.  Against the 
background of the culmination of the long-standing internal and external imbalances 
of the heavily-indebted countries in unsustainably high levels of their external debt 
and debt servicing in the early 1980s, IMF (1987) emphasized the inevitability of 
their tasks of reducing the absorption in order to meet the short-run shortage of 
foreign exchange and adjusting the non-interest current account for reducing external 
debt and debt servicing to manageable levels.  These tasks were accomplished via the 
                                                          
18 For example, IMF (1987), Cunningham (1993), Dijkstra and Hermes (2003), Nafziger (2012), and 
Todaro and Smith (2009).
19 For instance, Dijkstra and Hermes (2003), and Nafziger (2012).
20 For instance, Nafziger (2012).
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policies of financing the increasing internal and external deficits, reducing the 
government’s non-interest expenditures, and increasing the revenues of the 
government21.  The author diagnosed that the heavily-indebted countries experienced 
simultaneous increases in both their external debt and fiscal deficits, which in turn 
culminated in an inflationary surge22.   While the then national policies of improving 
the fiscal situation via increases in income and wealth taxes also culminated in capital 
flight, the author discovered the inability of the high-debt countries to sustain their 
economic growth performance because of the crowding-out of private investment, the 
sharply reduced gross capital formation, and the reduced public investment.   
While acknowledging the world interest rate hike of the early 1980s as a cause of the 
debt crises of several countries, Berge and Sachs (1988) analysed the effects of the 
size of the debt burden (debt/exports ratio) amidst the debt crises of several countries.  
The authors presented a concise review of literature on the probability models of the 
rescheduling of the external debt.  The authors contributed two fundamental 
statistical models of rescheduling of the external debt.  The first model capturing the 
beginning of a debt crisis is a cross-section probit model of debt rescheduling. The 
second model is a tobit model of debt rescheduling, which regards the secondary 
market value of the external debt of a country as a measure of her creditworthiness. 
There has been some discussion on the issue of an exclusive reliance on rescheduling
of the external debt as a policy response.  Sachs (1989) analysed the debt crisis of the 
1930s, when nearly all Latin American countries confronted the debt crisis via a 
                                                          
21 IMF (1987). 
22 IMF (1987). 
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unilateral moratorium on their debt repayments23. The author also compared the 
debt crisis of the 1930s with the debt crisis of the 1980s (this debt crisis commenced 
in 1982) wherein nearly all the indebted countries continued their debt servicing,
which precluded the possibility of an international banking crisis. Sachs asserted that 
the lack of recovery of the aforementioned countries from the debt crisis was partly 
due to strategic error of the creditor governments and international institutions in the 
form of their exclusive reliance on rescheduling of their respective debts, as well as 
on new lending for getting the debtor countries out of their debt crises.  The author
characterized the debt rescheduling as an inadequate policy response for the heavily 
burdened indebted developing countries, and confirmed that several indebted 
countries had been liquidated through capital flight, little domestic investment, and a 
power struggle among the creditor countries.  The author recommended a debt 
management program consisting of a combination of both a strategy of debt 
forgiveness of the highly overburdened debtor countries, and a debt rescheduling 
strategy for managing the sovereign debt crises of the developing countries.
Historically, both domestic and external factors have caused sovereign external debt 
crises.  Fishlow (1989) compared the experiences of Argentina and Brazil during the 
1890s and the 1980s, and found that they initially experienced booms in the 1880s (a 
result of rising domestic investment, spectacular growth in primary exports, 
migration, and extraordinary inflow of British capital that was used for construction 
                                                          
23 This unilateral moratorium on their debt repayments was resolved after the end of the Second World 
War (Sachs, 1989).
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of railways and other types of infrastructure24) and, finally, the debt crises as well as 
major economic downturns in the 1890s.  The author explained the 1890s’ debt crisis,
and noted that the failure of Brazil to obtain a foreign loan in 1897, when debt 
servicing absorbed a quarter of the total receipts of the federal government, led her to 
default.  Nevertheless, the author suggested that the debt crisis in Brazil was 
provoked by both internal factors (expansionary domestic policy) and external factors 
(foreign capital inflows). 
Cuddington (1990) presented a comprehensive review of the literature on the nature, 
extent, causes, and dynamics of the global external debt crisis of the 1980s, since its 
origin in August 1982, amidst the significantly distorted price systems, especially due 
to the then prevalent policy regimes of over-valued exchange rates and inward-
looking international trade in the debt ridden developing countries. The author 
presented detailed empirical analyses of especially the nature, extent and 
predictability of the debt servicing difficulties, as well as trends and dynamics of 
external debt against the historical background of global macroeconomic 
environment characterized by oil price shocks, wide fluctuation in real GDP growth, 
inflation as well as disinflation, capital flight, and alleged over-borrowing during the 
1970s. The author concluded that the bad policies of both the creditors and debtor 
countries were also among the numerous causes of the global external debt crisis of 
the 1980s, and emphasized the pressing imperative of launching new policy 
                                                          
24 During the period 1886-90, £63 millions were received by Argentina and £24million were received 
by Brazil (Fishlow, 1989).  
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initiatives on the part of both the official financial institutions and the global 
community. 
The literature on the excessive external debt of developing countries has also 
documented an interesting debate on the appropriateness of two alternative strategies 
of coping with debt overhang, debt write-off and debt rescheduling. Cohen (1990)
highlighted the discrepancy between the market and face values of external debt and 
the debt overhang problem (that is, the external debt servicing becomes a tax on the 
resources of the indebted country).  This situation, which is called the debt Laffer 
curve problem, involves the possible zero return on debt for creditors in both the 
scenarios of debt being zero and infinity, as well as inefficiency of debt rescheduling,
as two sources of inefficiency arising from excessive external debt. The author’s 
theoretical and empirical analyses advocate the use of a generalized buy-back scheme 
of efficient debt rescheduling, which prices the debt service at market value of the 
debt (that is, creditor counts one dollar of the debt service accomplished by the debtor 
as being equal to two dollars of the debt service in the case of the market value of 
debt being 50%) to cope with the debt overhang.   
The history of the numerous external debt crises of current and past centuries 
provides us with important insights into both the lessons and remedies of external 
debt crises. Eichengreen and Ports (1990) analysed the interwar external debt crises 
and explained the processes of lending during the 1920s, external debt defaults 
during the 1930s, readjustment of the debt during the 1940s and 1950s, and the
external debt crises during the 1980s, when desperate national debt servicing efforts 
culminated in slow economic growth for almost a decade. While highlighting the 
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practical impossibility of any world-level plan of resolving external debt crises, the 
authors found that the controversial market-based reductions in external debt (for 
example, buy-backs of bonds in the market at significantly below par prices) did help 
resolve the interwar external debt crises.
In the literature, equity financing has also been duly acknowledged as a potential 
source of economic growth.  Klein (1991) perceived the then persisting debt 
problems of developing countries as a by-product of the process of the recycling of 
the surplus oil revenues (petro-dollars) in the 1970s, when oil importing countries 
such as Brazil as well as oil exporting developing countries such as Mexico and 
Venezuela, were severely hit amidst a global recession.  According to the author, the 
aforementioned countries’ debt problems had been a hindrance to the economic 
growth for a period of more than eight years because their capital outflows in the 
form of their debt servicing were greater than their capital inflows.  The author
emphatically recommended that developing countries improve their economic growth 
by means of various forms of equity financing. 
In spite of the emergence of both foreign direct investment (FDI) as a pillar of private 
financial flows in the developing countries and the optimism about replacement of 
the lending of private banks by FDI, Nunnenkamp (1991) expected several heavily-
indebted countries to become constrained in terms of private lending and FDI 
inflows.  While highlighting that the eruption of the debt crises of 1982 had destroyed 
the risk illusions, the author speculated that foreign investors would shy away from 
the countries characterized by an increasing sovereign risk, and that the default on 
sovereign debt obligations was a matter of capital recipient countries’ willingness and 
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ability to service the external liabilities. In light of his empirical results of the 
pooled cross-country regressions for the 1980s, the author concluded that both the 
debt overhang and the sovereign risk were, indeed, relevant explanatory variables,
which were capable of explaining the FDI inflows of developing countries in the 
1980s.  
The literature also points to the adverse effects of the heavy national indebtedness on 
the national productivity of capital and labour and, thereby, on the national economic 
growth. Cunningham (1993) highlighted the well-accepted fact of the negative 
relationship between the debt burden and the economic growth of the heavily-
indebted countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Venezuela, and 
Yugoslavia). The author analysed the relationship between economic growth and 
external debt by treating the debt servicing burden (DS) as a primary factor of 
production along with other factors of production (capital stock and labour force) 
within the framework of the standard production model25. His empirical results 
confirmed the existence of the significant adverse effects of the heavy indebtedness 
                                                          
25 Cunningham (1993) recommended the inclusion of external debt servicing in the specification of the 
production function, as follows (Cunningham, 1993, pp. 117-118):
GDP = B0 + B1 DS + B2 K+ B3 /ȝ
This regression equation is used for testing the possibility of the existence of a long-run relationship 
between GDP – as a surrogate of economic growth – and its three explanatory variables – Debt 
Servicing burden (DS), Capital (K), and Labour (L).  Here, it is hypothesized that external debt 
servicing has a negative effect on economic growth (Cunningham, 1993).
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of a country on the productivity of both capital and labour and, thereby, on the 
economic growth.
There have been several empirical contributions on default functions, determinants of 
debt rescheduling, and two-gap analysis.  Meier (1995) presented a very concise 
review of the literature not only on ‘effects of aid’, ‘econometric default functions’, 
‘determinants of debt rescheduling’, and ‘two-gap analysis’ but also on the growth-
related implications and theoretical formulations of two-gap analysis.  
The deficit/debt-growth nexus has been a controversial issue in the literature because 
persistent budget deficits may reduce growth. Romer (2001) defined crisis as a 
situation involving a sharp contraction in fiscal policy, a large decrease in aggregate 
demand, major repercussions in both the capital markets and the foreign-exchange 
markets, and the possibility of a default on the part of the government in the context 
of paying back the loans incurred by it.  The author highlighted a widespread 
perception that large, persistent budget deficits not only reduce growth but also 
culminate in a crisis of some type.  He also noted that inefficiently high levels of 
budget deficits may be explained, not only by the inherent deficit bias of fiscal policy 
because of which countries pursue an unsustainable policy of always raising the 
debt/GDP ratio, but also by the fact that the costs of budget deficits, such as the cost 
of inflation, are poorly understood. 
An external debt burden may culminate into bankruptcy, collapse of growth, and 
exacerbation of poverty.  Mundell (2001) analysed the nature of relationships among 
debt, growth, poverty, and the international monetary system and demonstrated, that 
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the debt crises of the 1980s and the 1990s confirmed the practical possibilities of 
adverse effects of foreign borrowing, such as bankruptcy, collapse of growth, and 
exacerbation of poverty26.
The literature also highlights the current issue of the volatility of the debt service 
payments of the heavily-indebted countries.  Dijkstra and Hermes (2003) observed 
that indebted countries failed to service their debts during the decades of the 1880s, 
the 1930s, the 1980s, and the 1990s.  The authors defined sustainable debt as a debt 
which a country can service without adversely impacting the possibilities of long-run 
economic growth.  The authors identified the possibility of defining the sustainable 
debt27 as a debt which a country can service without adversely affecting “human 
development” or “international human rights”.  They traced the origin of the 
increasing indebtedness of developing countries to the oil price hike of 1973, when 
the oil exporting countries deposited their surplus petrodollars in the developed 
                                                          
26 Mundell stated (Mundell, 2001, p. 283): 
“Poverty needs growth; growth needs new technology and foreign capital; and foreign 
borrowing increases indebtedness, which leads to the possibility of bankruptcy, collapse of 
growth, and an exacerbation of poverty. That it is a real threat is confirmed by the debt and 
financial crisis of the 1980s and 1990s, which continues into the present time.”  
27 Theoretically, the debt service is sustainable in the long-run in case of the satisfaction of the 
following equality (Dijkstra and Hermes, 2003, p. 6):
[D/X]=[a/(gX-i)]
Here D signifies debt, X signifies exports, M signifies imports, a signifies the trade gap = M-X, gX
signifies the growth rate of exports, and i signifies the average interest rate on the debt.
The above equation implies that in the case of the growth rate of exports being greater than the 
average interest rate, sustainable debt/exports ratio can accompany a trade gap ‘a’ financed via an 
increase in the debt,  and that in the case of the growth rate of GNP being less than the average interest 
rate, the resulting solvency problems make it inevitable for the country to not only stop its practice of 
contracting new loans, but also to ensure the continuity of a trade surplus for servicing its debt and 
these inevitable steps may adversely impact the economic growth of the country (Dijkstra and Hermes,
2003, p. 6).
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countries’ commercial banks28 which, in turn, recklessly lent colossal sums of 
petrodollars to developing countries with trade deficits in the 1970s.  The authors
found that the debt crisis of the 1980s was also caused by both the unanticipated 
increase in interest rates and the decline in developing countries’ export volumes, as 
well as export prices emanating from the oil price-driven deep world recession, that 
culminated in a fully-fledged debt crisis in developing countries, and noted that the 
concerted lending was regarded as a solution to the debt crisis in the early 1980s.  
The authors also empirically demonstrated that there was a negative relation between 
debt service/GDP ratio and economic growth only in the 1990s, and that the volatility 
of the debt service payments of the heavily-indebted countries was due to the high 
levels of their external debt.  They pointed to the possibility of accelerating economic 
growth by reducing the volatility in their debt service payments via a reduction in 
their respective levels of debt.  
Questions about the true nature of a causal relationship between economic growth 
and external debt merit a rigorous empirical response.  In this context, Wijeweera,
Dollery and Pathberiya (2005) wrote a review of pioneering empirical literature on 
debt overhang.  On the basis of a cointegration analysis in the case of Sri Lanka for 
the period 1952-2002, the authors concluded that the external debt had not been a 
significant obstacle to Sri Lanka’ economic growth in that period because it was not 
large enough to result in a debt overhang crisis.      
                                                          
28 Before 1970, the developing countries had been borrowing mainly either from the governments of 
the developed countries or from the international financial institutions (Dijkstra and Hermes, 2003).
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External debt crises can be understood in light of basic transfers.  Todaro and Smith
(2009) portrayed the accumulation of external debt in developing countries as a 
widespread phenomenon since the early 1970s (for instance, the overall external debt 
of developing countries more than doubled during the period 1975-1979).  The 
authors acknowledged the fundamental importance of the concept of basic transfers 
for understanding the origin and consequences of the debt crisis, and regarded 
developing countries’ highly negative values of the basic transfer – reflecting the loss 
of foreign exchange in the form of net capital outflow – during the 1980s as another 
manifestation of the debt crises of the developing countries.  The authors viewed 
Mexico29 as the first country to experience a debt crisis but successfully resolved it 
via a dramatic reduction in external debt and restoring her modest economic growth. 
The external debt crisis of one country may have adverse spill-over effects for other 
countries.  Stein (2010) mentioned the debt crises of the less-developed countries as a 
partial cause of the overall 40% decline in foreign demand for the agricultural output 
of the United States during the period 1981-1986, which resulted in the agricultural 
crisis of the USA during the1980s.
While the contemporary contagious sovereign debt crises of the Euro-zone seem to 
be endless, Candelon and Palm (2010) affirmed that the relative lack of empirical 
studies on the mutation of the banking crisis into the sovereign debt crises is 
primarily due to the difficulties encountered in the processes of both conceiving the 
operational definitions of the debt crises and identifying the timing, as well as the 
                                                          
29 Mexico triggered a debt crisis by announcing her inability to service her debt in August 1987 and 
her prospective moratorium on debt payments to the private creditors for at least three months (Todaro 
and Smith, 2009, p. 684). 
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duration of the debt crises.  The authors presented a brief literature review on the 
linkages between the banking and debt crises in Europe.  They used the balance sheet 
approach for depicting the prospective linkages between the banking crises and debt 
crises, and contributed a graphical analysis for confirming the potential for the 
occurrence of sovereign debt crises in Europe in the future.   The authors did not rule 
out the possibilities of future contagious currency and sovereign debt crises in the 
Euro area.   
Benmelech and Dvir (2011) presented a brief literature review on whether short-term
debt is a symptom or a cause of a financial crisis, and carried out an empirical inquiry 
in the aforementioned two possible roles of short-term debt in the 1997-1998 
financial crisis of many East Asian countries, which had primarily financed their fast 
economic growth by means of short-term debt prior to a crisis.  The authors
confirmed the endogeneity of the short-term debt by means of the long-term debt,
which matured amidst the financial crisis, and concluded that the short-term debt had
been merely a symptom of the financial crisis.
Historically, there have been multiple causes for the external debt and financial crises 
of the numerous countries.  Nafziger (2012) has authored a very brief overall review 
of the literature on the external debt and financial crises of the numerous countries.
The author listed global shocks, the lack of access to credit, decreased export 
capacity, collapse of the prices of primary goods, over-valued national currencies, 
appreciation of the debt denominated in US dollars, poor macroeconomic 
management, over-valued national currencies and substantial flight of capital from 
foreign assistance, debt, and investment, amongst the important causes of the debt 
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crises of less-developed countries (LDCs).  The author noticed a persistent 
phenomenon of negative net transfers30 caused by the substantial debt servicing31 of 
developing countries in general during 1986-1988, and found that LDCs’ external 
debt dramatically grew from a sum greater than US$1 trillion in the late 1980s to 
US$2.3 trillion during 2001. The author highlighted the empirical facts that the 
unsustainably high average debt-service ratio of Argentina was 67% at the beginning 
of the 21st century, that Argentina defaulted, and that later Argentina’s external debt 
was rescheduled as well.  The author also characterized Pakistan as one of the major 
less developed debtor countries.
2.2.1 The external debt crisis of Pakistan 
Several economists have contributed descriptive and empirical analyses on Pakistan’s
external debt crisis32. Some of the empirical literature on Pakistan’s external debt 
crisis highlighted the historical record of the dramatic growth in Pakistan’s absolute 
external debt burden from US$24 million in 1954-55 to US$29.8 billion in 1997-98,
which led Pakistan ultimately to turn to the IMF in January 199933.   It pointed to the 
occurrence of a large increase in her external debt during the 1992/93 to 1998/99 
fiscal years, accompanied by a sharp increase in the short-term external debt and 
                                                          
30Net transfers refer to international resource flows – in the forms of grants, loans, and investment –
minus net international payments of interest and profit remittances (Nafziger, 2012).
31Debt servicing is defined as the payments of both the principal and interest in the context of long-
term debt (Nafziger, 2012).
32 For example, Easterly and Hebbel (1991), Sarmad (1992), Ahmad (1996), Papanek (1996), Ahmad 
and Ahmed (1998), Tahir (1998), Hasan (1999), Sherani (2002), Hussain (2003),  Kemal (2001),  
Ahmad (2011), and Siddiqui and Siddiqui (2001). 
33 For example, Tahir (1998), Anwar (2002), and Fan (2007).
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medium-term external debt as a percentage of total external debt from 10.7% in the 
1990/91fiscal year to 22.1% at the end of 1998.  The above dramatic growth in 
Pakistan’s external debt occurred as a result of her severe balance of payments crisis. 
A number of authors also referred to the World Bank’s characterisation of Pakistan as 
the only severely indebted country in the South Asian region in 200134.
Other empirical literature on Pakistan’s and other developing countries’ debt crises
pointed out that the unsustainable high levels of external debt as well as debt 
servicing and the resulting serious macroeconomic problems (the debt overhang, 
significant adverse effect on investment and economic growth, recession, and 
unemployment) led to the rationale for the policy imperatives of increasing national 
saving rate and implementing the requisite structural reforms in the fiscal system35.
These reforms were designed to lead to significant reductions in fiscal deficits, 
domestic debt, and external debt via the sustained increases in public revenues and 
the sustained cut in public expenditures.  
The literature also points to the deficit financing as a noted cause of macroeconomic 
instability. In the wake of the fiscal deficits at the forefront of the macroeconomic 
adjustment campaign during the 1990s, Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1991) 
presented a brief review of the literature on the question of sustainability of the fiscal 
deficits of the public sector and summarized the results of their case studies of ten 
                                                          
34 For instance, Siddiqui and Siddiqui (2001), and Fan (2007).
35 For example, Cunningham (1993), Hasan (1999), Kemal (2001), Zaman (2001), and Dijkstra and 
Hermes (2003). 
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countries, including Pakistan, according to which stable, low fiscal deficits produced 
good economic growth performance. The authors observed that the fiscal 
deterioration of Pakistan raised her primary deficits over and above the level of 1.7% 
of the GDP – a level compatible with the stable debt/output ratio.  
Of course, the significance of an empirical inquiry into the actual macroeconomic 
effects of the termination of the inflow of foreign economic assistance received by 
Pakistan is self-evident for all stakeholders. Khilji and Zampelli (1991) presented an 
empirical analysis of the prospective adverse effects of both the Gulf Crisis of the 
1990 and the termination of US assistance for Pakistan (for example, rising 
unemployment, balance of payments difficulties, and decline in economic growth).  
The authors concluded that a reduction in US assistance would reduce public 
expenditures, and, thereby, would result in a greater reduction in private consumption 
expenditure, private investment expenditure, the national standard of living, and 
private capital formation.  
Naturally, the aid-dependent growth strategy has important practical implications for 
national savings and investment and for the self-reliance of an aid-recipient country 
such as Pakistan.  Kemal (1992) contributed a concise review of the literature 
explaining the failure of Pakistan’s aid-dependent strategies to achieve self-reliance.
The author empirically determined a human resource development/productivity 
growth-based self-reliance growth strategy, which would achieve the doubling of 
GDP per capita within 18 years by raising the marginal saving rate to 34% in the case 
of the growth rate being equal to 7% and the capital/output ratio being equal to 3.4 
while, at the same time, precluding the necessity of borrowing for financing 
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investment. On the basis of his empirical finding of a significant negative 
relationship between Pakistan’s private savings and foreign capital inflows, the 
author concluded that Pakistan’s foreign aid-dependent growth strategy failed to 
achieve both higher savings and investment and, therefore, self-reliance because the 
inflows of foreign capital adversely affected Government of Pakistan’s efforts in the 
context of increasing her national savings as it did not feel the need for increasing 
national savings due to the availability of foreign aid. Consequently, Pakistan can 
never achieve the requisite sufficient level of savings to finance her desired level of 
investment36.
Current account deficits had been one of several external shocks for Pakistan during 
the period 1978-90.  Sarmad (1992) reviewed the literature on impacts of external 
shocks on current account deficits of developing countries, and identified large 
current account deficits, and the swelling burden of external debt as distinguishing 
aspects of Pakistan’s economy during the 1970s and 1980s.   Moreover, the author 
discerned that the increase in inflows of remittances caused the current account 
deficit to improve significantly during 1978-81, and that the current account deficit 
deteriorated due to the decrease in inflow of remittances in the period 1987-90.
The literature has also highlighted the empirical evidence of the distinct effects of the 
grants-based foreign aid and the loans-based foreign aid on public investment.  
Chishti and Aynul-Hasan (1992) recognised that foreign loan inflows into developing 
countries have been used for public investment in the long-term development 
                                                          
36 Kemal (1992).
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schemes of developing countries.  The authors analysed the effect of foreign aid 
inflows, in the forms of grants and loans, on public consumption and public 
investment in Pakistan for the period 1971-1988, and concluded that almost 28% of 
the domestic borrowing was used for financing the non-development expenditures of 
the government, that the foreign aid inflows in the form of grants had a modest effect 
on public investment, and that foreign aid in the form of loans did not have a 
significant effect on public investment.   
Moreover, the literature has highlighted a variety of effects of foreign aid on 
Pakistan’s economic growth. Khan and Rahim (1993) highlighted the prospective 
positive impact of foreign aid on economic growth, via the positive impact of foreign 
aid on both the investible resources and domestic investment, as one of the core 
principles of the theory of foreign aid. The authors concluded that the results of their 
empirical analysis did not suggest the presence of a negative effect of foreign aid on 
economic growth in the case of Pakistan, and that different types of foreign aid had 
different effects on economic growth. 
The literature also includes empirical analysis of the nature of relationships among 
the fiscal deficits, money supply and inflation in Pakistan.  While pointing to the 
persistence of alarming budget deficits during the 1970s and the 1980s, Chaudhary 
and Ahmad (1995) carried out a literature review on the nature of the relationship 
among fiscal deficits, money supply and inflation in Pakistan’s economy, and quoted 
several empirical studies depicting inflation as a monetary phenomenon in Pakistan 
in contrast to other empirical observations that inflation was caused by the structural 
factors.  On the basis of the empirical results of their study, the authors concluded 
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that there has been a positive relationship between the fiscal deficits and inflation 
during the 1970s and, further, that Pakistan’s money supply has been endogenously 
determined by international reserves and fiscal deficits. 
The issue of the real crowding-out of private investment in Pakistan’s large-scale 
manufacturing sector arising from fiscal deficits has also been empirically analysed.  
Looney (1995) provided a critical review of both the theoretical literature and the 
Pakistan-specific empirical literature on real crowding-out, as well as financial 
crowding-out, arising from fiscal deficits in the framework of macroeconomic 
theories of conventional crowding-out, Keynesian crowding-out, and a monetary 
approach to a country’s balance of payments.  On the basis of the empirical results of 
his study, the author concluded that non-infrastructural public sector investment (for 
example, public investment in public enterprises such as Pakistan Railways and 
Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation), in Pakistan’s case, caused real crowding-out of 
private investment in large-scale manufacturing.
The literature includes empirical research contributions on the current issue of 
economic reforms for increasing the rate of national savings and, thereby, achieving 
growth in productivity in Pakistan.  Ahmad (1996) viewed both domestic debt and 
external debt as the sources of Pakistan’s debt and the debt crisis in the form of her 
severe resource constraints.  In the context of solving Pakistan’s debt problem, the 
author disapproved of the policy-makers’ common approach of only resorting to 
various policy measures such as seeking short-run relief (for instance, their general 
practice of rolling-over the existing debt).  Instead, a sustainable solution to the debt 
crisis was proposed in the form of raising the rate of national savings via economic 
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reforms aiming at growth in productivity. His empirical results did not support the 
policy of selling public sector assets to foreigners as the desired results of the 
aforementioned policy, the reduced primary fiscal deficit and the corresponding 
reduction in domestic borrowing and external debt, could be better realized by selling 
the assets to domestic buyers.  This argument is premised in the author’s assertion 
that domestic buyers of public assets are expected to continue to save and reinvest 
their profits at a higher rate in Pakistan, thereby boosting the factor productivity as 
well as accelerating the rate of growth in Pakistan.  
The Pakistan economy is highly vulnerable to the volatility of capital flows and the 
corresponding risks such as the reversal of capital flows.  Khan (1996) authored a 
broad literature review on the characteristics, internal and external causes, 
macroeconomic effects, and policy implications of large-scale private capital flows 
(workers’ remittances, foreign currency deposits, portfolio investment, and FDI) to 
developing countries during the 1990s.  The author LGHQWLILHGWKHH[WHUQDOIDFWRUVí
cyclicDODQGVWUXFWXUDOIDFWRUVíDVWKHVLJQLILFDQWFDXVHVRIVXUJHLQFDSLWDOIORZVWR
developing countries during the 1990s.  The author drew attention to the 
macroeconomic effects – such as the acceleration of the investment rate and growth 
rates in several capital recipient developing countries – of the aforementioned surge 
in capital flows to developing countries.  Moreover, the author pointed to the 
volatility of capital flows and the corresponding risks such as the risk of reversal of 
capital flows, which could in turn reverse the actual benefits37 of foreign capital 
                                                          
37 That is, actual positive contributions of foreign capital inflows toward financing growing current 
account deficits, reducing the need for external debt to finance the current account deficits, achieving 
overall balance of payments surpluses and accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, alleviating the 
external debt crisis, and accelerating growth by increasing investment. 
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inflows realized by Pakistan in the first half of the 1990s and, thereby, increase the 
role of external debt in financing current account deficits as well as increase both 
external debt and total public debt. 
Historically, Pakistan has faced a serious structural problem of living beyond her 
means for a very long time.  Papanek (1996) endorsed the then existing widespread 
perception that Pakistan was at the brink of an imminent short-run foreign exchange 
crisis for the purpose of meeting her debt obligations and other liabilities.  The author 
diagnosed Pakistan’s serious chronic long-term structural imbalance of living beyond 
her means since her independence in 1947.  He proposed  a solution to the 
aforementioned structural problem in the form of a policy recommendation of 
attracting the requisite private foreign investment for generating sufficient income to 
service the external debt, pay profits to the foreign investors, accelerate the growth of 
output and exports, accumulate large foreign exchange reserves, and realize a more 
competitive environment.
Generally, Pakistan’s domestic saving rate had been very low38.  Burki (1996)
perceived fiscal deficits as Pakistan’s most important problem, and noted that the
problem had been practically addressed by the Government via two approaches.  The 
first approach was to borrow funds from the market, which crowded-out the private 
entrepreneurs and, thereby, caused the negative effects on Pakistan’s economic 
growth.  The second approach was to print money, which created regressive inflation 
and inflation tax.  The author argued that Pakistan’s domestic saving rate had been at 
                                                          
38 For example, Pakistan’s domestic savings/GDP ratio was 16% in sharp contrast to India’s domestic 
savings/GDP ratio of 22%, Thailand’s domestic savings/GDP ratio of 36%, and Korea’s 36 domestic
savings/GDP ratio of 36% (Burki, 1996).
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a very low level due to both the poor state of public finance and the poor 
performance of the financial sector, which were direct outcomes of the massive 
nationalization of private banks and the politicization of the banking sector.   
A number of research contributions have been published about the occasional 
rescheduling of Pakistan’s external debt. Tahir (1998) analyzed the history of 
accumulation of Pakistan’s debt burden and demonstrated that the absolute external 
debt burden sharply increased from US$24 million in 1954-55 to US$29.8 billion in 
1997-98. The author highlighted the fact that Pakistan’s debt rescheduling was a 
consequence of the rapid accumulation of arrears of external debt in the post-
sanctions period. On the basis of his own calculations of the degree of Pakistan’s 
indebtedness in terms of four debt burden indicators (debt/GNP ratio, debt/foreign 
exchange earnings ratio, debt service/foreign exchange earnings ratio, and interest 
payments/foreign exchange earnings ratio), the author characterized Pakistan as a 
moderately-indebted low-income country.
The possibility of the external debt default on the part of the Government of Pakistan 
has been continuously looming on the economic horizons of Pakistan.  Hasan (1999) 
highlighted the six-fold growth in Pakistan’s public debt during the period 1977-78.
The author argued that later the public debt burden of the Government of Pakistan 
became unsustainable relative to the size of the economy in the late 1990s, when the 
public debt/GDP ratio increased from 57.5% in 1975-77 to 102% in 1998-99.
Figures 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 present a graphical illustration of the evolution 
of Pakistan’s debt crisis during the period 1984/85-1998/99 on the basis of the 
author’s reported set of data on Pakistan’s domestic debt in billions of Rupees, 
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domestic debt/GDP ratio (%), external debt in billions of Rupees, external debt/GDP 
ratio (%), total debt in billions of Rupees, and the total debt/GDP ratio (%) which are 
measured along the vertical axis, with years shown along the horizontal axis:
Figure 2.1 Domestic Debt (Billion Rupees)
Data Source: State Bank of Pakistan annual reports & 
IMF international finance statistics
Figure 2.2 Domestic Debt/GDP Ratio (%)
Data Source: State Bank of Pakistan annual reports & 
IMF international finance statistics
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          Figure 2.3 External Debt (Billion Rupees)
Data Source: State Bank of Pakistan annual reports & 
IMF international finance statistics
Figure 2.4 External Debt/GDP Ratio (%)
Data Source: State Bank of Pakistan annual reports & 
IMF international finance statistics
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Figure 2.5 Total Debt (Billion Rupees)
Data Source: State Bank of Pakistan annual reports & 
IMF international finance statistics
Figure 2.6 Total Debt/GDP Ratio (%)
Data Source: State Bank of Pakistan annual reports & 
IMF international finance statistics
Figure 2.1 above portrays domestic debt continuously rising during the period 1985-
1999.  Figure 2.1 shows that the domestic debt dramatically increased from 143.9 
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1998/99, thereby implying an over nine-fold increase in domestic debt within a 
period of fifteen years.  It depicts a steeper increase in domestic debt during the 
1990s in contrast to the 1980s, as well as the steepest increase in domestic debt 
especially during the period 1997/98-1998/99, which was indeed the period of debt 
crisis of Pakistan.  
Figure 2.2 above portrays that the domestic debt/GDP ratio first steeply increased 
from 30.5% in 1984/85 to 43.2% in 1986/87, then fluctuated downward and upward 
before being reduced to 41.7% in 1997/98, and finally increasing steeply to 47.7% 
during the debt crisis period 1997/98-1998/99.  
Figure 2.3 above portrays that the external debt slowly increased from 140.2 billion 
Rupees in 1984/85 to 436.3 billion Rupees in 1990/91, remained constant at 436.3 
billion Rupees during the period 1990/91-1991/92, gradually increased to 785.1 
billion Rupees in 1994/95, and finally increasing steeply during the debt crisis period 
1994/95-1998/99 to 1581.9 billion Rupees in the specific year of the external debt 
crisis, 1998/99.  According to Figure 2.3, overall, there occurred an over eleven-fold 
increase in domestic debt within a period of fifteen years.  
Figure 2.4 above portrays that the external debt/GDP ratio initially steeply increased 
from 29.7% in 1984/85 to 36.4% in 1986/87, then fluctuated downward and upward 
before rising to 46.9% in 1996/97, and finally increasing steeply during the period 
1996/97-1998/99 before rising to 54.3% in the specific year of the external debt 
crisis, 1998/99.
Figure 2.5 above portrays that the total debt had been continuously rising during the 
period 1985-1999. The total debt dramatically increased from 284.1 billion Rupees 
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in the fiscal year 1998/99 to 2971.2 billion Rupees in the fiscal year 1998/99, thereby 
implying an over ten-fold increase in total debt within a period of fifteen years.  
Figure 2.5 depicts steeper increase in total debt generally during the period 1993-
1999 than the increase in total debt during the period 1984-1992.
Figure 2.6 above portrays that the total debt/GDP ratio first steeply increased from 
60.2% in 1984/85 to 79.6% in 1986/87, then fluctuated downward and upward before 
steeply rising to 92.2% in 1993/94, and later fluctuated downward and upward before 
steeply rising to 90.2% in 1996/97, 91.2% in 1997/98, and 102% in the year of the 
external debt crisis, 1998/99.  
The author portrayed Pakistan’s debt crisis of Pakistan and the recession triggered by 
her debt crisis of the 1990s and its adverse effects on her growth, in the following 
words (Hasan, 1999, p. 445):
“What are the factors, which explain the persistence, indeed the deepening of 
the debt problem notwithstanding sharp cutbacks in public spending and the 
relatively high inflation of the 1990s?  (It is not widely realized that total 
public spending (excluding interest) actually declined from 20.4% to 15.0%  
over the period, the biggest cut being absorbed by development spending 
which declined from 6.5 to 3.4 per cent of GDP.)…. The biggest element in 
the worsening of the key indices of debt burden was the slowdown in the 
growth of revenue.  Real revenues, which expanded 9% annually … showed 
zero growth during 1996-99. …To some extent, the sharply slower growth in 
revenues in the 1990s reflects the general slowdown in the economy.  The 
slower GDP growth in turn reflects serious neglect of investment in human 
and physical capital.”
The author found that Pakistan’s development spending and the prospects of 
economic growth were adversely affected by both the very high public debt/revenue 
ratio (624%) and the interest payments/revenues ratio (42.6%) in 1998-99, and noted 
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the culmination of the actual scenario of debt overhang39 in a decline in Pakistan’s 
investment rate to 15% of the GDP of Pakistan in 1998-99 as well as in 1999-2000.  
Amidst this scenario, the author also found Pakistan confronting the likelihood of 
external debt default, initially in 1996 and later in 1998, when Pakistan technically 
defaulted in the arena of external debt.  This was primarily due to the economic 
sanctions imposed by the West in reaction to formal multiple nuclear tests carried out 
by Pakistan40. The author’s portrayal of Pakistan’s debt crisis is similar to the 
already mentioned Romer’s characterization of a crisis.  
The literature implies that the burdens of both interest payments and debt servicing 
have become excessive for Pakistan.  Ishfaq and Chaudhary (1999) discovered the 
origin of the occurrence of Pakistan’s debt crisis in the actual transformation of her 
surplus revenue account in a deficit revenue account in 1984-85, after which the 
fiscal deficit as well as debt began growing at multiple rates (for instance, the overall 
fiscal deficit increased by 66% from Rs. 68.2 billion in 1990-91 to Rs.148 billion in 
1997-98).  The authors found that growth in both the internal borrowing and the 
external borrowing had been triggered by the persistence of high levels of fiscal 
deficits over several years since 1990, when Pakistan’s annual fiscal deficit of over 
6% of GDP continued.  The authors noted that Pakistan landed in a debt trap because 
of her persistently high fiscal deficits.  Moreover, they pointed out several adverse 
                                                          
39 Debt overhang refers to a scenario in which a country’s debt payments become linked to its 
economic growth and, therefore, the economic gains of economic growth are inevitably expended on 
the repayments of debt – such a debt overhang phenomenon is also called a foreign tax on the 
domestic production of a country (Wijeweera, Dollery and Pathberiya, 2005).
40 Hasan (1999). 
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macroeconomic consequences of the contemporary debt crisis in Pakistan.  The 
authors asserted that the first devastating consequence of Pakistan’s debt crisis had 
been the continuous, rapid growth in the burdens of both interest payments and debt 
servicing, which had already made both the debt and the debt servicing unaffordable.  
Their economic analysis of fiscal deficits and debt – being the mutual cause and
effect – highlighted the inherently intertwined fiscal deficits and debt as the basic 
causes of the high rates of inflation in Pakistan.
There has been an empirical analysis of the long-run effect of the budget deficit on 
the current account deficit in Pakistan.  Aqeel and Nishat (2000) wrote a short review 
of recent theoretical and empirical literature on the nature of the relationship between 
the budget deficit and the current account deficit and discovered mixed results.  Some 
of the literature supported the view that the trade deficit had not been affected by the 
budget deficit, and some of the other literature found empirical evidence in favour of 
the view that the trade deficit had been caused by the budget deficit41. The authors 
contended that the steady budget deficits – UDQJLQJIURPWRíKDYHEHHQ
the primary cause of all of Pakistan’s major ills. By using the approaches of 
cointegration, error-correction, and Granger trivariate causality testing, the authors 
found a negative short-run causal relationship between the budget deficit and the 
current account balance, as well as a significant positive long-run effect of the budget 
deficit on the trade deficit in Pakistan. 
                                                          
41 Aqeel and Nishat (2000). 
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The Government of Pakistan has been well aware of the serious nature of her debt 
crisis.42. The Debt Reduction and Management Committee of the Government of 
Pakistan (2001) acknowledged that the public debt had been fast accumulating due to 
the persistently large fiscal deficits of the decades of the 1980s and the 1990s, amidst 
both the downward rigidity of budgetary expenditures and the lack of buoyancy of 
public revenues.   The Committee also acknowledged the effect of the large current 
account deficits in the form of accumulation of unsustainable external debt, amidst 
stagnating exports, increasing imports, and decreasing remittances and other 
transfers.  The authors also recognised that the financing of Pakistan’s current 
account deficits as well as investment, which had been non-productive especially in 
the 1990s, by means of borrowed foreign resources resulted in the accumulation of an 
excessively large external debt, which was too large to service. The authors 
diagnosed that Pakistan’s debt crisis was propelled by the unsustainable levels of her 
current account deficits amidst the substantial slowdown of the growth in exports and 
remittances in the period 1990/91-1994/95, and their stagnation in the second half of 
the 1990s.  In this scenario, the authors discovered Pakistan entrapped in a debt crisis 
characterised by the continuously growing burden of debt servicing, which has been 
leading to both stagnating investment and growth43.  This stagnating investment, in 
turn, has been limiting the Pakistan economy’s capacity to both service and reduce
the debt44. The authors also found that the persistently low rate of national savings –
                                                          
42 Debt Reduction and Management Committee of the Government of Pakistan (2001). 
43 Pakistan economic growth rate sharply declined from over 6% in the 1980s to less than 4% in the 
1990s (Debt Reduction and Management Committee of the Government of Pakistan, 2001).  
44 Debt Reduction and Management Committee of the Government of Pakistan (2001).  
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ranging from 2.0% in 1949-50 to 15.0% in 1997-98 – as well as the increasing 
negative public sector’s savings had been the fundamental causes of both the 
economic problems and the debt crisis of Pakistan.  The authors noted that Pakistan’s 
external payments had also been directly affecting the exchange rate and, thereby, the 
Rupee value of the public debt and external debt. 
The literature has identified various adverse outcomes of the debt crisis in Pakistan.  
While explaining the nature of Pakistan’s contemporary debt crisis, Kemal (2001) 
also presented a comprehensive literature review on Pakistan’s 1990s debt crisis and 
its adverse implications for economic growth and poverty in Pakistan. The author 
concisely illustrated the various adverse outcomes of Pakistan’s debt crisis in the 
following words (Kemal, 2001, p. 263):
“Rising levels of debt and debt servicing, falling rates of investment, 
declining growth rates of output, and employment, and sharp increase in 
poverty sum up the disappointing performance of Pakistan’s economy over 
the last decade.” 
The author identified corruption and improper use of loans as important causes of 
Pakistan’ debt crisis.  The author contended that a direct result of the debt crisis of a 
country is that large shares of public expenditures as well as the foreign exchange 
earnings of the indebted country had to be absorbed by debt servicing.  The absence 
of debt relief amidst the debt crisis of a country pointed to the availability of only 
three significantly regressive policy options for satisfying the increasing debt 
servicing requirements, namely, imposition of capital tax, imposition of consumption 
tax, and reduction in public spending, as reported by the author. The author reported 
the outcomes of Pakistan’s debt crises, namely, a decline in public development 
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expenditures from 6.9% of GDP to 2.7% of GDP, due to absorption of a large share 
of public sector’s budgetary resources by debt servicing, and a rise in poverty as a 
result of the policy of broadening the net of regressive sales tax in Pakistan.
Pakistan’s external debt has been rescheduled several times.  Siddiqui and Siddiqui 
(2001) reported a short review of literature on the importance of political 
considerations (security and strategic interests of regionally vulnerable governments) 
and economic factors (for instance, achievement of the worldwide efficiency of 
resources use), as determinants of both the accumulation and rescheduling of 
sovereign debt.   The authors noted that Pakistan’s debt had been rescheduled many 
times since the first rescheduling in 1971-72 in anticipation of the prospective relief 
of Pakistan’s external debt problem. The authors also observed that Pakistan’s GDP 
growth rate exhibited an increasing trend during periods of debt rescheduling in the 
1970s and the 1980s, as well as during periods of increasing net transfers in the 
1990s.  Moreover, the authors discovered that high debt servicing not only hindered 
the development initiative but also culminated in a marked increase in the internal as 
well as external indebtedness of Pakistan.  Against this background, their empirical 
analysis reflects that the economic-cum-financial ratios (debt service/exports ratio, 
debt service/gross national product ratio, and international reserves/external debt 
ratio) have been significant as well as robust determinants of the probability of 
rescheduling of debt in Pakistan.
Pakistan’s external debt crisis has been a burning macroeconomic issue meriting 
serious official attention and response.  Hussain (2003) characterized the debt 
problem, involving a critical level of the debt servicing burden, as the key element of 
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Pakistan’s financial and economic crises (a deep, protracted recession experienced by 
Pakistan during the 1990s).   In this context, the author noted that the debt servicing 
exhausted 60.3% of Pakistan’s public revenue.  Therefore, the author viewed 
Pakistan’s external debt ($US35 billion in 2000) as a serious problem.  
The above literature highlighted excessive interest payments/debt servicing and 
inflation45, low savings rate46, volatility of capital flows47,  corruption and improper 
use of loans48, excessive public expenditure, poverty, unemployment and declining 
growth49, stagnating exports, downward rigidity of budgetary expenditures and the 
lack of buoyancy of public revenues50, and political and national strategic (that is, 
defense) factors as the determinants of both the accumulation and rescheduling of 
sovereign debt51 as Pakistan’s serous central macroeconomic structural problems, 
which warrant systemic structural macroeconomic reforms as a solution to Pakistan’s 
external debt crisis.
The literature has discovered the reason for the Government of Pakistan incurring 
massive external debt for financing the current public expenditures52.  While 
analyzing the economy of Pakistan in terms of macroeconomics indicators for the 
                                                          
45 Chaudhary and Ahmad (1995), and Hussain (2003). 
46 Ahmad (1996) and Burki (1996). 
47 Khan (1996). 
48 Papanek (1996) and Kemal (2001). 
49 Kemal (2001). 
50 Debt Reduction and Management Committee of the Government of Pakistan (2001). 
51 Siddiqui and Siddiqui (2001). 
52 Cheema (2004). 
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period 1997-2003, Cheema (2004) found that the dramatic increase in Pakistan’s 
external debt in the 1990s was due to the Government’s practice of incurring a huge 
amount of external debt and using it for financing current public expenditures.  The 
author identified the rising non-development expenditures in the form of debt 
servicing and defense expenditures, the persistence of both the fiscal and current 
account deficits, and persistently low rates of economic growth and macroeconomic 
mismanagement, as the important causes of Pakistan’s unsustainable debt in 1999
(external debt grew from US$ 23 billion in 1990-91 to approximately US$ 38 billion 
in 1998-1999).  The author found that the debt servicing alone consumed 63.5% of 
the nation’s budget in 1998-99. This finding is consistent with earlier similar finding 
of Tahir (1998), Chaudhary and Ahmad (1999)53 and Anwar (2002)54.
Several adverse macroeconomic consequences of Pakistan’s high fiscal deficits and 
debt have been observed.  Zaidi (2005) noted down a brief review of literature on 
Pakistan’s fiscal deficits.  Based on his descriptive empirical analysis of Pakistan’s 
intertwined problems of fiscal deficits and debt, he critiqued the contemporary debate 
on fiscal deficits.  The author highlighted the national debt retirement program 
launched by the Government of Pakistan in 1997.  The author found that Pakistan’s 
high fiscal deficits and debt resulted in high rates of inflation, low rates of economic 
growth, crowding-out of both private investment and private consumption, and the 
current account deficits.
                                                          
53 Chaudhary and Ahmad (1999) highlighted alarming dependence of Pakistan on foreign loans by 
pointing to the general tendency of the government of Pakistan to incur external debt even for 
servicing its external debt. 
54 Anwar (2002) found that Pakistan’s total debt service as a percentage of exports in 1998 was 
significantly greater than the heavily indebted countries’ total debt service as a percentage of exports. 
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International reserves are potential macroeconomic stabilizers. Khan and Ahmed
(2005) compiled a concise critical literature review on the ongoing debate on the 
demand for foreign exchange reserves.  The authors introduced international reserves 
as a buffer for cushioning national economies against any future emergency, as an 
instrument of intervention in the markets of foreign currencies, and as a means of 
financing imbalances in the external balance of payments. The authors analyzed the 
process of determination of the demand for international reserves in the economy of 
Pakistan. The authors discovered the stability of Pakistan’s long-run international 
reserve demand function and found that international reserves varied positively with 
balance of payments, and inversely with their opportunity cost.
The domestic debt, external debt and debt servicing have caused the worsening of the 
debt crisis in Pakistan.  The State Bank of Pakistan (2008) highlighted the domestic 
debt, the external debt, and the interest payments as the main factors responsible for 
the worsening of the contemporary debt crisis in Pakistan.  
Pakistan has been relying increasingly on the IMF since the 1950s (Fasih-Uddin,
2008). Fasih-Uddin (2008) identified four phases of the history of Pakistan-IMF 
relations.  The author affirmed that Pakistan-IMF relation had been normal in the first 
phase, 1950s-1960s, and that Pakistan was forced by the worsening situation of the 
balance of payments to frequently utilize the financial resources of the IMF in the 
second phase, the 1970s.  The author also confirmed that Pakistan implemented the 
IMF’s programs of stabilization and reform programs in the third phase during the 
period 1980-98, and that Pakistan successfully implemented the IMF’s stand-by 
arrangement as well as the poverty reduction and growth fund arrangements in the 
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fourth phase of the IMF-Pakistan relations in 2000 and in the period 2001-2004,
respectively.  Moreover, the author contributed a critique of the state of Pakistan’s 
economy, which experienced declines in GDP growth rate, export growth rate, and 
gross international reserves as well as increase in poverty, amidst Pakistan’s growing 
reliance on the IMF.
There have also been recorded positive and negative macroeconomic effects of 
workers’ remittances.  Abdul-Qayyum, Javid and Arif (2008) reviewed the literature,
which confirms that overseas workers’ remittances have both a positive effect on 
economic growth by reducing both the current account deficits and the reliance on 
external debt ņD UHIOHFWLRQRI DSUHYLRXV VLPLODUREVHUYDWLRQRI6DUPDG ņ
and a negative effect on poverty.   The authors also quoted empirical evidence in the 
literature indicating a negative effect of workers’ remittances on the economy via the 
reduction in labour force participation rate and the consequent declines in both the 
labour input and GDP.  By analysing the results of unit root tests and cointegration
tests, the authors concluded that there is empirical evidence of significant positive 
effects of workers’ remittances on economic growth, and significant negative effects 
of workers’ remittance on poverty in Pakistan.
The debt-inflation trap has been a hallmark of the highly-indebted national 
economies of Pakistan and several other developing countries.  Kwon, McFarlane 
and Robinson (2009) presented a wide-ranging review of the literature reporting the 
existence of a positive relationship between budget deficits and inflation, mostly in 
developing countries, and also examined the nature and determinants of the strength 
of the relationship between debt and inflation.   While empirically confirming the 
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results of earlier similar empirical studies, the authors highlighted the inherently 
intertwined fiscal deficits and debt as the basic cause of high rates of inflation and 
significant debt-inflation trap in Pakistan and other highly-indebted nations.
2.2.2 Changing composition of Pakistan’s external debt 
Ahmad and Ahmed (1998), Husain (1999), Anwar (2002), and Bilquees (2003) 
explained the nature of change in the composition of Pakistan’s total external debt 
during the period 1990-1999.  In spite of the fact that Pakistan’s long-term external 
debt had been a dominant part of her total external debt for several decades, there 
occurred a quick increase in short-term and medium-term external debt as a 
percentage of Pakistan’s total external debt from 10.7% in the fiscal year 1990/91 to 
22.1% in the fiscal year 1998/9955.  This change in composition of Pakistan’s 
external debt occurred not only due to the Government of Pakistan’s ever-increasing 
difficulties in obtaining long-term soft loans against the background of end of the 
Cold War but also due to a continuous decline in its credit worthiness as it had been 
borrowing only for the sake of precluding the possibility of its debt default56.
Pakistan’s debt crisis involves numerous complexities. Ahmad and Ahmed (1998) 
described historical trends in Pakistan’s resource deficit, borrowing, and external 
debt and presented an analysis of the complex nature of the contemporary debt crisis 
in Pakistan within the framework of a stock-flow consistent three-gap simulation 
model.  Like Ahmad (1996) and Burki (1996), the authors drew attention to the fact that 
Pakistan’s domestic savings were too small to accomplish her economic growth and 
                                                          
55 Anwar (2002). 
56 Hasan (1997). 
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emphasized that Pakistan resorted to external debt in the 1950s and the 1960s to 
finance productive investment to accelerate the economic growth rate, and that this 
strategy culminated in high rates of economic growth in the 1960s. This policy gave 
rise to the expectation that the external debt-driven economic growth could increase 
the saving rate as well as generate an adequate amount of exportable surplus in order 
to retire the external debt of Pakistan57. The authors asserted that Pakistan’s external 
debt remained manageable in the 1970s, in spite of the then reduced rate of economic 
growth, especially because of the external debt’s small size and favorable terms.
Gradually, Pakistan’s economy experienced a transformation of the overwhelmingly 
long-term nature of its external debt into the more expansive short-term external debt
in the 1980s, when the imminent debt crisis was postponed by a massive influx of 
American aid due to the role of Pakistan as a front-line state against Soviet military 
intervention in Afghanistan58. Therefore, Pakistan had been confronted by the 
serious danger of the collapse of her economy in the likely scenario of the actual cut-
off of access to external debt59. By accomplishing a simulation analysis, the authors 
demonstrated that Pakistan’s debt crisis would become worse even if there were no 
change in the interest rates on the foreign capital and debt, real GDP growth rates, 
foreign capital, money supply, price level, foreign exchange reserves, exchange rate, 
national saving rate, and productivity.  The authors concluded from their simulation 
                                                          
57 Ahmad and Ahmed (1998).
58 Ahmad and Ahmed (1998). 
59 Ahmad and Ahmed (1998). 
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analysis that it has become inevitable for the Government of Pakistan to reduce its 
dependence on external debt over the medium to long-run. 
While explaining the continuously worsening external debt situation of Pakistan 
caused by the historically unprecedented highest levels of fiscal and current account 
deficits in the 1990s, Husain (1999) identified two forms of remarkable changes in 
the composition of the total external debt of Pakistan.  The first change in 
composition of the total external debt was a dramatic decrease in the external debt 
financing share of bilateral grants and concessional loans, and the corresponding 
simultaneous dramatic increase in external debt financing shares of both the 
multilateral as well as non-concessional loans, which was accompanied by a steep 
hike in interest costs and debt servicing during the 1990s60. These factors had serious 
adverse macroeconomic implications in the form of the then seriously worsened 
profile of Pakistan’s external debt, which eventually caused foreign exchange crisis 
after mid-199661.  This grave macroeconomic scenario warranted Papanek (1996)’s 
policy recommendations of maintaining large reserves, significantly cutting back 
imports, balancing consumption with production and imports, balancing imports with 
exports, accelerating growth, reducing the large debt burden, financing balance of 
trade deficit mainly by means of private foreign private investment, eliminating 
corruption, and implementing long-term structural reforms. Moreover, a policy of 
fiscal consolidation is also warranted by the above factors.  Another form of dramatic 
                                                          
60 Husain (1999).
61 Hasan (1997). 
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change was the doubling of the short-term share of the total external debt during the 
previous fifteen years62.
Anwar (2002) recorded the fact that Pakistan’s total debt had nearly doubled during 
the previous 5 years against the background of a profound change in its composition 
in the 1990s.  The following, Figure 2.7, based on the World Bank data set for the 
1990s used by the author, illustrates, respectively, the levels of total external debt as 
well as its constituents, namely, long-term external debt and short/medium-term
external debt.
Figure 2.7 Long-term, short/medium-term and total external debt
Data Source: Statistics Department, State Bank of Pakistan.
62 Husain (1999).
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Figure 2.7 above depicts that long-term external debt had been gradually increasing 
throughout the 1990s.  It also shows that total external debt and short/medium-term 
external debt had been generally increasing over time until 1998/99, and that these 
two external debt variables declined in 1999/2000.
Figure 2.8 below, based on the World Bank data set for the 1990s used by the author,
illustrates the change in the composition of total external debt.
Figure 2.8 Shares of long-term &short/medium-term external debt in total external debt (%)
Data Source: Statistics Department, State Bank of Pakistan.
Figure 2.8 also depicts the generally decreasing percentage share of long-term 
external debt as well as the generally increasing percentage share of short/medium-
term external debt until 1999, respectively.  It indicates that the share of the 
short/medium-term external debt sharply increased from 10.7% in 1990-91 to 22.1% 
at the end of 1998-99.  This change in composition caused a large increase in the 
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external debt during the period 1992/93-1998/99.  Figure 2.8 indicates that the share 
of the short/medium-term external debt peaked at 22.1% in 1998/99 and declined in 
1998/99.  In contrast, Figure 2.8 indicates that the share of long-term external debt 
reached its minimum value of 77.9% in 1998/99 and increased in 1998/99.   Here it is 
pertinent to note the occurrence of significantly large increases in both the volumes 
of especially short/medium-term external debt as well as total external debt, and the 
share of short/medium-term external debt during the period 1991/92-1993/94. 
Figure 2.9 below, based on the World Bank data set for the 1990s used by the author,
illustrates the patterns of changes in the growth rates of long-term external debt, 
short/medium-term external debt, and total external debt during the 1990s. 
Figure 2.9 Growth rates of long-term, short-term and total external debt (%)
Data Source: Statistics Department, State Bank of Pakistan.
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Figure 2.9 shows the high growth rates of long-term external debt, short/medium-
term external debt, and total external debt which were, respectively, 12.2%, 10.8%, 
and 12.1% in 1991/92.  It shows that the growth rate of long-term external debt had 
been generally declining over time to reach its minimum of -0.4% in the year of the 
external debt crisis, 1997/98, before its continuous increase during the period 
1998/1999-1999/2000.  It also depicts the growth rate of short/medium-term external 
debt dramatically increasing to become 36.1% in 1992/93 and 47.8% in 1993/94.  In 
contrast, the growth rate of total external debt had been continuously decreasing since 
1992/93 until 1999/2000 when it reached its minimum value of -0.7%. Against this 
background, the author argued that the aforementioned changed composition of total 
external debt was due to the generally substantially higher positive growth rates of 
short/medium-term external debt, rather than the positive growth rates of long-term 
external debt in the 1990s.  The author found that the seeds of Pakistan’s debt crisis 
of the late 1990s were sown by the substantial current account deficits, amounting to 
around 6% of GDP in the early 1990s, and asserted that the devaluation of the Rupee, 
stagnating exports and foreign exchange earnings, heavy dependence on foreign 
resources, and import liberalization63 mainly caused the deterioration of the external 
debt indicators.  The author lamented the absence of the respectable economic growth 
as well as the macroeconomic stability in Pakistan’s economy in the 1990s as the 
cause of rapid growth in the debt servicing/foreign exchange earnings ratio from 
27.5% in 1994-95 to 41.4% in 1997-98, and highlighted the imperatives of achieving
                                                          
63 Import liberalization was accomplished via the reduction in maximum tariff from 225% in 1988 to 
70% in 1994-05, to 45% in 1997, and to 45% in 1998-99 according to the structural adjustment 
program framework, which significantly reduced the protection of the domestic industries (Anwar,
2002).
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fiscal consolidation based on tax reforms, recovering economic growth, and reducing 
poverty, stock of debt and debt servicing.
Against the background of Pakistan’s persistently high budget deficits of the 1980s 
and 1990s, Bilquees (2003) observed that Pakistan’s budget deficits have been 
significantly impacted by persistent primary budget deficits during the period 
1980/81-1995/9664. The author also explained the effect of continuously increasing 
budget deficits on the public debt of Pakistan via a three-gap model based on the 
revenue-expenditure gap, the savings-investment gap, and trade gap (difference 
between exports and imports).  According to the empirical findings of the author, the 
original cause of the persistently high budget deficits (revenue-expenditure gap) of 
the 1980s and the 1990s was the Government’s practice of totally neglecting the 
domestic resource mobilization during the earlier periods.  This was because of two 
factors, namely, its easy access to cheaper external financial resources, and the 
inflows of remittances65. The author found that the debt-servicing/foreign exchange 
earnings ratio increased from 20.4% in 1980-81 to 31.6% in 1984-85, and that the 
debt-servicing/foreign exchange earnings ratio averaged around 18% in the 1990s.  
The author also pointed to the changing composition of Pakistan’s public debt ņ the 
domestic debt/total public debt ratio gradually increased from its value of less than 
50% in the period until 1983-84, to 51% in 1983-84, and to 56% in 1990-91, before 
fluctuating between 53% and 56% in the later period until 2002-03.
                                                          
64 Pakistan had been experiencing primary budget deficits – implying excess of government 
consumption over government revenues – in almost all time periods with the exception of the very 
early 1980s (Bilquees, 2003).    
65 Bilquees (2003). 
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2.2.3 Pakistan’s external debt overhang
Debt overhang has been a key issue in empirical research regarding the 
macroeconomic effects of external debt.  Iqbal (1994), Siddiqui and Malik (2001), 
Sherani (2002), Hameed, Ashraf and Chaudhary (2008), Ahmed and Shakoor (2011), 
and Rais and Anwar (2012) presented empirical evidence of the existence of external 
debt overhang amidst the external debt crisis of Pakistan.
Pakistan has not been immune to the “Dutch disease” which refers to a decline in 
industrial sectors as a result of the appreciation of the national currency because of a
steep increase in the inflow of foreign exchange in the forms of foreign loans, foreign 
aid, foreign direct investment, and the revenues from abroad emanating from the 
export of natural resources66.  Iqbal (1994) offered a critical review of Pakistan-
specific literature on the macroeconomic effects of the structural adjustment loans of 
the World Bank and the IMF, and pointed out that Pakistan has received eight 
structural-cum-sectoral adjustment loans from the International Development 
Association (IDA), the IMF, and the World Bank since 1980.  The author confirmed 
that Pakistan had been experiencing the problems of large fiscal deficits, fast growth 
in money supply, an accelerating rate of inflation, unsustainable deficits in the 
current account, deteriorating terms of trade, and huge external debt in the 1970s and 
the 1980s.  By using simple econometric techniques, the author found a negative 
coefficient of the Word Bank-IMF adjustment loans (this coefficient signifies the 
effect of the aforementioned adjustment loans on the real output growth in Pakistan) 
                                                          
66 Nafziger (2012). 
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due to the actual use of those loans in the non-productive activities thus causing the 
real output growth to decelerate.  The author reported a significant positive effect of 
the adjustment loans on current government consumption, and interpreted it in 
Pakistan’s case as a Dutch disease effect.
Against the background of Pakistan’s increasingly high level of sovereign debt,
Zaman (2001) provided a review of literature on an institutional perspective on 
sovereign debt and popular wellbeing.  The author also reviewed and critiqued 
Pakistan’s record of the effects of external debt on economic growth and poverty.
While highlighting the historical facts of the willingness of external lenders to offer 
sovereign debt to Pakistan, this being the sole constraint on the amount of external 
debt incurred by the Government of Pakistan, the author endorsed the official view of 
the Government that Pakistan’s declining investment as well as growth rates and 
increasing poverty have been caused by the increasingly high level of Pakistan’s 
sovereign debt resulting from persistent fiscal deficits as well as balance of payments 
deficits. This point of view is consistent with the empirical results of several 
empirical studies ņ for example, Iqbal (1994), Siddiqui and Malik (2001), Chaudhary 
and Anwar (2001), Sherani (2002), Hameed, Ashraf, and Chaudhary (2008), Ahmed 
and Shakoor (2011), and Rais and Anwar (2012).  However, Zaman’s point of view 
is not consistent with the empirical results of certain other empirical studies ņ IRU
example, Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1991) and Khan and Rahim (1993).
Siddiqui and Malik (2001) referred to the assertion of the neoclassical growth model 
that perfect mobility of capital boosts economic growth.  The authors accomplished a 
critical review of the recent theoretical as well as empirical literature on the external 
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debt-growth relationship, found a lack of consensus on the external debt-growth 
relationship, and identified both the public debt and the external debt as the major 
sources of fiscal deficits and current account deficits.   The authors found empirical 
evidence of Pakistan’s debt overhang on the basis of the significant negative effects 
on economic growth of the debt servicing/export ratio and debt/export ratio.
By means of a scatter-plot of the average GDP growth versus external indebtedness, 
Sherani (2002) demonstrated that higher-levels of external indebtedness were 
correlated with lower rates of economic growth of the heavily-indebted countries,
including Pakistan, during the period 1980-1999.
While sounding extremely pessimistic about foreign debt as one of the prospective
means of increasing the transfer of real resources to developing countries to 
accelerate their economic growth, Chaudhary and Anwar (2001) affirmed that the 
rising trend of external debt jeopardized the economic growth of the debt-ridden 
developing countries, and acknowledged that the South Asian countries, including 
Pakistan, had been entrapped in economic crises amidst their debt overhang-oriented 
external debt since the 1980s.  The authors composed a very brief literature review on 
debt-overhang – classified as a mild debt-overhang which is called a liquidity trap, a 
weak debt-overhang, and a strong debt-overhang – and on the debt Laffer curve67.
They estimated a debt Laffer curve for South Asian countries, and discovered a 
statistically insignificant negative relationship between debt/export ratio and the 
secondary market price of debt outstanding in the case of Pakistan.  However, the 
                                                          
67 Laffer curve is a curve portraying a graphical relationship between the face value of debt of a 
country and the market value of the prospective debt repayments (Chaudhary and Anwar, 2001). 
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authors noted that Pakistan’s current debt/export ratio was less than her external debt-
maximizing current debt/export ratio and, therefore, Pakistan was situated on the 
right side of their debt Laffer curve, implying that Pakistan’s debt problem was not as 
bad as depicted by several other studies on the subject.  The authors concluded that 
the aforementioned countries could confront the problem of growing debt and debt 
servicing by continuing their existing borrowing trends.   
For a national economy, public debt may be beneficial as well as harmful.  Fan 
(2007) characterized public debt as a double-edged sword.   While the efficient 
utilization of public debt can accelerate economic growth, excessive dependence on 
public debt and public debt mismanagement can increase macroeconomic risks (high 
inflation) as well as impede economic growth-cum-development by crowding-out 
private investment68. The author highlighted escalating external debt as a cause of an 
increasing probability of default, and debt sustainability (the level and combination 
of public debt which enables a country to completely fulfill its current and future debt 
servicing obligations without accumulating debt arrears and without seeking debt 
relief and debt rescheduling) as the key to external debt management69. The author
identified two sets of indicators used for assessing a country’s external debt 
sustainability position.  According to him, the first set of solvency indicators 
(debt/GDP ratio, debt/foreign exchange earnings ratio, debt servicing/foreign 
                                                          
68 This scenario would not only make it increasingly difficult for the defaulting country to borrow 
more, but also cause the precipitation of capital flight as well as the emergence of the financial crisis 
and high inflation, especially in the case of monetization of public debt (Fan, 2007).
69 Debt sustainability is also portrayed as a situation in which either the debt/income ratio decreases or 
remains constant over a time span of years (Fan, 2007). 
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exchange earnings ratio, and debt servicing/current fiscal revenues ratio) reflects a 
country’s capability of continuously servicing its external debt. The second set of 
liquidity indicators (reserves/short-term debt ratio and reserves/total external debt 
ratio) reflects a country’s liquid assets, which affect the capability of a country to 
service its immediate external debt obligations70. The author referred to Pakistan’s 
inability to service her external debt71 and noted that Pakistan resorted to the 
exceptional financing facilities of the IMF in January 1999 in the aftermath of her 
severe balance of payments crisis (a direct result of her persistently growing fiscal 
deficits, stagnating export receipts, decreasing workers’ remittances, and enlarged 
current account deficits). The author noticed that Pakistan’s external was 
predominantly medium and long-term debt, that multilateral banks have been the 
largest creditors for the external debt of Pakistan, and, that both the World Bank and 
the Asian Development Bank have been playing an important role in the external 
debt financing of Pakistan.  To ensure the sustainability of financing large deficits in 
both the medium and long-term, the author stressed the imperatives of both 
maintaining long-term political and economic stability, and addressing the issues of 
growing current account deficits and rising potential risks of Dutch Disease 
(possibility of deterioration of competitiveness, especially in the manufacturing 
sectors of Pakistan caused by the growing inflows of official development assistance 
and workers’ remittances via appreciation of real exchange rates).  
                                                          
70 Fan (2007). 
71 External debt was rescheduled twice - first by the members of Paris Club and second by London 
Club during the period 1998-2001 (Fan, 2007).  
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The debt servicing affects both the productivity of factors of production and the 
economic growth. Hameed, Ashraf, and Chaudhary (2008) highlighted the negative 
effects of the debt servicing on the productivity of labour as well as capital, and, 
thereby, on economic growth. The authors also empirically confirmed the negative 
long-run effects of debt servicing ratio on both GDP and economic growth rate,
which culminated in a reduction in the capacity of Pakistan to service her debt. 
Both the inelastic government revenues and the rising debt servicing may trigger 
persistent fiscal deficits. Fasihuddin and Swati (2009) found that the 1950s, 1960s, 
and 1970s were the decades of Pakistan’s economic stability characterized by both 
the revenue account surpluses and the accomplishment of borrowing only for 
satisfying developmental needs.  The authors highlighted that persistent fiscal deficits 
had been caused by both the government’s inability to mobilize additional revenues,
and the increasing liabilities of debt servicing.  The authors highlighted Pakistan 
having revenue account deficits since 1984-85, and contended that the increasing 
fiscal and external imbalances forced the Government of Pakistan to join the 
Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Programs of the IMF and the World Bank in 
1988, and to sign the Stand-By Agreement in December 2008 for ensuring the 
stabilization of the deteriorating fiscal and economic conditions of Pakistan.  After 
the implementation of the above stabilization programs, the authors found that 
Pakistan could only reduce her total public expenditures/GDP ratio via an actual 
reduction in development expenditure/GDP ratio, which negatively affected the 
development performance of Pakistan.  
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Literature on the external debt crisis does not rule out the possibilities of significant 
positive as well as negative growth effects of external debt and debt servicing.  Afzal,
Hafeez-ur-Rehman and Jamshaid-ur-Rehman (2009) contributed a review of 
literature on multiple regression-based empirical studies indicating significant 
positive as well as negative effects of external debt and debt servicing on economic 
growth. The authors identified external debt and debt servicing as a major 
disbursement item in Pakistan’s exports earning budget. On the basis of the World 
Bank’s criterion of judging the unsustainability of debt, when the debt 
servicing/exports earnings ratio exceeds 20 per cent, the authors found that Pakistan’s 
debt had been unsustainable through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s – and, more 
specifically, from 1974/75 to 1997/98.  Moreover, the authors empirically discovered 
a unidirectional causality running from the debt servicing to GDP.  
Ahmed and Shakoor (2011) presented a very brief literature review on negative 
effects of external debt on economic growth. The authors used techniques of 
cointegration, Granger causality, and error correction, and empirically confirmed the 
existence of a unilateral long-run negative relationship between the external debt and 
the economic growth.
Rais and Anwar (2012) presented a very brief literature review on both positive and 
negative effects of domestic and external debt on economic growth.  By estimating 
the multiple regression economic growth models by means of the method of ordinary 
least squares, they concluded that both domestic debt and external debt have 
significant negative effects on the economic growth in Pakistan.    
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2.2.4 Pakistan’s economic crisis 
The use of short-term and medium-term financing for servicing the external debt may 
further deepen the external debt crisis.  Mehmood, Rauf and Ahmad (2009) provided 
a brief review of the literature on the evaluation of the sustainability of Pakistan’s 
and other countries’ sovereign debt. The authors found that Pakistan’s external debt 
crisis became worse in the 1990s, primarily due to servicing the external debt mainly 
by means of short-term and medium-term financing.  The author’ empirically 
illustrated that public debt and external debt had been unsustainable during the 1970s, 
the 1980s, and the 1990s.  The authors found little improvement in Pakistan’s debt 
repayment capacity because of her persistently high fiscal deficits and current 
account deficits, in spite of the prolonged process of fiscal reforms, stagnating 
tax/GDP ratio, low level of diversification of exports, and the unbalanced as well as 
unsustainable pattern of growth in GDP.    
The Pakistan economy has been entrapped by its intertwined financial and economic 
crisis.  Irfan-ul-Haque (2010) diagnosed the already mentioned negative state of 
macroeconomic affairs of both the 1990s and the early years of the first decade of the 
21st century as the causes of Pakistan’s 2008 Economic Crisis. The author also 
pointed out a number of other causes of the 2008 Economic Crisis – political 
transition to democracy, grave civil unrest in 2008, and a sharp increase in subsidies 
amidst a scenario of sharply rising world oil prices, with the political goal of the 
Government being to slowly pass on the world oil and food price hikes to consumers.  
The author argued that the multidimensional economic crisis, which originated from 
the rapidly worsening domestic and external imbalances in the early months of 2008, 
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was reflected in the acceleration of inflation from 7% in 2007 to 25% in 2008.  The 
author highlighted a net outflow of portfolio investment amounting to US$1 billion 
and a reduced FDI of US$4 billion, along with an increase in workers’ remittances to 
an unprecedented amount of over US$8 billion, a continuous but average inflation 
rate of over 20%, and deceleration of the economic growth rate (from 4% in the 2008 
fiscal year to 2%) due to the decline in the large scale manufacturing (because of 
severe electricity shortages), exports, and public sector development expenditures in 
the 2009 fiscal year. The author also noted that Pakistan experienced the effects of 
the international financial crisis primarily in the 2009 fiscal year, and that the terms-
of-trade-shock had the sole most important adverse external influence on the 
deteriorating macroeconomic conditions in Pakistan.  The author identified supply-
side problems associated with quality of workforce, management, infrastructure 
bottlenecks, and the supply of electricity as the primary causes of the weak 
performance of the Pakistan economy in both industry and exports.
Ahmad (2011) presented a brief review of empirical literature on the existence of a 
direct linkage between economic growth and external debt via its impact on saving 
and investment.   The author discovered that both the domestic and external debt 
caused a huge decline in savings, and concluded that the development activity bore 
the brunt of the debt-servicing burden disproportionately.
While confirming the dependence of Pakistan’s economic growth on the inflows of 
foreign capital, Abdul-Wahab and Ahmed (2011) presented a brief review of 
literature on the empirical evidence in support of the theoretical optimism about 
foreign aid as a prospective accelerator of economic growth (via the positive impact 
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of foreign aid on accumulation of physical and human capital), and the empirical 
evidence of the negative effects of foreign aid in aid-recipient nations.   By 
accomplishing the cointegration analysis for the data set for period 1972-2010, the 
authors confirmed the existence of both the long-run relationships among real per 
capita GDP, foreign assistance, and savings and a negative effect of foreign aid on 
economic growth due to Pakistan’s poor macroeconomic fundamentals caused by 
debt accumulation.      
Overall, this review of the literature reflects that several countries (for example, 
Argentina, Austria, Egypt, Greece, Russia, Hungary, Spain, Portugal, and Turkey)
have either partly or wholly defaulted in the past72. The indisputable facts of several 
countries’ actual experience of debt cycles (repetition of the scenarios of either 
partial or complete sovereign debt defaults) effectively illustrate both the maxim that 
history repeats itself, and the perception that the process of economic development in 
general, and the phenomena of sovereign debt defaults and the corresponding 
external debt crises in particular, are cyclical in nature.  This argument ultimately 
culminates in a testable hypothesis of the existence of debt cycles. 
This selective review of the literature, especially on Pakistan’s debt crisis, points to 
the existence of consensus between both the concerned authorities and the 
economists of Pakistan on the point that Pakistan’s external debt was indeed 
unsustainable during the 1990s.  The review also implies the existence of consensus 
on the occurrence of Pakistan’s debt crisis in the second half of the 1990s.  
                                                          
72 Nafziger (2012) and Keynes (1924).
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A glimpse of Pakistan’s evolving debt crisis is provided by Figure 2.10 depicting real 
total external debt stock measured in US Dollars, which is calculated via the division 
of total external debt stock by the GDP deflator using the data set reported by the 
World Bank in World Development Indicators 2012, and Figure 2.11, depicting 
external debt servicing as a percentage of exports of goods, services, and income 
reported by the World Bank in World Development Indicators 2012.
In Figure 2.10 following, the years ranging from 1981 to 2010 are shown along the 
horizontal axis and real total external debt stock is measured along the vertical axis. 
Figure 2.10
Data Source: World Bank 2012, World development indicators 2012.
Figure 2.10 above shows that real total external debt stock has been fluctuating 
upward and downward during the period 1981-2010.  Real total external debt stock 
was US$1,055.03 million in 1981 and US$5,511.93 million in 2010.  It shows that 
real total external debt stock prominently peaked, initially, at US$4,500.15 million in 
1986, then at US$5,735.84 million in  1999 amidst Pakistan’s external debt crisis, 
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again later at US$13,426.74 in 2002, and afterwards at US$5,393.65 million in 2007, 
and finally at US$5,511.93 million in 2010.  It reflects the recurrent nature of 
Pakistan’s external debt crisis.
In Figure 2.11 below, the years ranging from 1981 to 2010 are shown along the 
horizontal axis, and total external debt service as a percentage of exports of goods, 
services, and income is measured along the vertical axis. 
Figure 2.11Total external debt service as a percentage of exports (%)
Data Source: World Bank 2012, World development indicators 2012.
Figure 2.11 above shows that total external debt service as a percentage of exports 
has been violently fluctuating upward and downward during the period 1981-2010.  It 
shows that total external debt service as a percentage of exports was 25.9% in 1981
and 15.2% in 2010.  It also shows that real total external debt service as a percentage
of exports prominently peaked, initially, at 39.6% in 1985, then at 38.2% in 1994, 
and again later at 40.3% in 1997, immediately before Pakistan’s external debt crisis, 
and afterwards at 26.4% in 2004, and finally at 15.2% in 2009 and 2010.  It also 
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reflects a very high frequency of total external debt service as a percentage of exports 
being greater than 25%, as well as the recurrent nature of the vulnerability of the 
Pakistan economy to external debt crises.
In light of Figures 2.10 and 2.11, it is evident that both real total external debt stock 
and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports exhibited a general upward trend 
during the periods 1980-1986 and 1998-1998 and a general downward trend during 
the periods 1987-1990 and 2002-2006.
This above literature review suggests that Pakistan’s debt crisis clearly resembles the 
contemporary as well as the past debt crises of certain countries (for example, 
Greece).  In spite of the fact that Greece and Pakistan have quite different underlying
macroeconomic structures, institutional frameworks (for example, the European 
Union (EU) framework versus non-EU framework), Pakistan’s external debt/GDP 
exceeded 54% during her external debt crisis and, similarly, Greece’s net external 
debt/GDP ratio exceeded 54% during her external debt crisis73.
It also indicates a remarkable similarity in the official policy responses to their 
respective debt crises – VXFKDVFXWVLQSXEOLFH[SHQGLWXUHVRQKHDOWKDQGHGXFDWLRQí
of the governments of almost all the debt crisis-hit countries – irrespective of whether 
they are developing countries like Pakistan or developed countries such as the United 
Kingdom and the United States of America.
Review of both the general literature on the external debt crises and the literature on 
the external debt crisis of Pakistan highlights numerous national external debt crises 
                                                          
73 Hasan (1999) and Dias (2010). 
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as a serious global external debt problem and discovers the fact that both the 
governments of developing countries like Pakistan and the governments of the 
developed countries (for instance, Australia, UK, USA, and the Euro zone countries 
like Greece) agree in principle on the policies of deficit financing by means of 
domestic and external debt, reducing the existing unsustainable high levels of budget 
deficits, domestic debt, and sovereign debt by means of austerity-oriented radical 
fiscal reforms, which simultaneously aim at dramatically reducing their public 
expenditures, significantly increasing public revenues to reduce their budgetary 
deficits, domestic debt, and external debt.  However, here it is pertinent to note that 
the developed countries have been trying to alleviate their respective sovereign debt 
crises in the framework of different sets of constitutional checks and balances, 
institutional constraints and macroeconomic environments.  While the willingness of 
the foreign lenders to Pakistan is the sole constraint on the unbridled accumulation of 
external debt on the part of the Government of Pakistan  amidst the widespread 
problems of financial corruption and embezzlement, lack of transparency, 
accountability, efficiency, justice, and mismanagement in the process of allocation 
and usage of domestic and external debt in Pakistan74, the above developed countries 
have demonstrated the effectiveness of their external debt reduction policy mainly 
due to their legally inviolable constitutional limits on their sovereign debt, 
institutional constraints, built-in mechanisms of monetary-cum-fiscal self-discipline 
and political accountability, and relatively corruption-free transparent mechanism of 
public finance.  In contrast to a pragmatic mix of the individual and collective 
                                                          
74 Papanek (1996), Zaman (2001), Zaidi (2005), and Ahmad (2011).  
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effective remedial policy measures of the developed countries for their respective 
national external debt crises (for example, significant reduction in fiscal deficits, 
mutual financial bailouts, promotion of both their mutual international trade and 
foreign direct investment inflows among themselves in the framework of their 
regional economic blocks), a general policy response of the Government of Pakistan 
to its external debt crisis has been in the forms of incurring additional external debt in 
the form of short-term loans for even financing its current expenditures borrow and 
for servicing its external debt, rolling over its existing external debt, devaluing its 
currency according to the policy recommendations of the IMF, increasing regressive 
general sales tax, and reducing its already inadequate development expenditures75.
Against this background, the external debt overhang and the unsustainable burden of 
debt servicing emerged as the most serious macroeconomic problem in Pakistan76.  In 
addition, the poor external debt management on the part of the Government of 
Pakistan and foreign lenders (for example, IMF) made Pakistan’s external debt crisis 
worse77.  As compared to the above developed countries amidst their external debt 
crises, Pakistan became more economically and strategically vulnerable due to her 
external debt crisis, external debt overhang, and loss of creditworthiness78.
This review makes it clear that Pakistan’s chronic fiscal deficits, which emerged in 
the wake of very low rates of national savings and huge deficits in balance of trade 
                                                          
75 Kemal (2001), Siddiqui and Siddiqui (2001) and Hasan (1999). 
76 Ahmad (1996), Siddiqui and Siddiqui (2001), Kemal (2001), and Ahmad, (2011). 
77 Ahmad (2011). 
78 Siddiqui and Siddiqui (2001), Kemal (2001), and Ahmad (2011). 
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and balance of payments, triggered Pakistan’s debt crisis during the 1990s. While 
highlighting the fact that the seeds of the causes of the 2008 economic crisis in
Pakistan had been sown during the late 20th century, it establishes that Pakistan’s debt 
crisis has backward and forward linkages with Pakistan’s other multiple economic 
crises, such as recession in the 1990s ņ*'3JURZWKUDWHVLJQLILFDQWO\GHFOLQHGIURP
6.1% in the 1980s to 4.4% in the 1990s79 ņ, financial crises (for example, 60.3% of 
Pakistan’s revenues were used for debt servicing in 2000)80, poverty crisis (for 
instance, share of population below Pakistan’s poverty line  increased from 26.6% to 
32.2% during the period in 1992/93-1998/99)81, water crisis in agriculture sector (that 
is, water delivery efficiency from canals to crops’ root zone ranges from 30% to 
40%)82, and energy crises (for example, chronic acute shortages and load shedding of 
electricity due to inefficiencies in production and distribution of electricity, wasteful 
consumption, losses in the process of transmission of electricity, and rising electricity 
prices amidst steep decline in electricity’s share of total capital formation from 21.4%  
in 1994/95 to  4.2% in 2007/0883.
The literature on Pakistan’s debt crisis implies that the excessive external debt and 
external debt service burden have been big hindrances to the growth of the economy 
– RQHRIWKHIXQGDPHQWDOK\SRWKHVHVRIWKLVWKHVLVíEHFDXVHIOXFWXDWLRQVLQERWKWKH
                                                          
79 Fasih-Uddin and Swati (2009). 
80 Hussain (2003). 
81 (Hussain (2003). 
82 Hussain (2003). 
83 Fasih-Uddin and Swati (2009). 
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external debt and foreign aid have caused fluctuations in the growth rate of the 
economy.  This is why, despite the positive correlation between capital inflows and 
growth rates and a period of political stability in the 1960s, a drop in foreign aid was 
followed by a drop in Pakistan’s growth rate in the second half of the 1960s.  
Pakistan’s external debt crisis hindered the economic growth via both cuts in 
development expenditure and excessive indirect taxation (15% general sales tax),
which caused inflation and, thereby, reduced effective aggregate demand, and the 
growth rate. In this context, the effect of variables such as growth rates of real total 
external debt stock, real long-term external debt stock, real short-term external debt 
stock and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports of goods, services, and 
income first of all on the real GDP growth rate and later on the growth rates of real 
GDP shares of agriculture, industry, and services, can be determined by using net 
inflows of foreign direct investment, workers’ remittances, money supply, real capital 
stock and total labour force as the control variables.  All these variables, either used 
as dependent, explanatory or control variables, have been directly obtained from the 
literature.  For instance, the growth rates of real GDP, capital stock and labour force 
are obtained from the neoclassical growth theory contributed by Robert Solow 
(Nafziger, 2012) as well as from the empirics of economic growth contributed by 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), and from the economic growth-specific empirical 
work accomplished by Chenery and Strout (1966), Cunningham (1993) and Iqbal 
(1994).  Similarly, the growth rate of debt servicing as a percentage of exports is 
obtained from Cunningham (1993), and the growth rate of external debt (total, short-
term and long-term external debt) is obtained from Benmelech and Dvir (2011) as 
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well as Chishti and Aynul-Hasan (1992). Moreover, the control variable the growth 
rate of workers’ remittances is obtained from Abdul-Qayyum, Javid and Arif (2008), 
the growth rate of FDI is obtained from Nunnenkamp (1991), and the growth rate of 
money is obtained from Chaudhary and Ahmad (1995) as well as from the recent 
monetary growth theory, which treats money as one of the several factors of 
production (Pierson, 1972).  The data on the above variables are also available in the 
World Development Indicators 2012 published by the World Bank.  
Notwithstanding the existing differences of opinion regarding fiscal deficits, the 
review of the empirical literature on Pakistan’s and other countries’ sovereign 
external debt crises confirms the empirical validity of the point of view that 
budgetary deficits, being the root cause of debt crises, are not only inevitably 
required to be significantly reduced but also inevitably required to be replaced by 
sustainable budget surpluses for meaningfully alleviating the contemporary sovereign 
debt crises. The literature review indicates that the prospective solution to Pakistan’s
debt crisis lies not only in achieving significantly higher sustainable national savings
and investment rates, sustainable budget surpluses, sustainable balance of trade 
surpluses, and sustainable balance of payments surpluses, but also in implementing 
effective austerity reforms. In this context, it is pertinent to recommend policies of 
eliminating superfluous public administrative expenditures as well as other wasteful 
current public expenditures84, eradicating  massive corruption and wastage of public 
funds by means of constitutional, institutional, legal, judicial and administrative 
                                                          
84 For example, public expenditures on permanently inefficient public sector enterprises, such as 
Pakistan railways, public expenditures on the subsidized provision of industrial and agricultural inputs. 
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reforms, increasing in the growth-oriented development expenditures on human 
resource development85 and infrastructure86, privatizing the inefficient public sector 
enterprises87, controlling inflation via fiscal and monetary discipline by ensuring the 
effective functional independence of especially the State Bank of Pakistan in letter 
and spirit, imposing constitutional ceilings on deficit financing, domestic debt and 
external debt, ensuring the highest possible level of justice, efficiency, transparency
and accountability in the allocation/usage/investment of public funds as well as 
domestic and external debt, instituting taxation88 and expenditure89 reforms in the 
arena of public finance with the policy objective of eventually achieving balanced 
budgets and budget surpluses, instituting progressive international trade reforms for 
promoting and diversifying industrial exports not only by domestically employing the 
exportable raw materials for producing as well as exporting quality industrial 
products instead of exporting raw materials but also by integrating the Pakistan’s 
export sector with all the potential foreign target markets, increasing the inflows of 
workers’ remittances by training as well as facilitating  the unemployed  workers to 
get employed in foreign countries, and accelerating foreign investment in Pakistan by 
                                                          
85 For example, education/training and healthcare. 
86 For example, electric power generation, big and small dams, extension and restoration of the 
existing irrigation network of canals, intercity motorways and roads from farms to markets, modern 
mass transport systems in all big cities.
87 Hussain (2003). 
88 For example, implementation of an equitable system of taxation of all sectors (agriculture/mining, 
industry, and the services) without any provision of exemption for any sector. 
89 For example, an equitable distribution public expenditure among all provincial as well federal 
territories, regions (that is, rural and urban regions), and sectors (for example, agriculture, mining, 
industry, and the services) without any discrimination provision of exemption for any sector for 
achieving balanced growth. 
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ensuring the emergence of a foreign investment-friendly macroeconomic 
environment in Pakistan.
However, in spite of the widespread recognition of Pakistan’s public debt crisis and 
external debt crisis in the late 1990s, the literature on Pakistan’s external debt crisis 
includes either descriptive empirical analysis of the macroeconomic effects of the 
external debt crisis, or merely the regressions-based empirical analyses of 
determination of the real GDP growth effects of only total external debt growth and 
external debt servicing. In the literature on Pakistan’s debt crisis, an empirical 
analysis of the dynamic effects of Pakistan’s debt crisis on three sectoral shares of 
real GDP is conspicuously absent.  This empirical analysis is also the subject matter 
of this thesis, as is the examination of the long-run dynamic macroeconomic growth 
effects of Pakistan’s on-going external debt crisis observed during the 1990s and 
2000s.  
Moreover, an extension in the literature is warranted by the fact that most of these 
empirical research works on Pakistan’s external debt crisis and its economic growth 
effects are out-dated in the sense that they were published either in the late 1990s or 
in the early 2000s, soon after the external debt crisis.
Despite the existence of a lot of literature on Pakistan’s debt crisis, a noteworthy 
deficiency of the empirical literature is that it does not capture the multiple dynamic 
macroeconomic growth effects. Indeed, there is scope for updating the empirical 
research on Pakistan’s external debt crisis as well.
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Moreover, another deficiency in the existing literature is the lack of an up-to-date 
comprehensive simultaneous empirical analysis of the effects of the growth rates of 
Pakistan’s real total external debt stock, real long-term external debt stock, real short-
term external debt stock, and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports of goods, 
services, and income on the growth rates of real GDP, agriculture’s share of real 
GDP, industry’s share of real GDP, and the services’ share of real GDP.  The existing 
literature on Pakistan’s debt crisis also lacks an up-to-date comprehensive empirical 
research on the short-run, long-run, and dynamic growth effects of the on-going 
external debt crisis during the 1990s and 2000s.  This empirical analysis is also the 
subject matter of this thesis along with both an examination of the short-run and 
long-run effects of the growth rates of the aforementioned four external debt growth
variables of Pakistan on the real GDP growth rates, and on the aforementioned three 
sectoral real GDP shares’ growth rates, and an explanation of the dynamic inter-
linkages between them during the period 1981-2010.  
2.3. Conclusions and policy recommendations
This literature review highlights the spectrum of diverse theoretical perceptions of 
various schools of economic thought about the prospective roles as well as 
macroeconomic effects of budget deficits, deficit financing, and sovereign debt of 
nations. It confirms that for several decades Pakistan has been experiencing a 
chronic problem of too much reckless reliance on external debt as a key driver of its 
economic growth and development.  It portrays the fact that Pakistan’s reckless 
accumulation of external debt, indeed, not only generated patterns of unsustainable 
patchy growth during the 1960s, the 1980s, and around the mid-2000s, but also 
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resulted in the recession and the imminent sovereign debt default of Pakistan during 
the late 1990s. 
The review of the empirical literature on the sovereign debt crises of Pakistan and 
other countries establishes the view that budgetary deficits, being the root cause of 
debt crises, are not only required to be significantly reduced but are also required to 
be replaced by sustainable budget surpluses to meaningfully alleviate the 
contemporary sovereign debt crises.  It indicates that the prospective solution of 
Pakistan’s debt crisis lies in realizing significantly higher sustainable national savings
and investment rates, sustainable budget surpluses, sustainable balance of trade 
surpluses, and sustainable balance of payments surpluses, as well as the effective 
implementation of austerity reforms.  
The surveyed literature offers a quite wide range of different policy recommendations 
for solving the problems of external debt crisis and external debt overhang in 
Pakistan and other heavily indebted countries. For having a coherent understanding 
of these remedial policy recommendations of different studies, these policy 
recommendation are being systematically categorized and homogenized in light of 
their inherent interconnections based on the existence of fundamental relationship 
between a country’s domestic resource gap and foreign exchange gap in the sense 
that domestic saving-investment gap and fiscal deficits (domestic resource gap) spill 
over into current account deficits and balance of payments, and, thereby, create 
foreign exchange gap90.  Pakistan is a classic example of developing countries, which 
                                                          
90 Meier (1995).
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persistently have very low national saving rate relative to the required investment 
rate, fiscal deficits, and current account deficits in the balance of payments91.
Therefore, Pakistan has been excessively relying on the inflows of foreign capital in 
the form of external debt/aid, which culminated in an unaffordable burden of external 
debt service (in the 1990s) having negative implications for both the fiscal balance 
and current account balance92.  Thus, a number of empirical studies93 recommended 
the policies of increasing national saving rate as well as selling assets to domestic 
buyers to achieve economic self-reliance and implementing structural reforms (for 
example, austerity in expenditures, tax reforms, and elimination of corruption) in the 
fiscal structure for ensuring significant reductions in primary deficits, fiscal deficits, 
domestic debt, and external debt over the medium to long-run via the sustained 
increases in public revenues and the sustained cut in public expenditures. Papanek 
(1996) recommended the policy of attracting the requisite private foreign investment 
for generating sufficient income to service the external debt, and accelerate the 
growth of output and exports. Sachs (1989) recommended a debt management policy 
consisting of a combination of both a strategy of debt forgiveness, and a debt 
rescheduling strategy for managing the sovereign debt crises. To ensure the 
sustainability of financing large deficits in the medium and long-term, Fan (2007)
                                                          
91 Meier (1995).
92 Meier (1995), and Aqeel and Nishat (2000).
93 For example, Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1991), Cunningham (1993), Ahmad (1996), Burki 
(1996), Papanek (1996), Ahmad and Ahmed (1998), Hasan (1999), Kemal (2001), Zaman (2001), 
Anwar (2002), and Dijkstra and Hermes (2003).  
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recommended the policy of maintaining long-term political and economic stability,
and addressing the issues of growing current account deficits and rising potential 
risks of Dutch Disease.  To accelerate economic growth, Dijkstra and Hermes (2003)
recommended a policy of reducing the volatility in debt service payments via a
reduction in the level of debt. To preclude the possibilities of external debt-
overhang, Klein (1991) recommended an alternative policy of using various forms of 
equity financing for accelerating economic growth.
The literature on Pakistan’s debt crisis gives rise to one of the fundamental 
hypotheses of this thesis that, especially the external debt service burden has become 
big hindrances to the growth of the HFRQRP\ í YLD LWV LPSDFWV on both cuts in 
development expenditure and excessive indirect taxation, which has caused inflation 
and, thereby, reduced the effective aggregate demand.  In this context, the effects of 
variables such as the growth rates of real total external debt stock, real long term 
external debt stock, real short-term external debt stock, and total external debt 
servicing as a percentage of exports, first on real GDP growth rate and later on the 
growth rates of sectoral real GDP shares, can be determined by using net inflows of 
FDI, workers’ remittances, money supply, total real capital stock and total labour 
force as the control variables. This empirical analysis is the subject matter of this 
thesis.
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Chapter 3
Effects of external debt growth variables on the growth rate of real 
GDP for Pakistan
3.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the real GDP growth effects of external debt growth variables 
for Pakistan during the era of external debt accumulation since 1981.  More 
specifically, it uses the unit root tests for nonstationarity, the method of Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS), OLS residual and stability diagnostics, and the Johansen’s 
multiple cointegration tests for empirically determining short-run and long-run 
effects of the growth rates of real total external debt stock, real long-term external 
debt stock, real short-term external debt stock, and total debt servicing as a 
percentage of exports on the growth rate of real GDP. The tests for cointegration are 
carried out to determine the existence of long-run stable equilibrium relationships 
between the real GDP growth rate and the relevant explanatory variables. 
Section 3.2 presents the empirical econometric analysis of the real GDP growth 
effects of the four external debt growth variables.  Subsection 3.2.1 presents the
estimation results of short-run real GDP growth models using three control variables 
(the growth rates of real foreign direct investment, real workers’ remittances and 
compensation of employees received, and money and quasi money).  This subsection 
also presents an analysis of the robustness of results of short-run econometric models 
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to the inclusion of two additional control variables (the growth rate of the total labour
force and the first-differenced growth rate of real capital stock).  In addition, it
presents the empirically determined elasticities of the real GDP (with respect to the 
explanatory variables), which are estimated using double-log regression models of 
dependent variables in the form of real GDP and the explanatory variables by means 
of the OLS method.   Subsection 3.2.2 presents an empirical analysis of the long-run 
effects of four external debt growth variables on the growth rate of real GDP on the 
basis of empirical results of the Johansen cointegration tests.  Finally, Section 3.3 
presents a summary, conclusions and policy recommendations.
3.2 Real GDP growth effects of the external debt growth variables
Pakistan had been running current account deficits for the period 1981-2010.  This 
has meant that Pakistan has been depending on foreign resources and external debt 
for financing not only the national savings-investment gap, but also the foreign 
exchange gap (the excess of imports over exports) to foster economic growth and 
development.  Against this background, and to test the efficacy of such an approach, 
it is important to estimate the economic effects of Pakistan’s ever-growing external 
debt on the growth rate of real GDP.  
The annual time series of the variables are obtained from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators available for the period 1981-2010. The time series real 
capital stock [Kt+1=(1-į.t+It] is calculated via the use of World Development 
Indicator gross capital formation as percentage of GDP, Dadkhah and Zahidi 
(1990)’s empirical estimates of Pakistan’s initial capital stock in 1980 (Kt=Pakistani 
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Rupees 293.8 Billion) [Dadkhah and Zahidi1 1990, p. 403] and the depreciation rate 
RI FDSLWDO VWRFN į EHLQJ HTXDO WR  'DGNKDK DQG =DKLGL  S 395), and 
Pakistani Rupees 9.9 per US Dollar as at the end of the year’s (1980) average 
exchange rate obtained from the Balance of Payments Statistics 1960-2009 published 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The names, acronyms, and data sources 
of all the relevant variables are presented in Table 3.1 in the appendix to this chapter. 
In addition, descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3.2 in the appendix. The 
correlations between the external debt variables were calculated using Spearman’s 
rank-order correlation coefficients. These are reported in Table 3.2.1.  The 
correlations between real long-term external debt stock, real short-term external debt 
stock, and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports were not strong.
After testing the growth time series for nonstationarity by means of the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test statistics and the Phillips-Peron test statistics, results of these unit 
root tests for nonstationarity of the growth rate time series are presented in Table 3.3 
in the appendix. The Phillips-Peron test statistic is more suitable due to the small 
sample properties of the available relevant annual data set for the period 1981-2010. 
On the basis of the Phillips-Peron test statistics, the first-differenced growth rate of 
real capital stock and all other relevant growth rate time series are confirmed to be 
stationary at the 99% confidence level.
                                                          
1 Dadkhah and Zahidi (1990), ‘Estimation and Cross-country Comparison of Capital Stocks,’ 
Empirical Economics Volume 15 Number 4, pp.383-408.
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The Phillips-Peron unit root test-based stationarity of all the above growth variables 
and the first-differenced growth rate of capital stock, which result from differencing,
has determined the appropriateness and relevance of using and estimating only short-
run model (model including only and only the relevant stationary variables) to 
determine the short-run real GDP growth effects of the external debt growth 
variables.  In other words, the stationarity of variable is the prerequisite for a 
estimating a short-run model.  This approach is premised in the fact that there is no 
time available for the occurrence of any change in the mean and variances of 
variables in the short-run, and, therefore, all variables are stationary in the short-run 
implying the relevance of only the short-run models for estimation.  In contrast, all 
variables are nonstationary in the long-run because of occurrence of changes in mean 
and variance of variables in the long-run implying the appropriateness of estimating a 
long-run model, which includes nonstationary variables.
While the economic theory perceives the existence of equilibrium (long-run) 
relationships among macroeconomic variables instead of disequilibrium relationships 
among them, the actual macroeconomic time series data may exhibit disequilibrium 
relationships among the time series about which the economic theory cannot offer 
much explanation (Utkulu, 1997).  This problem has been resolved by economists by 
distinguishing between short-run and long-run relationships among the 
macroeconomic time series and testing the existence of long-run relationships among 
them by means of cointegration technique, which allows the use of nonstationary 
time series of variables in levels and confirms the existence of equilibrium (long-run) 
relationship among them in case of existence of cointegration among the 
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nonstationary time series in the sense that a linear  combination of the nonstationary 
time series is stationary [(Utkulu, 1997) and (Moosa and Bhatti, 1997)].  As the 
economic theory is mainly concerned with the determination of true long-run 
relationships among the macroeconomic variables, the prime beneficial aspect of the 
Johansen Maximum Likelihood (ML) method is that it helps determine true long-run 
economic relationship among macroeconomic variables by determining the number 
of existing cointegrating (i.e. long-run) relationships among the variables under 
consideration as well as the order of cointegration.  This concern of the economic 
theory for the true long-run relationship justifies the determination of long-run real 
GDP growth effects of external debt growth by using Johansen cointegration 
technique method. 
Here it is also pertinent to note the methodological differences between short-run 
models using a conventional OLS regression and a cointegrating regression ņ while 
the changes in the dependent variable Yt are due to changes in both an independent 
variable Xt and a purely random error term ɽt (that is, white noise) in the case of OLS 
regression, ɽt is not necessarily purely random in the case of ɽt being a general 
stationary process in the case of cointegrating equation (Moosa and Bhatti, 1997, p. 
169). In contrast to a conventional OLS regression, it is not required to designate 
one of the above variables as exogenous in the cointegrating equation because the 
decomposition of the movement of the two time series is symmetrical in the 
cointegrating equation (Moosa and Bhatti, 1997, p. 169).
While all the above growth variables and the first-differenced growth rate of capital 
stock are stationary, not all their corresponding original underlying variables 
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(logarithms of real GDP, real total external debt stock, real long-term external debt 
stock, total debt servicing as a percentage of exports, real workers’ remittances and 
compensation of employees received, foreign direct investment net inflows, and total 
labour force) in levels are stationary on the basis of the Phillips-Peron tests of 
nonstationarity at the 99% confidence level. Therefore, there arises a technical 
justification for testing the existence of cointegration among the above relevant 
growth variables for determining the long-run real GDP growth effects of the above 
four external debt growth variables via the Johansen cointegration test.  The Johansen 
cointegration test, employing all the above relevant growth variables and the first-
differenced growth rate of capital stock, is used to test the null hypothesis of no 
cointegrating vector for determining whether there exists the possibility of the 
presence of a long-run stable equilibrium relationship among them. Therefore, the 
primary interest of the present empirical study lies in determining both the short-run 
and long-run effects of the growth rates of external debt variables on the growth rate 
of real GDP in order to know whether the short-run effects are similar to or different 
from the long-run effects.
3.2.1 Short-run econometric models of real GDP growth effects of external 
debt growth and estimation results
The stationarity of all the above growth time series implies the relevance of 
estimating short-run econometric models of real GDP growth.  To determine the
short-run effects of external debt on economic growth, the OLS method was used to 
estimate sixteen standard growth regression models including the independent 
variables, which have been found significant in explaining economic growth in the 
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growth models discussed in the empirical literature.  This approach sounds 
reasonable as the estimations of the sixteen growth models make it possible to 
present a comprehensive spectrum of all possible scenarios of the estimated real GDP 
growth effects of all explanatory external debt variables in the framework of the 
various growth models. More specifically, the growth models make it possible to 
identify the individual real GDP growth effects of the explanatory external debt 
growth variables in the framework of the various growth models having either one, 
two, or three, or all of the explanatory external debt growth variables with or without 
the set of control variables.  In other words, this econometric modelling approach of 
adding explanatory variables step-by-step in the econometric models makes it 
possible to detect any major changes in the magnitude and significance of the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables after the addition of an explanatory variable 
in an econometric model.   Estimation results of these real GDP growth models are 
presented in Table 3.4 in the appendix.  
An econometric justification is found for only 13 of the above 16 real GDP growth 
models, which simultaneously passed the tests associated with the OLS residual 
diagnostics2 and stability diagnostics3 at 1% and 5% significance levels in light of 
empirical results of these diagnostics presented in Table 3.4.1 in the appendix.  Out 
of these 13 real GDP growth models,  here it is pertinent to select only the right 
                                                          
2 Jarque-Bera test for normality, Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test in the form of 
Probability of F-Statistic, Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey Test of Heteroskedasticity in the form of 
Probability of Chi-Square-Statistic, and Heteroskedasticity Test for Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedastic (ARCH) Effects in the form of Probability of Chi-Square-Statistic. 
3 Chow Breakpoint Test for the breakpoint date of 1998 ņ Pakistan’s nuclear tests of 28 May 1998 
triggered the imposition of the Western powers’ economic sanctions against Pakistan, which, in turn, 
triggered Pakistan’s external debt crisis in 1998 (Husain 1999, p.419). 
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models (Models 3, 8, 9, 13, 15, and 16 having signs of the estimated coefficients of 
the explanatory variables according to both theory and expectations) and present only 
the empirical results of the above six real GDP growth models, on the basis of the 
selection criterion of theoretical relevance-cum-plausibility of the models in terms of 
the usefulness of their explanatory variables determined by the underlying economic 
theory.
3.2.1.1 Econometric modelling and estimation results
A generic form of the aforementioned Real GDP Growth Models is presented below:
 ௧ܻሶ =  Į଴ + Įଵ ܺ௧ሶ +  Įଶ  ܼ௧ሶ +  ɽ௧ (3.1) 
In equation 3.1,  ௧ܻሶ signifies the growth rate of real GDP ( ௧ܻ),  ܺ௧ሶ signifies the vector 
of the growth rates of explanatory variables (ܺ௧), namely, real total external debt 
stock, real long-term external debt stock, real short-term external debt stock, and total 
debt servicing as a percentage of exports, and  ܼ௧ሶ signifies a vector of the growth 
rates of controls (ܼ௧), namely, real foreign direct investment, real workers’ 
remittances and compensation of employees received, and money and quasi money.
In the Real GDP Growth Model 3, the growth rate of real GDP is assumed to vary in 
response to changes in the growth rates of real long-term external debt stock, real 
workers’ remittances and compensation of employees received, real foreign direct 
investment net inflows, and money and quasi money.  From the estimation results in 
Table 3.4, both the growth rates of real long-term external debt stock and real foreign 
direct investment net inflows have a significant positive effect on the growth rate of 
real GDP.  
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In the Real GDP Growth Model 8, the growth rate of real GDP is assumed to vary in 
response to changes in the growth rates of real total external debt stock, total debt 
servicing as a percentage of exports, real workers’ remittances and compensation of 
employees received, real foreign direct investment net inflows, and money and quasi 
money. From the estimation results in Table 3.4, the growth rate of total debt 
servicing as a percentage of exports has a significant negative effect on the growth 
rate of real GDP, and both the growth rates of real total external debt stock and real 
foreign direct investment net inflows have a significant positive effect on the growth 
rate of real GDP.  
For the Real GDP Growth Model 9, the growth rates of real total external debt stock 
and total debt servicing as a per cent of exports are replaced by the growth rates of
real long-term external debt stock and real short-term external debt stock (vis-à-vis 
Model 8) and the equation is re-estimated. From the estimation results in Table 3.4, 
both the growth rates of real long-term external debt stock and real foreign direct 
investment net inflows have a significant positive effect on the growth rate of real 
GDP.
For the Real GDP growth model 13, the growth rate of real long-term external debt 
stock is added to the set of explanatory variables in the Real GDP Growth Model 8 
and the equation is re-estimated.  From the estimation results in Table 3.4, the growth 
rate of total debt servicing as a percentage of exports has a significant negative effect 
on the growth rate of real GDP.  In contrast, the growth rate of real foreign direct 
investment net inflows has a significant positive effect on the growth rate of real 
GDP. 
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In the Real GDP growth model 15, the growth rate of real GDP is assumed to vary in 
response to changes in the growth rates of real long-term external debt stock, real 
short-term external debt stock, total debt servicing as a percentage of exports, real 
workers’ remittances and compensation of employees received, real foreign direct 
investment net inflows, and money and quasi money.   From the estimation results in 
Table 3.4, the growth rate of total debt servicing as a percentage of exports has a 
significant negative effect on the growth rate of real GDP.  In contrast, the growth 
rates of real long-term external debt stock and real foreign direct investment net 
inflows have a significant positive effect on the growth rate of real GDP. 
For the Real GDP Growth Model 16, the growth rate of real total external debt stock 
is added to the set of explanatory variables in the Real GDP Growth Model 15 and 
the equation is re-estimated.   From the estimation results in Table 3.4, the growth 
rate of total debt servicing as a percentage of exports has a significant negative effect 
on the growth rate of real GDP.  In contrast, the growth rate of real foreign direct 
investment net inflows has a significant positive effect on the growth rate of real 
GDP. 
From the point of view of an empirical analysis of the effects of external debt 
variables on real GDP, it is also important to consider the relationship in the form of 
the partial degree of responsiveness (partial elasticity) of real GDP to changes in its 
determinants, such as real total external debt stock, real long-term external debt 
stock, real short-term external debt stock, total debt servicing as a percentage of 
exports, and other pertinent control variables by means of estimating the double-log 
regression models (Studenmund 2011, p. 213).  Also, Gujrati (2009) notes that the fit 
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of a double-log model seems to be slightly better than the fit of the linear model.  Of 
course, the use of the double-log models is also justifiable on the basis of exploring 
the possibility of changes in the nature of statistical significance of the determinants 
of the real GDP.  Thus, the effects of the explanatory variables described above on 
the percentage change in real GDP rather than the growth rate of real GDP are 
analysed.  
All the aforementioned variables’ log time series (logarithms of real GDP, real total 
external debt stock, real long-term external debt stock, real short-term external debt 
stock, total debt servicing as a percentage of exports, real workers’ remittances and 
compensation of employees received, real foreign direct investment net inflows and 
money and quasi money growth rate) were tested for nonstationarity by using the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics and the Phillips-Peron test statistics.  Results 
of unit root tests for nonstationarity of all the log time series are presented in Table 
3.5 in the appendix.
While replicating the construction pattern of the same above 16 models, 16 double-
log real GDP models are estimated by using the stationary as well as nonstationary 
log time series.
A generic form of these double-log real GDP models is presented below:
݈݋݃ ௧ܻ =  ß଴ +  ßଵ݈݋݃ ܺ௧ + ßଶ݈݋ܼ݃௧ +  ߟ௧ (3.2)
In equation 3.2, ௧ܻ signifies the real GDP, ܺ௧ is a vector of explanatory variables 
including real total external debt stock, real long-term external debt stock, real short-
term external debt stock, and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports, and ܼ௧ is 
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a vector of controls including real foreign direct investment, real workers’ 
remittances and compensation of employees received, and money and quasi money
growth rate.
Estimation results of the 16 double-log real GDP models are presented in Table 3.6 in 
the appendix.  It is pertinent to note that all the estimated absolute values of 
elasticities of real GDP, with respect to its explanatory external debt variables and 
control variables are less than one, thereby implying that real GDP is inelastic. 
Now the regression equation 3.1 is being re-estimated using the slightly modified 
approach of Cunningham (1993) to determine the robustness of the above estimation 
results to the addition of two more control variables, stationary time series of the 
growth rate of the total labour force (instead of population growth rate) and the first-
differenced growth rate of real capital stock (instead of investment/GDP ratio), to the 
above vector of control variables  ܼ௧ሶ 4. Results of unit root tests for nonstationarity of 
all the above growth rate time series are already presented in Table 3.3 in the 
appendix. On the basis of the Phillips-Peron test statistics, the first-differenced 
growth rate of real capital stock and all other relevant growth rate time series are 
confirmed to be stationary at the 99% confidence level.  In this amended modelling 
framework, equation 3.1 is re-estimated and the estimation results of 16 of real GDP 
growth models are presented in Table 3.7 in the appendix.  
                                                          
4 Here, the modified approach of Cunningham (1993) is used partly because of the availability of the 
World Bank data for our preferred variables and partly because of the greater theoretical suitability of 
the selected explanatory variables for explaining the growth rates of both real GDP and its sectoral 
shares.
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An econometric justification is found for the estimation of only 14 of the above 16 
real GDP growth models, which simultaneously passed the tests associated with the 
aforementioned OLS residual and stability diagnostics at the 1% and 5% significance 
levels in light of the empirical results of these diagnostics presented in Table 3.7.1 in 
the appendix.  
Out of these 14 real GDP growth models, here it is pertinent to select only the right 
models (Models 1, 3, 6, 8, 10, 13, 15 having signs of the estimated coefficients of the 
explanatory variables according to both theory and expectations) and present only the 
empirical results of the above seven real GDP growth models, on the basis of the 
aforementioned selection criteria. 
In the new Real GDP Growth Model 1, the growth rate of real GDP is assumed to 
vary in response to changes in the growth rates of real total external debt stock, real 
long-term external debt stock, real short-term external debt stock, total debt servicing 
as a percentage of exports, total labour force, and the first-differenced growth rate of 
real capital stock. From the estimation results in Table 3.7, only the growth rate of 
total debt servicing as a percentage of exports has a significant negative effect on the
growth rate of real GDP.  
In the Real GDP Growth Model 3, the growth rate of real GDP is assumed to vary in
response to changes in the growth rates of real long-term external debt stock, real 
workers’ remittances and compensation of employees received, real foreign direct 
investment net inflows, money and quasi money, total labour force, and the first-
differenced growth rate of real capital stock.  From the estimation results in Table 
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3.7, both the growth rates of real long-term external debt stock and real foreign direct 
investment net inflows have a significant positive effect on the growth rate of real 
GDP. 
For the Real GDP Growth Model 6, the growth rate of real total external debt stock is 
added to the set of explanatory variables of the Real GDP Growth Model 3 and the 
equation is re-estimated.  From the estimation results in Table 3.7, only the growth 
rate of real foreign direct investment net inflows has a significant positive effect on 
the growth rate of real GDP.  
For the Real GDP Growth Model 8, the growth rate of real long-term external debt 
stock is replaced by the growth rates of real total external debt stock and total 
external debt servicing as a percentage of exports (vis-a-vis Real GDP Growth Model 
3) and the equation is re-estimated. From the estimation results in Table 3.7, the 
growth rate of total debt servicing as a percentage of exports has a significant 
negative effect on the growth rate of real GDP, and both the growth rates of real total 
external debt stock and real foreign direct investment net inflows have a significant 
positive effect on the growth rate of real GDP.  
In the Real GDP Growth Model 10, the growth rate of real GDP is assumed to vary 
in response to changes in the growth rates of real long-term external debt stock, total 
debt servicing as a percentage of exports, real workers’ remittances and 
compensation of employees received, real foreign direct investment net inflows, 
money and quasi money, total labour force, and the first-differenced growth rate of 
real capital stock. From the estimation results in Table 3.7, the growth rate of total 
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debt servicing as a percentage of exports has a significant negative effect on the 
growth rate of real GDP, and both the growth rates of real long-term external debt 
stock and real foreign direct investment net inflows have a significant positive effect 
on the growth rate of real GDP.  
For the Real GDP Growth Model 13, the growth rate of real total external debt stock 
is added to the set of explanatory variables in the Real GDP Growth Model 10 and 
the equation is re-estimated.  From the estimation results in Table 3.7, the growth rate 
of total debt servicing as a percentage of exports has a significant negative effect on 
the growth rate of real GDP.  In contrast, both the growth rates of real long-term 
external debt stock and real foreign direct investment net inflows have a significant 
positive effect on the growth rate of real GDP.  
For the Real GDP Growth Model 15, the growth rate of real short term external debt 
stock is added to the set of explanatory variables in the Real GDP Growth Model 10 
and the equation is re-estimated.    From the estimation results in Table 3.7, the 
growth rate of total debt servicing as a percentage of exports has a significant 
negative effect on the growth rate of real GDP.  In contrast, both the growth rates of 
real-long term external debt stock and real foreign direct investment net inflows have 
a significant positive effect on the growth rate of real GDP. 
A comparison of Real GDP Growth Model 3 in Tables 3.4 and Real GDP Growth 
Model 3 in Table 3.7 confirms that both the growth rates of real long-term external 
debt stock and real foreign direct investment net inflows have a significant positive 
effect on the growth rate of real GDP. Real GDP Growth Models 8, 13, and 15 in 
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both Tables 3.4 and 3.7 confirm that the growth rate of total debt servicing as a 
percentage of exports has a significant negative effect on the growth rate of real 
GDP, and both the growth rates of real total external debt stock and real foreign 
direct investment net inflows have a significant positive effect on the growth rate of 
real GDP. 
A comparison of Tables 3.4 and 3.7 shows that the significant short-run positive real 
GDP growth effect of the growth rate of real total external debt stock observed in 
four real GDP growth models (Models 2, 7, 8 and 14) in Table 3.4 in the case of the 
three control variables (the growth rates of real workers’ remittances and 
compensation of employees received, real foreign direct investment net inflows, and 
money and quasi money) is robust to the inclusion of two additional control variables
(the growth rate of the total labour force and the first-differenced growth rate of real 
capital stock), as reflected in the four models (Models 2, 7, 8 and 14) in Table 3.7.  
There is empirical evidence – based on the estimation results of several pertinent real 
GDP growth models in Tables 3.4 and 3.7 – indicating the existence of a significant 
short-run positive effect of the growth rate of real long-term external debt stock on
the growth rate of real GDP, which is not at all surprising because it is consistent 
with the growth theory. A comparison of Tables 3.4 and 3.7 shows that a significant 
short-run positive real GDP growth effect of the growth rate of real long-term 
external debt stock observed in the case of the three real GDP growth models 
(Models 3, 9 and 15) in Table 3.4 in the case of three control variables (the growth 
rates of real workers’ remittances and compensation of employees received, real 
foreign direct investment net inflows, and money and quasi money) is robust to the 
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inclusion of two additional control variables (the growth rate of the total labour force 
and the first-differenced growth rate of real capital stock), as reflected in the three 
real GDP growth models (Models 3, 9 and 15) in Table 3.7. While there is empirical 
evidence of the existence of a significant short-run positive effect of the growth rate 
of real long-term external debt stock on the growth rate of real GDP, there is 
absolutely no empirical evidence of the existence of significant negative effects of 
the growth rate of real long-term external debt stock on the growth rate of real GDP. 
However, this result differs from the results of other slightly similar empirical studies 
accomplished by Iqbal (1994), who found a negative effect of the world Bank-IMF 
adjustment loans on Pakistan’s real output growth, and Rais and Anwar (2012), who 
found a significant negative effect of external debt/GDP ratio on the growth rate of 
real GDP per capita for the period 1972-2010.
Nevertheless, there is no empirical evidence of any significant short-run effect of the 
growth rate of real short-term external debt stock on the growth rate of real GDP in 
the pertinent five real GDP growth models in Tables 3.4 (in the case of the three 
control variables ņ the growth rates of real workers’ remittances and compensation 
of employees received, real foreign direct investment net inflows, and money and 
quasi money) and 3.7 (in the case of the five control variables ņthe growth rates of
real workers’ remittances and compensation of employees received, real foreign 
direct investment net inflows, money and quasi money and the total labour force and 
the first-differenced growth rate of real capital stock).
There is empirical evidence – based on the estimation results of the several pertinent 
real GDP growth models in Tables 3.4 and 3.7 – indicating the existence of the 
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significant short-run negative effects of the growth rate of total debt servicing as a 
percentage of exports on the growth rate of real GDP.   A comparison of Tables 3.4 
and 3.7 shows that the significant short-run negative real GDP growth effect of the 
growth rate of total debt servicing as a percentage of exports observed in six pertinent 
Real GDP Growth Models (Models 1, 8, 13, 14, 15 and 16) in Table 3.4 in the case of 
three control variables (the growth rates of real workers’ remittances and 
compensation of employees received, real foreign direct investment net inflows, and 
money and quasi money) is robust to the inclusion of two additional control variables 
(the growth rate of the total labour force and the first-differenced growth rate of real 
capital stock) in the set of pertinent real GDP growth models (Models 1, 8, 10, 13, 
14, 15 and 16) in Table 3.7.
As for the earlier analysis of the real GDP growth, it is pertinent to consider the 
relationship in the form of the partial degree of responsiveness (partial elasticity) of 
real GDP to changes in its determinants, by means of estimating the double-log 
regression models of real GDP after adding two more control variables, the total 
labour force and the real capital stock, in the above vector of control variables ܼ௧ in 
equation 3.2. While replicating the construction pattern of the double-log models of 
real GDP in equation 3.2, 16 double-log real GDP models are re-estimated by means 
of the OLS method using the pertinent stationary as well as nonstationary log time 
series.  
Estimation results of these 16 double-log real GDP models are presented in Table 3.8 
in the appendix. There is empirical evidence of the estimated absolute values of 
elasticities of real GDP with respect to all variables other than the three variables 
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(real short-term external debt stock, total labour force, and real capital stock) being 
less than one in the case of most of the double-log real GDP models, thereby 
implying that real GDP is inelastic; or greater than one with respect to real short-term 
external debt stock, total labour force, and real capital stock in several double-log real 
GDP models, thereby implying that real GDP is elastic.
3.2.2 Long-run real GDP growth effects of the external debt growth variables
While all the above growth variables and the first-differenced growth rate of capital 
stock are stationary, not all their corresponding original underlying variables 
(logarithms of real GDP, real total external debt stock, real long-term external debt 
stock, total debt servicing as a percentage of exports, real workers’ remittances and 
compensation of employees received, foreign direct investment net inflows, and total 
labour force) are stationary on the basis of the Phillips-Peron tests of nonstationarity 
at the 99% confidence level. Therefore, there arises a technical justification for 
testing the existence of cointegration among the above relevant growth variables for 
determining the long-run real GDP growth effects of the above four external debt 
growth variables via the Johansen cointegration test.  The Johansen cointegration test, 
employing all the above relevant growth variables and the first-differenced growth 
rate of capital stock, is used to test the null hypothesis of no cointegrating vector for 
determining whether the possibility of the presence of a long-run stable equilibrium 
relationship exists among them.  
The results of the Johansen’s multiple cointegration test, presented in Tables 3.9 and 
3.10 in the appendix, are based on the use of five control variables (the growth rates 
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of real workers’ remittances and compensation of employees received, real foreign 
direct investment net inflows, money and quasi money and total labour force, and the 
first-differenced growth rate of the real capital stock).  The results presented in Table 
3.9 confirm the presence of cointegration, implying the existence of a long-run stable 
positive equilibrium relationship especially between the above growth variables.  
In Table 3.9 in the appendix, both the maximum-eigenvalue test and the trace test 
indicate the existence of three cointegrating equations at the 0.05 significance level,
thereby confirming the robustness of the aforementioned empirical result indicating 
the existence of a long-run stable equilibrium relationship among the relevant growth 
variables, especially the growth rates of real GDP, real total external debt stock, real 
long-term external debt stock, real short-term external debt stock, and total debt 
servicing as a percentage of exports.   Here it is pertinent to note that the maximum-
eigenvalue test is considered to be a more reliable in the case of small samples
(Adebiyi and Adeyemi, 2008).
For ensuring a clearer interpretation, especially of the real GDP growth effects of the 
four external debt growth variables, cointegrating vectors are normalized with respect 
to the growth rate of real GDP, and presented in Table 3.10 in the appendix.   
Because of the unexpected signs of some of the normalized cointegrating coefficients 
in the cases of one cointegrating equation and three cointegrating equations, it is 
pertinent to interpret the normalized cointegrating coefficients associated with the 
case of two cointegrating equations, which are based on the normalized cointegrating 
coefficients presented in Table 3.10 and have associated with them a log-likelihood 
value of 155.984.  According to this cointegrating equation, which has the expected 
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signs of all the normalized cointegrating coefficients, only the growth rates of real 
long-term external debt stock and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports,
respectively, have the expected significant positive and negative long-run effects on 
the growth rate of the real GDP at the 5% significance level for the period 1981-
2010.
More specifically, the above cointegration equation implies that a unit individual 
increase in the growth rate of real long-term external debt stock culminated in an 
increase in the growth rate of real GDP, amounting to 0.575 units.  The above 
empirical evidence of a significant positive long-run real GDP growth effect of the 
growth rate of real long-term external debt stock, confirms the existence of a positive 
long-run equilibrium relationship between the growth rate of the real GDP and the 
growth rate of real long-term external debt stock for Pakistan, thereby implying that 
the growth rate of the real GDP has been accelerated by the growth in the real long-
term external debt stock during 1981-2010.  This empirical result is plausible because 
substantial sums of the long-term external debt (for example, the World Bank loans) 
have been invested in economic growth-oriented infrastructural projects such as 
dams, roads, healthcare, and educational facilities of Pakistan. Moreover, the above 
cointegration equation implies that a unit individual increase in the growth rate of 
total debt servicing as a percentage of exports culminated in a decrease in the growth 
rate of real GDP, amounting to 0.152 units.  The above empirical evidence of a
significant negative long-run real GDP growth effect of the growth rate of total debt 
servicing as a percentage of exports signifies the phenomenon of external debt 
overhang in the long-run, and confirms the existence of a negative long-run 
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equilibrium relationship between the growth rate of real GDP and the growth rate of
total debt servicing as a percentage of exports for Pakistan, thereby implying that the 
growth rate of real GDP has been decelerated by the growth in total debt servicing as 
a percentage of exports during 1981-2010.  This empirical result is also plausible in 
light of the fact that Pakistan’s real GDP growth rate has continually declined since 
1988, especially in the periods of her external debt crisis mainly due to her rising 
external debt burden (Husain 1999).  This explanation is backed up by the following 
Pakistan-specific macroeconomic analysis of Husain (1999, p.357):
“Since 1988, Pakistan has negotiated successive agreements for achieving 
macroeconomic stabilization with the IMF.… The economic outcomes for 
WKLV SHULRG ņ ORZHU JURZWK VWDJQDQW H[SRUWV KLJK UDWHV RI LQIODWLRQ DQG
VHULRXVGHEWEXUGHQņDUHWKHPDQLIHVWDWLRQVRIWKLVphenomenon.”
In short, the above findings of mutually consistent positive short-run and long-run 
effects of the growth in real long-term external debt stock on the growth rate of real 
GDP as well as negative short-run and long-run real GDP growth effects of the 
growth in total debt servicing as a percentage of exports imply that the findings of the 
short-run real GDP growth effects of the above external debt growth variables give a 
sense of what one expects of the nature of long-run real GDP effects of the above 
external debt growth variables.
3.3 Conclusions and the policy recommendations
The above empirical econometric analysis focused on the role of four external debt 
growth variables in determining the growth rate of real GDP in both the short-run and 
long-run.  The unit root tests of the pertinent times series of all the aforementioned 
growth variables confirmed the stationarity of the pertinent growth time series.  
145 
 
Moreover, the estimation results presented in Tables 3.4, 3.7, 3.9 and 3.10 lead to the
following main conclusions regarding the real GDP growth effects of four external 
debt growth variables as well as control variables:
i) There is empirical evidence of a significant short-run positive effect of the 
growth rate of real total external debt stock on the growth rate of real GDP ņ a
fact highlighted in the already presented brief history of Pakistan’s economy 
and literature review.  The significant short-run positive real GDP growth effect 
of the growth rate of real total external debt stock observed in the four models 
(Models 2, 7, 8 and14 ) in Table 3.4 in the case of the three control variables 
(the growth rates of real workers’ remittances and compensation of employees 
received, real foreign direct investment net inflows, and money and quasi 
money) is robust to the inclusion of two additional control variables (the 
growth rate of the total labour force and the first-differenced growth rate of real 
capital stock), as reflected in the four models (Models 2, 7, 8 and 14) in Table 
3.7. This empirical evidence leads to a short-run policy recommendation of 
accelerating real GDP growth by ensuring the most judicious, strictly merit-
based, equitable, transparent, and efficient allocation as well as investment of 
the requisite real total external debt stock only and only in the highly prioritized 
development projects (for example, power generations, small and large dams, 
roads, modern means of telecommunications and social infrastructure) of all 
sectors (agriculture, industry, and the services), provinces, and regions of the 
Pakistan’s economy for achieving the desirable patterns of sustainable balanced 
growth.
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The above empirical evidence of the existence of a significant short-run 
positive effect of the growth rate of real total external debt stock on the growth 
rate of real GDP is consistent with a similar theoretical-cum-descriptive
analyses by Gill and Pinto (2005) and Khan (1996), as well as with some of the 
similar empirical literature on the subject – for example, Siddiqui and Malik
(2001). However, the methodology, variables (with the exception debt 
servicing/export ratio), and time period of the data set, and sources of data used 
by Siddiqui and Malik (2001) and the present empirical study in this thesis are 
different.  For example, Siddiqui and Malik (2001) used OLS and Fixed Effects 
Models, growth rate of real GDP per capita, foreign debt/GDP ratio, data set for 
the period 1975-98, and data sources such as International financial statistics 
year book-2000, Global development fianance-2001 and World debt tables. 
However, the above empirical result of this thesis is different from the 
empirical evidence of a similar empirical study of Iqbal (1994), who found a 
significant negative effect of the structural adjustment lending of the IMF on
Pakistan’s growth rate of real GDP during the period 1979-91.  In contrast to 
these two empirical studies which did not include unit root tests-based 
econometric analyses of short-run and long-run effects, the present empirical 
study has extended the literature by using unit root tests for nonstationarity of 
the time series using the data obtained from the World devilment indicators
2012 for the period 1981-2012, a comprehensive set of stationary times series
(including four different external debt growth time series instead of only one or 
two external debt growth time series), short-run econometric models, 
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Johansen’s multiple cointegration tests showing the existence of long-run stable 
equilibrium relationships among real GDP growth rate and four external debt 
growth variables, and a comprehensive set of control variables. In addition, 
the present empirical study in this thesis extends the literature by replicating the 
aforementioned empirical analysis for growth rates of sectoral real GDP shares 
as well as by presenting not only the analysis of vector autoregressive impulse 
responses of the growth rates of real GDP and four external debt growth 
variables but also the analysis of vector autoregressive impulse responses of the 
growth rates of sectoral real GDP shares and four external debt growth 
variables.
ii) There is empirical evidence – based on the estimation results of all the eighteen 
pertinent real GDP growth models – indicating the existence of a significant 
short-run positive effect of the growth rate of real long-term external debt stock 
on the growth rate of real GDP (a fact highlighted in the already presented brief 
history of Pakistan’s economy and literature review). A comparison of Tables 
3.4 and 3.7 shows that the significant short-run positive real GDP growth effect 
of the growth rate of real long-term external debt stock observed in four real 
GDP growth models (Models 1, 3, 9 and 15) in Table 3.4 in the case of three
control variables (the growth rates of real workers’ remittances and 
compensation of employees received, real foreign direct investment net 
inflows, and money and quasi money) is generally robust to the inclusion of 
two additional control variables (the growth rate of the total labour force and 
the first-differenced growth rate of real capital stock) in the case of two out of 
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four real GDP growth models (Models 3, 10, 13 and 15) in Table 3.7. This 
empirical evidence leads to an important short-run policy recommendation of 
ensuring a corruption-free, merit-based efficient allocation of long-term 
external debt among all sectors of economy for realizing synergy among them 
and, thereby, realizing the highest attainable growth rate of real GDP. 
iii) There is no empirical evidence of any significant short-run effect of the growth 
rate of real short-term external debt stock on the growth rate of real GDP in the 
pertinent five real GDP growth models in Tables 3.4 and 3.7.  
iv) There is empirical evidence of the existence of a significant short-run negative 
effect of the growth rate of total debt servicing as a percentage of exports on 
the growth rate of real GDP.   In other words, the significant short-run negative 
real GDP growth effect of the growth rate of total debt servicing as a 
percentage of exports observed in all pertinent  real GDP growth models in 
Table 3.4 in the case of the three control variables (the growth rate of real 
workers’ remittances and compensation of employees received, real foreign 
direct investment net inflows, and money and quasi money) is robust to the 
inclusion of two additional control variables (the growth rate of the total labour
force and the first-differenced growth rate of real capital stock), as reflected in 
all pertinent real GDP growth models in Table 3.7.  This empirical evidence 
confirms the existence of the phenomenon of external debt overhang in 
Pakistan’s economy ņ a fact highlighted in the already presented brief history 
of Pakistan’s economy and literature review ņ and is consistent with parts of 
the theoretical and empirical literature.  This result, which occurs via both the 
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external debt-exports-growth channel and the crowding out effects on 
investment, is consistent with a similar empirical studies by Cunningham 
(1993) and Ahmed and Shakoor (2011). Like the present empirical study in 
this thesis, Cunningham (1993) used the growth rate of real GDP as the 
dependent variable by applying the OLS method. Unlike the present empirical 
study, Cunningham (1993) did not include unit root tests-based econometric 
analyses of short-run and long-run effects. Unlike the present empirical study, 
Ahmed and Shakoor (2011) included the growth rate of real GDP per capita as 
the dependent variable and only one external debt growth variable in the form 
of the growth rate of debt service burden along with the growth rate of 
population, investment and trade openness as explanatory variables using 
Pakistan’s official data set for the period 1980/81-2007/08. Like the present 
empirical study, Ahmed and Shakoor (2011) used root tests as well as the 
Johansen’s cointegration method to determine the nature of long-run 
relationships among the above variables.  The above empirical evidence refutes 
a previous empirical finding that debt servicing is not a significant determinant 
of the growth in national output (Afzal, Hafeez-ur-Rehman and Jamshaid-ur-
Rehman, 2009). In contrast to the present study in this thesis, Afzal, Hafeez-
ur-Rehman and Jamshaid-ur-Rehman (2009) used a larger data set obtained 
from Pakistan Economic Survey for the period 1971/72-2007/08 and focused 
on the empirical examination of the export-led growth hypothesis by testing the 
causality between exports, economic growth and debt servicing.
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v) In light of the Johansen’s multiple cointegration test results showing the 
existence of long-run stable equilibrium relationships among real GDP growth 
rate and four external debt growth variables, only the growth rates of real long-
term external debt stock and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports,
respectively, have the expected significant positive and negative long-run 
effects on the growth rate of GDP at the 5% significance level for the period 
1981-2010. A long-run policy recommendation based on the empirical 
evidence of the plausible significant positive short-run and long-run effects of 
the growth rate of real long-term total external debt on the growth rate of real 
GDP is that Government of Pakistan should accelerate the economic growth 
rate by simultaneously instituting a comprehensive fiscal austerity-oriented 
package of long-term fundamental fiscal, constitutional, and administrative
reforms.  On one hand, this reform package is recommended to be designed to 
strictly and transparently implement constitutional ceilings on fiscal deficits 
and domestic/external debt for ensuring fiscal discipline5, to increase the 
national savings rate through fiscal incentives, and to institute a judicious and 
efficient policy mix of financing public expenditures by means of external debt 
finance and equity finance. On the other hand, this reform package is 
recommended to be designed for reinforcing the above short-run policy of 
                                                          
5 For example, borrowing only and only in case of its absolute necessity and the elimination of all 
unnecessary non-development public expenditures, such as the public expenditures for providing 
public subsidies to the wealthy industrialists and farmers,  the public expenditures on the private 
foreign trips of the very important  persons of the Government of Pakistan, and the public expenditures 
on lavish illumination of highways and official buildings with electric floodlights in Islamabad for 
welcoming foreign dignitaries, in spite of the contemporary general scarcity of electricity in the 
country due to the ongoing serious national power crisis.  
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promoting an equitable-cum-efficient allocation of real long-term total external 
debt stock among the prospective investors in both public and private sector 
investment projects and ensuring efficient investment of the real long-term 
external debt stock by its beneficiaries.  
Keeping in view the historical facts of financial corruption as well as the 
inefficient and unproductive use of external debt in Pakistan6, another
important policy recommendation based on the above empirical evidence is to 
ensure a transparent corruption/waste (use of external debt for financing non-
productive current expenditures)-free merit-based efficient allocation of long-
term external debt among all sectors of economy, especially in their long-term 
economic and social infrastructural projects (roads, dams, irrigation networks, 
renewable energy, electricity generation, public education as well as health, and 
sanitation) for realizing synergy among them, increasing factor productivity, 
and, thereby, achieving the highest attainable sustainable growth rate of real 
GDP in Pakistan.
In short, the above results confirmed the robustness of a significant positive 
real GDP growth effect of the growth rate of real long-term external debt stock 
and a significant negative real GDP growth effect of the growth rate of total 
debt servicing as a percentage of exports signifying external debt overhang in 
both the short and long-run.  
                                                          
6 (Iqbal, 1994), (Papanek, 1996), and (Kemal, 2001). 
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vi) As expected in light of a brief history of Pakistan’s economy and literature 
review, there is empirical evidence of the existence of a significant short-run 
positive effect (only in Real GDP Growth Model 5) of the growth rate of real 
workers’ remittances and compensation of employees received on the growth 
rate of real GDP in real GDP growth models in Tables 3.4 and 3.7.   These
results of Table 3.4 are generally robust to the inclusion of two additional 
control variables (the growth rate of the total labour force and the first-
differenced growth rate of real capital stock) in Table 3.7.  This empirical 
evidence leads to a policy recommendation that the Government of Pakistan 
can accelerate the growth rate of real GDP by simultaneously increasing 
investment in programs of human capital formation and growth in foreign 
employment opportunities for both the skilled and unskilled Pakistani workers
in the whole world in general and in the labour-deficient regions of the Middle 
East. The above empirical evidence is in sharp contrast to the previously 
documented empirical fact of the insignificant negative effect of remittances on 
Pakistan’s real output growth, as found by Kandil and Mirzaie (2008). In 
contrast to the present study in this thesis, Kandil and Mirzaie (2008) used two-
stage least squares method and the data set for the period 1975-2003.
vii) As expected in light of a brief history of Pakistan’s economy and literature 
review, there is empirical evidence of the existence of a significant short-run 
positive effect of the growth rate of real foreign direct investment (FDI) net 
inflows on the growth rate of real GDP in all pertinent thirteen real GDP 
growth models in both Tables 3.4 and 3.7, implying robustness of the
153 
 
significant short-run positive effect of the growth rate of real foreign direct 
investment net inflows on the growth rate of real GDP documented in Table 3.4 
to the inclusion of two additional control variables (the growth rate of the total 
labour force and the first-differenced growth rate of real capital stock) in the 
case of Table 3.7. While this empirical result is consistent with both the 
theoretical and empirical literature which portrays positive effects of FDI on 
real GDP growth via the FDI-induced relaxation of the national economic 
capacity constraints (Kandil and Mirzaie, 2008), it contradicts Kandil and 
Mirzaie (2008) finding that there is no empirical evidence of a positive effect of 
FDI flows on real output growth in the case of Pakistan (Kandil and Mirzaie,
2008). It is historical fact that Government of Pakistan had been mostly using 
external debt instead of foreign private investment for financing its balance of 
payments deficits7. Against this background, a pertinent policy 
recommendation based on the above empirical evidence of both external debt 
overhang and significant positive effect of FDI flows on the growth rate of real 
GDP is that the Government of Pakistan can alleviate its external debt crisis by 
ensuring maximum possible inflows of FDI for generating sufficient income to 
service the external debt, pay profits to the foreign investors, accelerate the 
growth of output and exports, and accumulate large foreign exchange reserves
ņ a pragmatic structural solution of the external debt crisis initially advocated 
by Papanek (1996) and later endorsed by Todaro and Smith (2009).  Because of 
the general tendency of Government of Pakistan to resort to fiscal deficits by 
                                                          
7 Kemal (2001). 
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incurring excessive amounts of external debt mainly because of lack of 
accountability of the concerned government officials and politicians, Pakistan’s
economy has become a black hole economy for external debt as there is lack of 
transparency in the processes of external debt-related decision making and the 
use of external debt.  An alternative short-run policy recommendation based on 
the external debt overhang caused by the Pakistan’s unsustainable burden of 
debt servicing is to radically reduce the external debt stock through 
comprehensive macroeconomic reforms for minimizing the external debt 
burden. But the success of a short-run policy recommendation of external debt 
reduction is quite unlikely.  On the basis of a comparison between the policy of 
accelerating real GDP growth by means of external debt stock, which 
inevitably involves the burden of debt servicing as well as the external debt 
overhang, and the policy of accelerating real GDP growth by means of 
increasing inflows of FDI, the policy of accelerating real GDP growth by 
increasing the inflows of FDI has greater economic rationale.
In general, overall empirical results belonging to Table 3.4 were robust to the 
inclusion of two additional control variables ņ the growth rate of the total labour
force and the first-differenced growth rate of real capital stock, as depicted in Table 
3.7.
In short, the above empirical econometric analysis of the determinants of the growth 
rates of real GDP has generally confirmed certain Pakistan-specific historical facts 
about the actual significant negative real GDP growth effects of growth in debt 
servicing burden in the form of external debt overhang and significant positive real 
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GDP growth effects of the growth in external debt (in the form of either real total 
external debt stock or real long term external debt stock), real workers’ remittances 
and compensation of employees received, and real foreign direct investment net 
inflows. History of Pakistan’s economy, pertinent literature review, and empirical 
evidence have confirmed that external debt, real workers’ remittances and 
compensation of employees received, and real foreign direct investment net inflows 
were  significant determinants of Pakistan’s growth rate of real GDP. 
A limitation of this empirical study is the small dataset covering the period 1981-
2010 ņ a practical manifestation of a “small samples problem”, which is usually 
encountered in applied macroeconomics because macroeconomic variables, such as 
budget deficits, are generally measured on yearly basis (Brooks, 2008, p. 2).
Therefore, there is scope for overcoming the aforementioned limitation and, thereby, 
improving the estimation results of the real GDP growth models by replicating the 
above empirical study in the future using a larger dataset and covering a longer time 
period than the above 30-year study.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
Table 3.1 Variables Names, Acronyms, and Data Sources*
Variable Name Acronym
Gross domestic product GDP
Gross domestic product deflator (annual %) GDPD
Real gross domestic product RGDP
Log of real gross domestic product LOG_RGDP
Growth rate of real gross domestic product DLOG_RGDP
Total external debt stocks (Total external debt is the sum of public, publicly guaranteed, and private nonguaranteed long-term debt, use of IMF credit, 
and short-term debt. Short-term debt includes all debt having an original maturity of one year or less and interest in arrears on long-term debt)
TEDS
Real total external debt stocks RTEDS
Log of real total external debt stocks LOG_RTEDS
Growth rate of real total external debt stocks DLOG_RTEDS
Long -term external debt stock (Long-term external debt stock is the public and publicly guaranteed debt which comprises long-term external 
obligations of public debtors, including the national government, political subdivisions (or an agency of either), and autonomous public bodies, and 
external obligations of private debtors that are guaranteed for repayment by a public entity)
LTEDS
Real long-term external debt stock RLTEDS
Log of real long-term external debt stock LOG_RLTEDS
Growth rate of real long-term external debt stock DLOG_RLTEDS
Short-term external debt (Short-term external debt is defined as debt that has an original maturity of one year or less.) STED
Real short-term external debt RSTED
Log of real short-term external debt LOG_RSTED
Growth rate of real short-term external debt D_LOG_RSTED
Total external debt servicing as a percentage of exports (of goods, services, income) TEDSAPOE
Log of total external debt servicing as percentage of Exports LOG_TDSAPOE
Growth rate of total external debt servicing as percentage of exports DLOG_TDSAPOE
Workers’ remittances and compensation of employees received WRACRGDPR
Real workers’ remittances and compensation of employees received RWRACRGDPR
Log of real workers’ remittances and compensation of employees received LOG_RWRACOER
Growth rate of real workers’ remittances and compensation of employees received DLOG_RWRACOER
Foreign direct investment net inflows FDINI
Real foreign direct investment net inflows RFDINI
Log of real foreign direct investment net inflows LOG_RFDINI
Growth rate of real foreign direct investment net inflows DLOG_RFDINI
Table 3.1 continued on the next page
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Table 3.1 Variables Names, Acronyms, and Data Sources*
Variable Name Acronym
Money and quasi money growth rate MAQMGRR 
Log of money and quasi money growth rate LOG_MAQMGRR
Total labour force TLF
Log of total labour force LOG_TLF
Growth rate of the total labour force DLOG_TLF
Gross capital formation as % of GDP GCFAPOGDP
Initial capital stock Kt
Depreciation rate of capital stock ǻ
Real capital stock RKS
Log of real capital stock LOG_RKS
Growth rate of real capital stock DLOG_RKS
The first-differenced growth rate of real capital stock DDLOG_RKS
Agriculture’s share of real GDP AGSOGDP
Log of agriculture’s share of real GDP LOG_AGSOGDP
Growth rate of agriculture’s share of real GDP DLOG_AGSOGDP
Industry’s share of real GDP INSOGDP
Log of industry’s share of real GDP LOG_INSOGDP
Growth rate of industry’s share of real GDP D LOG_INSOGDP
Services’ share of real GDP SESOGDP
Log of the services’ share of real GDP LOG_SESOGDP
Growth rate of the services’ share of real GDP DLOG_SESOGDP
Pakistani rupees per US dollar exchange rate (end of the year 1980 average exchange rate = Pak Rs. 9.9 per US $) PKRUSDER
*(1) Data source for the variables initial capital stock and depreciation rate of capital stock; Dadkhah and Zahidi (1990), ‘Estimation and cross-country comparison of capital 
stocks,’ Empirical Economics 15:383-408. (2) Data source for Pakistani rupees per US dollar exchange rate (end of the year 1980 average exchange  rate = Pak Rs 9.9 per US $); 
International Monetary Fund:  Balance of Payments Statistics 1960-2009. (3) Data source for all the remaining variables World Bank’s Catalogue Sources: World Development 
Indicators 2012.
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Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Variable
Mean Median Maximum Minimum
Standard 
Deviation Observations
Gross capital formation as percent of GDP 0.19 0.19 0.23 0.16 0.02 30
GDP deflator 9.48 8.65 24.9 2.5 4.84 30
Money and quasi money growth rate 0.15 0.16 0.29 0.04 0.06 30
Real foreign direct investment net inflows (Million US$) 115 44.2725 726 5.5579 160 30
Real gross domestic product (Million US$) 8720 7170 28900 2840 6040 30
Real GDP share of agriculture 0.25 0.26 0.32 0.2 0.03 30
Real GDP share of industry 0.24 0.24 0.27 0.22 0.02 30
Real GDP share of services 0.5 0.5 0.55 0.46 0.02 30
Real capital stock (Million US$) 970000 662000 3010000 163000 822000 30
Real long-term external debt stock (Million US$) 2960 2410 11200 858 2100 30
Real short-term external debt (Million US$) 253 228 616 60.9932 150 30
Real total external debt stocks (Million US$) 3590 3000 13400 1060 2470 30
Real workers’ remittances and compensation of 
employees received (Million US$)
396 271 1420 43.1727 315 30
Total external debt servicing as percent of exports (of 
goods, services, income) 0.27 0.28 0.40 0.11 0.09 30
Total labour force (Millions)                       38.6097                 35.6706                  59.3531                24.4284            10.5461 29
Growth rate of real foreign direct investment net inflows 0.1 0.19 1.92 -1.99 0.82 29
Growth rate of real gross domestic product 0.06 0.15 1.15 -1.28 0.57 29
Growth rate of real capital stock -0.1 -0.1 -0.09 -0.11 0.01 29
Growth rate of real long-term external debt stock 0.06 0.15 1.21 -1.48 0.61 29
Growth rate of real short-term external debt 0.03 0.08 1.31 -1.63 0.72 29
Growth rate of real total external debt stock 0.06 0.13 1.21 -1.47 0.61 29
Growth rate of real workers’ remittances and 
compensation of employees received 0.05 0.08 2.04 -1.36 0.7 29
Growth rate of total external debt servicing as a
percentage of exports (of  goods, services, income)              -0.02 0.00       0.30 -0.76 0.23 29
Growth rate of the total labour force 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.01 28
Growth rate of real GDP share of agriculture -0.01 0.00 0.10 -0.08 0.04 29
Growth rate of real GDP share of industry 0.00 0.00 0.12 -0.12 0.04 29
Growth rate of real GDP share of services 0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.04 0.02 29
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Table 3.2.1 Correlation between external debt variables
Variables Real total external 
debt stock
Real long-term 
external debt stock
Real short-term 
external debt 
Total debt servicing 
as a percentage of 
exports
Real total external 
debt stock
1.000
Real long-term 
external debt stock
0.995**
(51.001)
[0.000]
1.000
Real short-term 
external debt 
0.451**
(2.670)
[0.013]
0.421**
(2.454)
[0.021]
1.000
Total debt servicing 
as a percentage of 
exports
-0.330
(-1.850)
[0.075]
-0.348
(-1.963)
[0.060]
0.224
(1.214)
[0.235]
1.000
Notes:  Figures outside parentheses are Spearman rank-order correlation coefficients. Figures in ( ) are t-statistics and                                                                                                   
figures in [ ] are probabilities. **95%.
Table 3.3 Results of Unit Root Tests of Stationarity of Variables in Levels
Variable ADF Test Statistic PP Test Statistic
Growth rate of real gross domestic product -7.538*** -8.521***
Growth rate of real total external debt stock -7.367*** -11.409***
Growth rate of real long-term external debt stock -7.361*** -10.214***
Growth rate of real short-term external debt stock -6.671*** -7.583***
Growth rate of total debt servicing as a percentage of exports -6.881*** -6.860***
Growth rate of real workers’ remittances and compensation of employees 
received
-6.086*** -6.371***
Growth rate of real foreign direct investment net inflows -6.633*** -7.656***
Money and quasi money growth rate -4.218*** -4.406***
Growth rate of the total labour force -4.920*** -4.920***
Growth rate of real capital stock -0.477 -1.143
The first-differenced growth rate of real capital stock -1.473 -7.963***
Notes: ADF stands for Augmented Dickey-Fuller; PP stands for Phillips-Peron; ***99%, **95%, and *90%
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Table 3.4  Estimation Results of Short Run Real GDP Growth Models                                                                                                       
Dependent Variable:  Growth rate of real gross domestic product
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9  Model 10 Model 11 Model 
12
Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16
Growth rate 
of
real total 
external 
debt stock
-0.034
(0.450)
0.798***
(0.072)
0.155
(0.391)
0.825***
(0.093)
0.801***
(0.067)
0.048
(0.494)
0.220
(0.364)
0.831***
(0.086)
0.151
(0.461)
Growth rate 
of real long-
term external 
debt stock
0.896** 
(0.421)
0.796***
(0.068)
0.645
(0.387)
0.773***
(0.081)
0.797***
(0.063)
0.729
(0.456)
0.584
(0.359)
0.775***
(0.075)
0.638
(0.425)
Growth rate 
of real short-
term external 
debt stock
0.054
(0.054)
0.268***
(0.089)
-0.026
(0.054)
0.026
(0.048)
0.268***
(0.089)
0.022
(0.060)
-0.028
(0.050)
0.025
(0.044)
0.014
(0.056)
Growth rate 
of total debt 
servicing as a 
percentage of 
exports
-0.125**
(0.057)
-0.112
(0.151)
-0.128**
(0.057)
-0.119**
(0.055)
-0.112
(0.131)
-0.121**
(0.055)
-0.129**
(0.058)
-0.118**
(0.055)
-0.120**
(0.057)
Growth rate 
of real 
workers’ 
remittances 
and 
compensatio
n of 
employees 
received
0.035 
(0.059)
0.045
(0.055)
0.420***
(0.085)
0.592***
(0.079)
0.041
(0.057)
0.032
(0.060)
0.045
(0.054)
0.045
(0.055)
0.055
(0.051)
0.430***
(0.087)
0.044
(0.058)
0.049 
(0.053)
0.042
(0.056)
0.055
(0.052)
0.051
(0.054)
Growth rate 
of real 
foreign direct 
investment 
net inflows
0.079**
(0.029)
0.069** 
(0.028)
0.113*
(0.063)
0.185**
(0.068)
0.070**
(0.028)
0.083**
(0.031)
0.063**
(0.028)
0.064**
(0.029)
0.055*
(0.027)
0.100
(0.065)
0.065*
(0.032)
0.056**
(0.027)
0.068**
(0.029)
0.051*
(0.028)
0.054*
(0.030)
Money and 
quasi money 
growth rate
0.180 
(0.240)
0.142 
(0.227)
-0.100
(0.502)
0.035
(0.591)
0.150
(0.232)
0.194
(0.245)
0.264
(0.225)
0.131
(0.231)
0.219
(0.214)
-0.028
(0.512)
0.135
(0.240)
0.232
(0.218)
0.279
(0.230)
0.208
(0.218)
0.222
(0.227)
C 0.011 
(0.013)
-0.021
(0.039)
-0.013 
(0.036)
0.035 
(0.081)
0.005
(0.095)
-0.014
(0.037)
-0.024
(0.040)
-0.035
(0.036)
-0.010
(0.037)
-0.025
(0.034)
0.023
(0.082)
-0.011
(0.039)
-0.028
(0.035)
-0.038
(0.037)
-0.023
(0.035)
-0.026
(0.037)
Adjusted R2 0.986       0.984 0.986 0.931 0.907 0.986 0.984 0.987 0.986 0.988 0.930 0.985 0.988 0.986 0.988 0.987
Notes:  Figures in parentheses are standard errors; ***99%, **95%, and *90%
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Table 3.4.1The OLS Residual and Stability Diagnostics
Model Jarque
-Bera 
(JB)
Probability 
of Jarque-
Bera (JB)
Breusch-Godfrey
Serial Correlation
LM Test-:
Prob. of 
F-Statistic
Breusch-Godfrey
Serial Correlation
LM Test:
Probability of 
Chi-Square-
Statistic
Breusch-Pagan-
Godfrey
Test of 
Heteroskedasticity:
Probability of 
F-Statistic 
Breusch-Pagan-
Godfrey
Test of 
Heteroskedasticity:
Prob. of Chi-
Square-Statistic
Heteroskedasticity 
Test for ARCH 
Effects: 
Prob. of  Chi-
Square-Statistic
Chow Test of 
structural break at 
1998: 
Prob. of F-Statistic
M1 0.282 0.8683 0.1804 0.1236 0.8462         0.8145 0.2945 0.6760  
M2 0.695 0.7065 0.8403 0.7965 0.9210 0.9015 0.3695 0.4629
M3 0.501 0.7784 0.4849 0.3972 0.9582 0.9468 0.5229 0.4654
M4 2.157 0.3402 0.3168 0.2373 0.1924 0.1792 0.5510 0.0447
M5 1.264 0.5314 0.7537 0.6922 0.0998 0.1003 0.8272 0.2455
M6 0.462 0.7939 0.5594 0.4582 0.9799 0.9717 0.4033 0.5092
M7 0.480 0.7867 0.7578 0.6852 0.9527 0.9356 0.2647 0.3677
M8 1.016 0.6017 0.3000 0.2079 0.8540 0.8152 0.5102 0.7741
M9 0.767 0.6816 0.6319           0.5378 0.9669 0.9543 0.4026 0.5743
M10 0.272 0.8728 0.0831 0.0469 0.9426 0.9226 0.3224 0.5797
M11 1.719 0.4234 0.4346 0.3308 0.1035 0.1068 0.7403 0.0128
M12 0.713 0.7002 0.6293 0.5188 0.9440 0.9193 0.3913 0.4543
M13 0.487 0.7840 0.1655 0.0919 0.9389 0.9125 0.2978 0.6462
M14 0.764 0.6825 0.2128 0.1251 0.9538 0.9324 0.2798 0.5569
M15 0.270 0.8735 0.1172 0.0609 0.9688 0.9532 0.2788 0.7583
M16 0.380 0.8272 0.1562 0.0762 0.9106 0.8688 0.2924 0.7131
Table 3.5 Results of Unit Root Tests of Stationarity of Variables in Levels
Variable ADF Test Statistic PP Test Statistic
Log of real gross domestic product -1.211 -2.652*
Log of real total external debt stock -3.566** -3.452**
Log of real long-term external debt stock -3.440** -3.321**
Log of real short-term external debt stock -3.758*** -3.756***
Log of total debt servicing as a percentage of exports -1.288 -1.267
Log of real workers’ remittances and compensation of employees received -1.288 -1.267
Log of real foreign direct investment net inflows -2.340 -2.401
Log of Money and quasi money growth rate -4.416*** -5.369***
Log of total labour force 1.461 1.667
Log of real capital stock -7.282*** -5.110***
Notes: ADF stands for Augmented Dickey-Fuller; PP stands for Phillips-Peron; ***99%, **95%, and *90%
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Table 3.6 Estimation Results of Double-log Real GDP Models                                                                                                             
Dependent Variable:  log of real GDP
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16
Log of real 
total 
external 
debt stock
0.541 
(0.551)
0.597***
    (0.053)
-0.362
(0.401)           
0.766***
    (0.048)
0.724***
(0.058)
0.365
(0.341)
-0.122
(0.340)
0.811***
(0.048)
0.369
(0.305)
Log of real 
long-term 
external 
debt stock
0.454
(0.524)
0.606***
(0.049)
0.966**
(0.401)
0.733***
(0.046)
0.724***
(0.051)
0.387
(0.326)
0.843**
(0.334)
0.778***
(0.045)
0.428
(0.292)
Log of real 
short-term 
external 
debt stock
-0.097*
(0.049)
0.130*
(0.066)
-0.140***
(0.026)
-0.112***
(0.025)
0.063
(0.085)
-0.127***
(0.028)
-0.116***
(0.026)
-0.086***
(0.025)
-0.100***
(0.027)
Log of total 
debt 
servicing as 
a
percentage
of exports
-0.324***
(0.064)
0.327**
(0.146)
-0.241***
(0.071)
-0.229***
(0.062)
0.236
(0.192)
-0.224***
(0.065)
-0.142**
(0.058)
-0.146**
(0.057)
-0.146**
(0.056)
Log of real 
workers’ 
remittances 
and 
compen-
sation of 
employees 
received
0.202***
(0.029)
0.197***
(0.027)
0.341***
(0.059)
0.376***
(0.057)
0.196***
(0.027)
0.179***
(0.021)
0.157***
(0.028)
0.180***
(0.020)
0.155***
(0.025)
0.362***
(0.061)
0.179***
(0.020)
0.156***
(0.025)
0.157***
(0.021)
0.158***
(0.020)
0.156***
(0.020)
Log of real 
foreign 
direct 
investment 
net inflows
0.146***
(0.021)
0.134***
(0.019)
0.295***
(0.035)
0.370***
(0.046)
0.129***
(0.020)
0.108***
(0.016)
0.062*
(0.030)
0.104***
(0.016)
0.053*
(0.027)
0.348***
(0.055)
0.105***
(0.016)
0.053*
(0.028)
0.066***
(0.023)
0.059**
(0.023)
0.060**
(0.022)
Log of
money and 
quasi 
money 
growth rate
-0.029
(0.038)
-0.024
(0.034)
-0.047
(0.087)
-0.037
(0.085)
-0.020
(0.035)
-0.006
(0.026)
-0.020
(0.032)
-0.004
(0.026)
-0.014
(0.028)
-0.044
(0.086)
-0.004
(0.026)
-0.014
(0.029)
-0.005
(0.024)
-0.003
(0.024)
-0.003
(0.023)
C 2.471***
(0.823)
3.078***
(0.784)
3.322***
(0.692)
8.209***
(1.461)
9.152***
(1.130)
3.568***
(0.747)
3.239***
(0.542)
2.359***
(0.692)
3.629***
(0.525)
2.743***
(0.587)
8.471***
(1.462)
3.420***
(0.558)
2.839***
(0.654)
2.788***
(0.525)
3.187***
(0.503)
2.974***
(0.528)
Adjusted R2 0.972 0.977 0.981 0.881 0.885 0.981 0.989 0.984 0.989 0.987 0.883 0.989 0.987 0.991 0.991 0.991
Notes:  Figures in parentheses are standard errors; ***99%, **95%, and *90%
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Table 3.7 Estimation Results of Real GDP Growth Models                                                                                                                
Dependent Variable:  Growth rate of real gross domestic product
Variable Original 
Model 1
New 
Model 1 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 
16
Growth rate of 
real total
external 
debt stock
-0.034
(0.450)
0.179
(0.552)
0.795***
(0.077)
0.105
(0.418)
0.895***
(0.101)
0.787***
(0.072)
0.347
(0.631)
0.092
(0.384)
0.876***
(0.095)
0.208
(0.588)
Growth rate of 
real long-term 
external debt 
stock
0.896** 
(0.421)
0.713
(0.510)
0.782***
(0.070)
0.681
(0.407)
0.791***
(0.088)
0.775***
(0.064)
0.489
(0.556)
0.687*
(0.374)
0.775***
(0.081)
0.595
(0.517)
Growth rate of 
real short-term 
external debt 
stock
0.054
(0.054)
0.001
(0.075)
0.278**
(0.102)
-0.093
(0.062)
-0.010
(0.056)
0.283**
(0.101)
-0.044
(0.084)
-0.081
(0.059)
0.000
(0.051)
-0.021
(0.078)
Growth rate of 
total debt 
servicing as a 
percentage of 
exports
-0.125**
(0.057)
-0.117*
(0.062)
-0.160
(0.164)
-0.124*
(0.062)
-0.125**
(0.057)
-0.176
(0.141)
-0.124**
(0.059)
-0.115*
(0.061)
-0.125**
(0.059)
-0.122* 
(0.061)
Growth rate of 
real workers’ 
remittances and 
compensation of 
employees 
received
0.015
(0.063)
0.034
(0.057)
0.412***
(0.092)
0.575***
(0.090)
0.029
(0.061)
-0.006
(0.063)
0.037
(0.060)
0.033
(0.059)
0.056
(0.053)
0.434***
(0.092)
0.015
(0.068)
0.052
(0.057)
0.017
(0.060)
0.056
(0.055)
0.045
(0.064)
Growth rate of 
real foreign direct 
investment net 
inflows
0.079**
(0.033)
0.075**
(0.031)
0.149**
(0.071)
0.212**
(0.076)
0.075**
(0.032)
0.086**
(0.033)
0.071**
(0.031)
0.076**
(0.033)
0.067**
(0.029)
0.134*
(0.071)
0.080**
(0.034)
0.067**
(0.030)
0.078**
(0.031)
0.067**
(0.030)
0.069**
(0.032)
Money and quasi 
money growth 
rate
0.140
(0.250)
0.120
(0.234)
-0.084
(0.538)
0.122
(0.632)
0.123
(0.240)
0.182
(0.245)
0.249
(0.240)
0.124
(0.241)
0.230
(0.220)
0.071
(0.545)
0.148
(0.250)
0.232
(0.226)
0.277
(0.235)
0.230
(0.227)
0.242
(0.235)
Growth rate of the 
total labour force
-0.426
(1.516)
-0.003
(1.526)
-0.578
(1.415)
-1.935
(3.257)
-4.135
(3.674)
-0.490
(1.490)
-0.127
(1.484)
-0.356
(1.435)
-0.605
(1.459)
-0.927
(1.308)
-2.354
(3.231)
-0.412
(1.527)
-0.850
(1.379)
-0.441
(1.403)
-0.928
(1.350)
-0.806
(1.426)
The first-
differenced 
growth rate of real 
capital stock
5.867
(6.861)
4.904
(5.967)
2.569
(5.547)
-13.529
(13.015)
-9.784
(15.196)
2.906
(5.838)
8.930
(6.392)
1.336
(5.850)
2.939
(6.078)
-1.002
(5.344)
-18.612
(13.473)
5.364
(7.601)
-0.700
(5.625)
5.119
(6.333)
-0.988
(5.887)
0.547
(7.428)
C 0.011 
(0.013)
0.018 
(0.050)
-0.021
(0.063)
0.003
(0.058)
0.089
(0.133)
0.114
(0.151)
-0.001
(0.061)
-0.028
(0.061)
-0.026
(0.059)
0.003
(0.060)
-0.003
(0.054)
0.079
(0.131)
-0.010
(0.065)
-0.006
(0.056)
-0.032
(0.058)
-0.003 
(0.055)
-0.010
(0.060)
Adjusted R2 0.986 0.985 0.984 0.986 0.927 0.904 0.986 0.985 0.986 0.986 0.988 0.929 0.985 0.988 0.987 0.988 0.987
Notes:  Figures in parentheses are standard errors; ***99%, **95%, and *90%
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Table 3.7.1 The OLS Residual and Stability Diagnostics
Mode
l
Jarque-
Bera 
(JB)
Probability 
of Jarque-
Bera (JB)
Breusch-
Godfrey
Serial 
Correlation
LM Test-:
Prob. of 
F-Statistic
Breusch-Godfrey
Serial Correlation
LM Test:
Probability of 
Chi-Square-
Statistic
Breusch-Pagan-
Godfrey
Test of 
Heteroskedasticity
:
Probability of 
F-Statistic 
Breusch-Pagan-
Godfrey
Test of 
Heteroskedasticity:
Prob. of Chi-
Square-
Statistic
Heteroskedasticity 
Test for ARCH 
Effects: 
Prob. of  Chi-
Square-Statistic
Chow Test of 
structural break 
at 1998: 
Prob. of F-
Statistic
M1 0.103 0.9498 0.1315 0.0656 0.8554 0.8043 0.2689 0.2794
M2 0.541 0.7630 0.9404 0.9122 0.8984 0.8571 0.6090 0.1007
M3 0.750 0.6871 0.7010 0.5930 0.8954 0.8533 0.4800 0.1243
M4 4.670 0.0968 0.5038 0.3716 0.7894 0.7282 0.5870 0.0024
M5 0.620 0.7333 0.5937 0.4677 0.3303 0.2940 0.9339 0.9339
M6 0.686 0.7096 0.7625 0.6545 0.9273 0.8873 0.4256 0.1029
M7 0.516 0.7728 0.7806 0.6785 0.9360 0.8993 0.7371 0.2385
M8 0.723 0.6966 0.7065 0.5823 0.9540 0.9251 0.5580 0.2852
M9 0.787 0.6747 0.6036 0.4591 0.9546 0.9260 0.5812 0.1318
M10 0.477 0.7879 0.3064 0.1731 0.9318 0.8935 0.2680 0.3237
M11 4.658 0.0974 0.6928 0.5652 0.6416 0.5651 0.6302 0.0020
M12 0.664 0.7176 0.6667 0.5132 0.9760 0.9546 0.6707 0.2417
M13 0.423 0.8091 0.3541 0.1934 0.9585 0.9261 0.2623 0.3110
M14 0.681 0.7116 0.5172 0.3437 0.9750 0.9529 0.4132 0.5930
M15 0.479 0.7873 0.3212 0.1675 0.9626 0.9326 0.2688 0.4060
M16 0.455 0.7965 0.3328 0.1585 0.9880 0.9729 0.3026 0.2885
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Table 3.8 Estimation Results of Double-log_RGDP Models                                                                                                               
Dependent Variable: log of real GDP
Variable Original 
Model 1
New 
Model 1 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 
16
Log of real total 
extern-
al debt stock
0.541 
(0.551)
0.195
(0.480)
0.687***
(0.069)
-0.468
(0.334)
0.873***
(0.076)
0.707***
(0.070)
0.064
(0.398)
-0.421
(0.330)
0.885***
(0.075)
0.100
(0.390)
Log of real long-
term external 
debt stock
0.454
(0.524)
0.824*
(0.448)
0.696***
(0.056)
1.148***
(0.327)
0.797***
(0.063)
0.713***
(0.056)
0.740*
(0.359)
1.118***
(0.322)
0.807***
(0.062)
0.718*
(0.351)
Log of real 
short-term 
external debt 
stock
-0.097*
(0.049)
-0.085*
(0.045)
0.167**
(0.076)
-0.142***
(0.040)
-0.089**
(0.033)
0.167**
(0.080)
-0.093**
(0.044)
-0.138***
(0.039)
-0.085**
(0.033)
-0.091**
(0.043)
Log of total debt 
servicing as a
percentage of 
exports
-0.324***
(0.064)
-0.184**
(0.082)
0.081
(0.203)
-0.114
(0.088)
-0.106
(0.072)
0.003
(0.193)
-0.096
(0.072)
-0.098
(0.071)
-0.091
(0.064)
-0.092
(0.066)
Log of real 
workers’ 
remittances and 
compensation of 
employees 
received
0.165***
(0.049)
0.154***
(0.041)
0.522***
(0.063)
0.557***
(0.071)
0.159***
(0.040)
0.095**
(0.045)
0.168***
(0.049)
0.117***
(0.039)
0.157***
(0.040)
0.522***
(0.068)
0.115**
(0.043)
0.161***
(0.040)
0.099**
(0.044)
0.122***
(0.038)
0.118**
(0.042)
Log of real 
foreign direct 
investment net 
inflows
0.056*
(0.029)
0.049*
(0.024)
0.050
(0.070)
0.144*
(0.072)
0.048*
(0.024)
0.104***
(0.027)
0.036
(0.032)
0.081***
(0.024)
0.031
(0.026)
0.051
(0.080)
0.083***
(0.027)
0.032
(0.026)
0.086***
(0.030)
0.064**
(0.027)
0.066**
(0.029)
Log of money 
and quasi money 
growth rate
-0.010
(0.031)
-0.005
(0.026)
-0.068
(0.064)
-0.060
(0.071)
-0.003
(0.025)
0.008
(0.025)
-0.013
(0.030)
0.006
(0.023)
-0.007
(0.025)
-0.068
(0.066)
0.006
(0.024)
-0.006
(0.025)
0.006
(0.025)
0.003
(0.023)
0.004
(0.023)
Log of total 
labour force
3.494***
(1.027)
2.167*
(1.240)
2.102**
(1.004)
-4.682**
(2.076)
-6.703**
(2.791)
1.749*
(1.015)
2.352**
(1.004)
1.239
(1.417)
1.977**
(0.890)
1.210
(1.152)
-4.656
(2.774)
2.020**
(0.948)
0.975
(1.150)
1.547
(1.142)
1.217
(1.021)
1.273
(1.069)
Log of real 
capital stock
1.093***
(0.293)
0.560
(0.398)
0.553
(0.324)
-1.797***
(0.624)
-2.307**
(0.857)
0.449
(0.325)
0.754**
(0.327)
0.292
(0.444)
0.600**
(0.287)
0.295
(0.361)
-1.789**
(0.835)
0.616*
(0.311)
0.225
(0.360)
0.518
(0.363)
0.375
(0.322)
0.398
(0.342)
C 2.471***
(0.823)
-88.736***
(25.767)
-49.607
(32.795)
-47.987*
(26.558)
138.936*
*
(53.031)
189.071**
(71.485)
-38.624
(26.842)
-58.905**
(26.642)
-26.391
(36.976)
-47.391*
(23.494)
-25.624
(30.027)
138.262*
(70.799)
-48.648*
(25.283)
-19.266
(30.005)
-38.663
(29.906)
-28.212
(26.638)
-29.930
(28.095)
Adjusted R2 0.972 0.985 0.985 0.990 0.933 0.919 0.990 0.990 0.986 0.992 0.990 0.930 0.992 0.991 0.991 0.992 0.992
Notes:  Figures in parentheses are standard errors; ***99%, **95%, and *90%
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Table 3.9 Results of Johansen Cointegration Rank Tests
Null 
Hypothesis
Eigenvalue Maximum 
Eigenvalue 
Statistic
5 Percent
Critical 
Value
Probability Trace
Statistic
5 Percent
Critical 
Value
Probability**
r=0* 0.909630 62.50002 33.87687 0.0000 140.6880 69.81889 0.0000
U* 0.797707 41.54901 27.58434 0.0004 78.18797 47.85613 0.0000
U* 0.616720 24.93373 21.13162 0.0139 36.63896 29.79707 0.0070
U 0.326613 10.28133 14.26460 0.1941 11.70522 15.49471 0.1716
U 0.053293 1.423895 3.841466 0.2328 1.423895 3.841466 0.2328
*denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level                                                                                                                                                                                             
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values                                       
Table 3.10  Cointegrating Equations Based on the Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients
Number of 
Co-
integrating 
Equations
Log 
Likelihood
Dependent 
Variable of 
Interest
Real 
GDP 
growth 
rate
Growth 
rate of
real total 
external 
debt stock
Growth rate of 
real long-term 
external debt 
stock
Growth rate 
of real short-
term external 
debt stock
Growth rate 
of total debt 
servicing as 
a percent of 
exports
1 135.210 Real GDP 
growth rate
1.000 0.702 
(0.467)
-1.333
(0.434)
0.018
(0.052)
-0.102 
(0.059)
2 155.984 Real GDP 
growth rate
1.000 0.000 -0.575
(0.052)
-0.027 
(0.039)
0.152 
(0.061)
3 168.451 Real GDP 
growth rate
1.000 0.000 0.000 -0.239
(0.059)
-0.180
(0.147)
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Chapter 4
Effects of external debt growth variables on the growth rates of the 
real GDP shares of agriculture, industry, and services for Pakistan
4.1 Introduction
In light of an empirical evidence of a substantial usage of external debt for financing 
investments in Pakistan’s agriculture, industry, and services sectors1, this chapter 
extends the analysis in Chapter 3 by estimating the relationships between the growth 
rates of sectoral shares of real GDP and the four external debt growth variables to 
shed some light on structural changes that have occurred in the economy.  More 
specifically, it inquires into the nature of short-run and long-run effects of four 
external debt growth variables on the growth rates of the real GDP shares of the 
agriculture, industry and services sectors of Pakistan’s economy during the era of 
external debt accumulation since 1981. This analysis may also provide lessons for 
Greece and other European Union countries facing similar problems.
This chapter is also motivated by the historical fact of simultaneous robust growth of 
all sectors of Pakistan’s economy in the 1960s, which implies that there exist
possibilities of effects of external debt growth variables on the growth rates of the 
sectoral constituents of real GDP in the form of the real GDP shares of agricultural, 
industrial, and services sectors. While the existing literature on economic effects of 
                                                          
1 Husain (1999), and Fasih-Uddin and Swati (2009). 
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external debt for Pakistan does include empirical research on the real GDP growth 
effects of a couple of external debt growth variables, this chapter’s new empirical 
study of the effects of external debt growth variables on her sectoral real GDP shares’ 
growth rates is warranted by the absence of comprehensive empirical literature on 
these effects on the growth rates of the real GDP shares of agriculture, industry, and 
services. 
Finally, the above empirical research will be useful to determine the existence of any 
similarity or difference between the short-run and long-run effects of the growth rates 
of Pakistan’s real total external debt stock, real long-term external debt stock, real 
short-term external debt stock, and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports of 
goods, services, and income on the growth rates of the real GDP shares of 
agriculture, industry, and services.
By using the unit root tests for nonstationarity, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), OLS 
residual and stability diagnostics, and the Johansen’s multiple cointegration tests, this 
chapter presents an econometric analysis of the short-run and long-run effects of the 
growth rates of real total external debt stock, real long-term external debt stock, real 
short-term external debt stock, and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports on 
the growth rate of the real GDP share of agriculture, on the growth rate of the real 
GDP share of industry, and on the growth rate of the real GDP share of services. 
In addition, the OLS-based double-log regression models of dependent variables, in 
the form of sectoral real GDP shares and the explanatory external debt variables, are 
also estimated for determining the elasticities of the real GDP shares of agriculture, 
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industry, and services with respect to the explanatory external debt variables in order 
to find out about the elastic or inelastic nature of the real GDP shares of agriculture, 
industry, and services with respect to the explanatory external debt variables.  
Moreover, the tests for cointegration are carried out to determine whether the above 
dependent variables, and explanatory external debt growth variables, are cointegrated 
to explore the possibility of the existence of a long-run stable equilibrium 
relationship between the above dependent variables and the relevant explanatory 
external debt growth variables.  
Section 4.2 presents the empirical econometric analysis of the short-run effects of 
four external debt growth variables on the growth rates of the real GDP shares of 
agriculture, industry, and services. Subsection 4.2.1 presents the sector-level 
estimation results of short-run models of the growth rates of the real GDP shares of 
agriculture, industry, and services using the three control variables (the growth rates 
of real foreign direct investment, real workers’ remittances and compensation of 
employees received, and money and quasi money).  It also presents an analysis of the 
robustness of results of short-run econometric models to the inclusion of two 
additional control variables (the growth rate of total labour force and the first-
differenced growth rate of real capital stock).  In addition, it presents elasticities of 
the real GDP shares of agriculture, industry and services, which are estimated using 
double-log regression models of dependent variables in the form of sectoral real GDP 
shares by means of the OLS method.  Subsection 4.2.2 presents an empirical analysis 
of the long-run effects of four external debt growth variables on the growth rates of 
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the real GDP shares of agriculture, industry, and services.  Finally, Section 4.3 
presents a summary, conclusions and policy recommendations.
4.2 Sector-level estimation results 
This section presents the estimation results of the effects of Pakistan’s ever-growing 
external debt on the growth rates of the real GDP shares of agriculture, industry, and 
services using annual data obtained from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators and the aforementioned time series of real capital stock (calculated in 
Chapter 3) for the period 1981-20102.
All the sectoral real GDP share growth time series were tested for nonstationarity by 
using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics and the Phillips-Peron test 
statistics.  The results of unit root tests for nonstationarity of all the sectoral real GDP 
share growth time series are presented in Table 4.1 in the appendix. On the basis of 
the Phillips-Peron test statistics, the first-differenced growth rate of real capital stock 
and all other relevant growth rate time series are confirmed to be stationary at the 
99% confidence level. The stationarity of all the above growth time series implies 
the relevance of estimating short-run econometric models of the growth rates of the 
real GDP shares of agriculture, industry, and services. 
Here, it is pertinent to note that the already applied criterion of selecting the right 
models having signs of the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables 
                                                          
2 The names, acronyms, and data sources of all the relevant variables have already been presented in 
Table 3.1 along with descriptive statistics presented in Table 3.2 in the appendix to the Chapter 3.
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according to both theory and expectations is not applicable in the case of sectoral 
GDP share growth models due to the following facts:
i) There is lack consensus on both the external debt-growth rate relationship 
observed by Siddiqui and Malik (2001).
ii) The economic theory is unable to predict as well as explain the direction of 
change in the growth rates of the real GDP shares of agriculture, industry, and 
services since the sectoral real GDP share growth rates signify change in the 
sectoral-cum-structural composition of the national economy.  The sectoral 
changes occur in such a way that some sectoral real GDP shares increase and 
other sectoral real GDP shares decrease.  The sectoral changes can be either 
due to natural changes over time in the sectoral composition of the national 
economy or real GDP, or total external debt (in terms of long-term and short-
term external debt), or because of the changing conditions and the 
fundamentals of national and global economies.  This argument also applies  to 
effects of certain external debt growth variables on the growth rates of real 
GDP shares of agriculture, industry, and the services during the business cycle 
associated with Pakistan’s external debt crisis in light of the following assertion 
of Ormerod and Campbell (1997, p. 88):
“The idea that the movements in GDP over the course of the business 
cycle are inherently unpredictable is not new in economics and some of 
the early quantitative thinking about the cycle, by for example Fisher 
(1925) and Slutsky (1937) in the 1920s and 1930, advanced this as a 
hypothesis. The use of spectrum analysis confirms the validity of the 
hypothesis.”
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iii) Certain negative real GDP growth effects as well as sectoral real GDP share 
growth effects of the external debt growth variables are also consistent with the 
empirical finding of Iqbal (1994), that Pakistan’s real output growth 
decelerated due to the use of structural adjustment loans in nonproductive 
activities. 
In light of the above facts, the sectoral real GDP growth effects of the explanatory 
external debt growth variables are expected to be either positive or negative and, 
therefore, it is pertinent to note that the right sectoral real GDP share growth models 
may have anyone of the expected positive and negative signs of the estimated 
coefficients of the explanatory variables. 
4.2.1.1 Short-run effects of the external debt growth variables on the growth 
rate of the real GDP share of agriculture 
To determine the short-run effects of external debt growth on the growth rate of real 
GDP share of agriculture, the OLS method was used to estimate sixteen agriculture’s 
real GDP share growth models including the independent variables, which have been 
found significant in explaining economic growth in the growth models, as discussed 
in the empirical literature.  This approach sounds reasonable as the estimation of the 
sixteen agriculture’ real GDP share growth models makes it possible to present a 
comprehensive spectrum of all possible scenarios of the estimated effects of all 
explanatory external debt growth variables on the growth rate of the real GDP share 
of agriculture in the framework of various agriculture’s GDP share growth models.
More specifically, the estimations of these growth models make it possible to identify 
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the individual effects of the explanatory external debt growth variables on the growth 
rate of the real GDP share of agriculture in the framework of the various growth 
models having either one, two, three, or all of the explanatory external debt growth 
variables, with or without the set of control variables.  In other words, this 
econometric modelling approach of adding explanatory variables step-by-step in the 
econometric models helps detect any major changes in the magnitude and  
significance of the coefficients of the explanatory variables after the addition of an 
explanatory variable in an econometric model of the growth rate of the real GDP 
share of agriculture.  Estimation results of the aforementioned sixteen of agriculture’s 
real GDP share growth models are presented in Table 4.2 in the appendix.
However, an econometric justification can be found for only 15 of the above 16 of 
agriculture’s real GDP share growth models, which simultaneously passed the tests 
associated with the OLS residual diagnostics3 and stability diagnostics4 at the 5% 
significance level in light of the empirical results of these diagnostics presented in 
Table 4.2.1 in the appendix to this chapter.  Out of these 15 of agriculture’s real GDP 
share growth models, here it is pertinent to present only the empirical results of four 
important models (Models 1, 5, 6, and 13), on the basis of the selection criteria of the 
theoretical relevance-cum-plausibility of the models in terms of the usefulness of 
their explanatory variables determined by the underlying economic theory.
                                                          
3 Jarque-Bera test for normality, Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test in the form of 
Probability of F-Statistic, Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey Test of Heteroskedasticity in the form of 
Probability of Chi-Square-Statistic, and Heteroskedasticity Test for Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedastic (ARCH) Effects in the form of Probability of Chi-Square-Statistic. 
4  Chow Breakpoint Test for the breakpoint date of 1998 ņ Pakistan’s nuclear tests of 28 May 1998 
triggered the imposition of the Western powers’ economic sanctions against Pakistan which, in turn, 
triggered Pakistan’s external debt crisis in 1998 (Husain 1999, p. 419). 
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4.2.1.1.1 Econometric modelling and estimation results
A generic form of the aforementioned agriculture’s real GDP share growth models is 
presented below:
 ௧ܻሶ =  Ȗ଴ + Ȗଵ ܺ௧ሶ +  Ȗଶ ܼ௧ሶ + ɰ௧ (4.1)
In equation 4.1,  ௧ܻሶ signifies the growth rate of the agriculture’s share of real GDP 
( ௧ܻ),  ܺ௧ሶ signifies the vector of the growth rates of explanatory variables (ܺ௧), namely,
real total external debt stock, real long-term external debt stock, real short-term 
external debt stock, and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports, and  ܼ௧ሶ
signifies a vector of the growth rates of controls (ܼ௧) namely real foreign direct 
investment, real workers’ remittances and compensation of employees received, and 
money and quasi money. 
In agriculture’s Real GDP Share Growth Model 1, the growth rate of agriculture’s 
share of real GDP is assumed to vary in response to changes in the growth rates of 
real total external debt stock, real long-term external debt stock, real short-term 
external debt stock, and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports.  From the 
estimation results in Table 4.2, only the growth rate of real total external debt stock 
has a significant positive effect on the growth rate of agriculture’s share of real GDP,
and the growth rate of real long-term external debt stock has a significant negative 
effect on the growth rate of agriculture’s share of real GDP.
In agriculture’s Real GDP Share Growth Model 5, the growth rate of agriculture’s 
share of real GDP is assumed to vary in response to changes in the growth rates of 
total debt servicing as a percentage of exports, real workers’ remittances and 
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compensation of employees received, real foreign direct investment net inflows, and 
money and quasi money. From the estimation results in Table 4.2, none of the 
explanatory variables has either a significant positive effect or a significant negative 
effect on the growth rate of agriculture’s share of real GDP.
For agriculture’s Real GDP Share Growth Model 6, the growth rate of total debt 
servicing as a percentage of exports is replaced by the growth rates of real total 
external debt stock, and real long-term external debt stock (vis-a-vis agriculture’s 
Real GDP Share Growth Model 5) and the equation is re-estimated.  From the 
estimation results in Table 4.2, only the growth rate of real total external debt stock 
has a significant positive effect on the growth rate of agriculture’s share of real GDP.
For agriculture’s Real GDP Share Growth Model 13, the growth rates of real total 
external debt stock and real long term external debt stock are added (vis-a-vis 
agriculture’s Real GDP Share Growth Model 5) and the equation is re-estimated.  
From the estimation results in Table 4.2, none of the explanatory variables has either 
a significant positive effect or a significant negative effect on the growth rate of 
agriculture’s share of real GDP.
From the point of view of an empirical analysis of the effects of external debt 
variables on agriculture’s share of real GDP, it is also important to consider the 
relationship in the form of the partial degree of responsiveness (partial elasticity) of 
agriculture’s share of real GDP to changes in its determinants, such as real total 
external debt stock, real long-term external debt stock, real short-term external debt 
stock, total debt servicing as a percentage of exports, and other pertinent control 
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variables, by means of estimating the double-log regression models of agriculture’s 
share of real GDP (Studenmund 2011, p. 213).  Also Gujrati (2009) notes that the fit 
of a double-log model seems to be slightly better than the fit of the linear model.  Of 
course, the use of the double-log models of agriculture’s share of real GDP is also 
justifiable on the basis of exploring the possibility of changes in the nature of 
significance of the determinants of agriculture’s share of real GDP.  Thus, the effects 
of the above explanatory variables on the percentage change in agriculture’s share of 
real GDP rather than the growth rate of agriculture’s share of real GDP are analysed.  
All the aforementioned variables’ log time series (logarithms of agriculture’s share of 
real GDP, real total external debt stock, real long-term external debt stock, real short-
term external debt stock, total debt servicing as a percentage of exports, real workers’ 
remittances and compensation of employees received, real foreign direct investment 
net inflows, and money and quasi money growth rate) were tested for nonstationarity
by using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics and the Phillips-Peron test 
statistics.  Results of unit root tests for nonstationarity of all the log time series are 
presented in Table 4.3 in the appendix.
While replicating the construction pattern of the aforementioned 16 of agriculture’s 
real GDP share growth models, 16 double-log agriculture’s share of real GDP models
are estimated by means of the OLS method using the pertinent stationary as well as 
nonstationary log time series.  A generic form of the double-log agriculture’s share of 
real GDP models is presented below:
݈݋݃ ௧ܻ =  Ɂ଴ +  Ɂଵ݈݋݃ ܺ௧ +  Ɂଶ݈݋ܼ݃௧ + ᪋௧ (4.2)
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In equation 4.2, ௧ܻ signifies the agriculture’s share of real GDP, ܺ௧ is a vector of 
explanatory variables including real total external debt stock, real long-term external 
debt stock, real short-term external debt stock, and total debt servicing as a 
percentage of exports, and ܼ௧ is a vector of controls including real foreign direct 
investment, real workers’ remittances and compensation of employees received, and 
money and quasi money growth rate.
Estimation results of the 16 double-log agriculture’s share of real GDP models are 
presented in Table 4.4 in the appendix.  It is pertinent to note that all the estimated 
absolute values of elasticities of agriculture’s share of real GDP, with respect to its 
explanatory external debt variables and control variables, are less than one, thereby 
implying that agriculture’s share of real GDP is inelastic. 
Now regression equation 4.1 is being re-estimated using the slightly modified 
approach of Cunningham (1993) to determine the robustness of the above estimation 
results to the addition of two more control variables, stationary time series of the 
growth rate of total labour force (instead of population growth rate) and the first-
differenced growth rate of the real capital stock (instead of investment/GDP ratio), to 
the above vector of control variables ܼ௧ሶ 246F5.  In this amended modelling framework, 
equation 4.1 is re-estimated and the estimation results of sixteen of agriculture’s real 
GDP share growth models are presented in Table 4.9 in the appendix.  An 
econometric justification is found for all of agriculture’s real GDP share growth 
                                                          
5 Here, the modified approach of Cunningham (1993) is used partly because of the availability of the 
World Bank data for our preferred variables and partly because of the greater theoretical suitability of 
our selected explanatory variables for explaining the growth rates of both real GDP and its sectoral 
shares.
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models, which simultaneously passed the tests associated with the aforementioned 
OLS residual and stability diagnostics at the 5% significance level in light of the 
empirical results of these diagnostics presented in Table 4.9.1 in the appendix.  
However, here it is pertinent to only present the empirical results of one important 
agriculture’s Real GDP Share Growth Model (New Model1) of the 5 agriculture’s 
real GDP share growth models (Models 1, 7, 12, 14, and 16), on the basis of the 
aforementioned selection criteria. 
In the new agriculture’s Real GDP Share Growth Model 1, the growth rate of 
agriculture’s share of real GDP is assumed to vary in response to changes in the 
growth rates of real total external debt stock, real long-term external debt stock, real 
short-term external debt stock, total debt servicing as a percentage of exports, total 
labour force, and the first-differenced growth rate of real capital stock.  From the 
estimation results in Table 4.9, only the growth rate of real total external debt stock 
has a significant positive effect on the growth rate of agriculture’s share of real GDP,
and the growth rate of real long-term external debt stock has a significant negative 
effect on the growth rate of agriculture’s share of real GDP.
Overall, Tables 4.2 and 4.9 have documented the evidence of existence of the 
following effects:
i) Significant positive short-run effects of the growth rate of real total external 
debt stock on the growth rate of agriculture’s share of real GDP. 
ii) Significant negative short-run effects of the growth rate of real long-term 
external debt stock on the growth rate of agriculture’s share of real GDP 
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iii) Significant negative short-run effects of the growth rate of real foreign direct 
investment net inflows on the growth rate of agriculture’s share of real GDP.
A comparison of the estimation results of agriculture’s Real GDP Share Growth 
Model 1 (using no control variables) in Table 4.2 and New Agriculture’s Real GDP 
Share Growth Model 1 (using the growth rate of the total labour force and the first-
differenced growth rate of real capital stock as two control variables) in Table 4.9 
reflects the robustness of the following pieces of empirical evidence to the addition of 
the growth rate of the total labour force and the first-differenced growth rate of real 
capital stock as control variables:
i) The growth rate of real total external debt stock has a significant positive short-
run effect on the growth rate of agriculture’s share of real GDP.
ii) The growth rate of real long-term external debt stock has a significant negative 
short- run effect on the growth rate of agriculture’s share of real GDP.
The above two pieces of empirical evidence authenticate this chapter’s first 
motivation by confirming the actual existence of the significant short-run effects of 
the growth rates of real total external debt and real long-term external debt stock on 
the growth rate of the real GDP share of agriculture.  Moreover, the above empirical 
evidence not only signals the actual significant usage of the above external debt in 
the agricultural sector in irrigation projects (for example, construction of dams as 
mentioned earlier) thereby endorsing this chapter’s second motivation but also 
addresses this chapter’s third motivation by empirically showing that the short-run
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effects of the growth rates of real total external debt and real long-term external debt 
stock on the growth rate of the real GPP share of agriculture are dissimilar.
As for the earlier analysis of the agriculture sector, it is pertinent to consider the 
relationship in the form of the partial degree of responsiveness (partial elasticity) of 
agriculture’s share of real GDP to changes in its determinants, by means of 
estimating the double-log regression models of agriculture’s share of real GDP after 
adding two more control variables, that is, total labour force and the real capital 
stock, in the above vector of control variables ܼ௧ in equation 4.2. While replicating 
the construction pattern of the double-log models of agriculture’s real GDP share in 
equation 4.2, the 16 double-log agriculture’s share of real GDP models are re-
estimated by means of the OLS method using the pertinent stationary as well as 
nonstationary log time series.  
The estimation results of the 16 double-log agriculture’s share of real GDP models
are presented in Table 4.10 in the appendix.  It is pertinent to note that all the 
estimated elasticities of agriculture’s share of real GDP with respect to its 
explanatory external debt variables and control variables, other than total labour
force, are less than one, thereby implying that agriculture’s share of real GDP is 
inelastic.  However, there is empirical evidence of the estimated absolute values of 
elasticities of agriculture’s share of real GDP with respect to total labour force being 
either less than one, in the case of fourteen of the double-log agriculture’s share of 
real GDP models (Models 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16), thereby 
implying that agriculture’s share of real GDP is inelastic, or greater than one in the 
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case of two of the double-log agriculture’s share of real GDP models (Models 1 and 
4), thereby implying that agriculture’s share of real GDP is elastic.
There is empirical evidence of the plausible significant positive short-run effect of 
the growth rate of real total external debt stock on the growth rate of agriculture’s 
share of real GDP, based on a comparison of Agriculture’s Real GDP Share Growth 
Model 1 in Table 4.2 and Agriculture’s Real GDP Share Growth Model 1 in Table 
4.9.
4.2.1.2 Short-run econometric models of the growth rate of the real GDP share 
of industry 
To determine the short-run effects of the aforementioned four external debt growth 
variables on the growth rate of the real GDP share of industry using the same 
reasoning as in Section 4.2.1.1, the OLS method was used to estimate sixteen of 
industry’s real GDP share growth models.  The estimation results of these industry’s 
real GDP share growth models are presented in Table 4.5 in the appendix.
However, an econometric justification is found for only 15 of the above 16 of 
industry’s real GDP share growth models, which simultaneously passed the tests 
associated with the aforementioned OLS residual and stability diagnostics at the 5% 
significance level in light of the empirical results of these diagnostics presented in 
Table 4.5.1 in the appendix.  Out of these 15 of industry’s real GDP share growth 
models, here it is pertinent to only present the empirical results of five important 
industry’s real GDP share growth models (Models 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6), on the basis of 
the aforementioned selection criteria. 
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4.2.1.2.1 Econometric modelling and estimation results
A generic form of the aforementioned industry’s real GDP share growth models is 
presented below:
 ௧ܻሶ =  ៭଴ + ៭ଵ ܺ௧ሶ +  ៭ଶ ܼ௧ሶ +  ˶௧ (4.3)
In equation 4.3,  ௧ܻሶ signifies the growth rate of the industry’s share of real GDP ( ௧ܻ), 
 ܺ௧ሶ signifies the vector of the growth rates of explanatory variables (ܺ௧) namely real 
total external debt stock, real long-term external debt stock, real short-term external 
debt stock, and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports, and  ܼ௧ሶ signifies a
vector of the growth rates of controls (ܼ௧) namely real foreign direct investment, real 
workers’ remittances and compensation of employees received, and money and quasi 
money.
In industry’s Real GDP Share Growth Model 2, the growth rate of the industry’s 
share of real GDP is assumed to vary in response to changes in the growth rates of 
real total external debt stock, real workers’ remittances and compensation of 
employees received, real foreign direct investment net inflows, and money and quasi 
money.  From the estimation results in Table 4.5, only the growth rate of real foreign 
direct investment net inflows has a significant positive effect on the growth rate of 
the industry’s share of real GDP.
For industry’s Real GDP Share Growth Model 3, the variable growth rate of real total 
external debt stock is replaced by growth rate of real long-term external debt stock
(vis-a-vis Model 2) and the equation is re-estimated.  From the estimation results in 
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Table 4.5, only the growth rate of real foreign direct investment net inflows has a 
significant positive effect on the growth rate of the industry’s share of real GDP.
For industry’s Real GDP Share Growth Model 4, the variable growth rate of real total 
external debt stock is replaced by growth rate of real short-term external debt stock
(vis-a-vis Model 2) and the equation is re-estimated.   From the estimation results in 
Table 4.5, only the growth rate of real foreign direct investment net inflows has a 
significant positive effect on the growth rate of the industry’s share of real GDP.
For industry’s Real GDP Share Growth Model 5, the variable growth rate of real total 
external debt stock is replaced by the growth rate of total debt servicing as a 
percentage of exports (vis-a-vis Model 2) and the equation is re-estimated.  From the 
estimation results in Table 4.5, the growth rate of real workers’ remittances and 
compensation of employees has a significant negative effect on the growth rate of 
industry’s share of real GDP, and the growth rate of real foreign direct investment net 
inflows has a significant positive effect on the growth rate of industry’s share of real 
GDP.
In industry’s Real GDP Share Growth Model 6, the growth rate of industry’s share of 
real GDP is assumed to vary in response to changes in the growth rates of real total 
external debt stock, real long-term external debt stock, real workers’ remittances and 
compensation of employees received, real foreign direct investment net inflows, and 
money and quasi money.  From the estimation results in Table 4.5, only the growth 
rate of real foreign direct investment net inflows has a significant positive effect on 
the growth rate of industry’s share of real GDP.
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As for the analysis of the agriculture sector, here it is pertinent to consider the 
relationship in the form of the partial degree of responsiveness (partial elasticity) of 
industry’s share of real GDP to changes in its determinants, by means of estimating 
the double-log regression models of industry’s share of real GDP using the same 
format as in section 4.2.1.1. 
A generic form of the double-log industry’s share of real GDP models is presented 
below:
݈݋݃ ௧ܻ =  ʞ଴ + ʞଵ݈݋݃ ܺ௧ +  ʞଶ݈݋ܼ݃௧ +  ߱௧ (4.4)
In equation 4.4, ௧ܻ signifies the industry’s share of real GDP, ܺ௧ is a vector of 
explanatory variables including real total external debt stock, real long-term external 
debt stock, real short-term external debt stock, and total debt servicing as a 
percentage of exports, and ܼ௧ is a vector of controls including real foreign direct 
investment, real workers’ remittances and compensation of employees received, and 
money and quasi money growth rate.
The estimation results of the 16 double-log industry’s share of real GDP models are 
presented in Table 4.6 in the appendix.  It is pertinent to note that all the estimated 
absolute values of elasticities of industry’s share of real GDP with respect to its 
explanatory external debt variables and control variables are less than one, thereby 
implying that industry’s share of real GDP is inelastic.
By means of the same modified approach of Cunningham (1993) used in Section 
4.2.1.1, now regression equation 4.3 is being re-estimated to determine the robustness 
of the above estimation results to the addition of two more control variables, 
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stationary time series of the growth rate of total labour force and the first-differenced 
growth rate of real capital stock, to the above vector of control variables  ܼݐሶ .  In this 
amended modelling framework, equation 4.3 is re-estimated and the estimation 
results of sixteen of industry’s real GDP share growth models are presented in Table 
4.11 in the appendix.  An econometric justification is found for only 10 of the above 
16 of industry’s real GDP share growth models, which simultaneously passed the 
tests associated with the aforementioned OLS residual and stability diagnostics at the 
5% significance level in light of the empirical results of these diagnostics which are 
presented in Table 4.11.1 in the appendix.  Out of these 10 industry’s real GDP share 
growth models, here it is pertinent to only present the empirical results of one 
important model, industry’s Real GDP Share Growth Models 2, on the basis of the 
aforementioned selection criteria. 
In industry’s Real GDP Share Growth Model 2, the growth rate of the industry’s 
share of real GDP is assumed to vary in response to changes in the growth rates of 
real total external debt stock, real workers’ remittances and compensation of 
employees received, real foreign direct investment net inflows, money and quasi 
money, total labour force, and the first differenced growth rate of real capital stock.  
From the estimation results in Table 4.11, only the growth rate of real foreign direct 
investment net inflows has a significant positive effect on the growth rate of 
industry’s share of real GDP.
Table 4.11 has documented the evidence of the existence of the following effects:
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i) Significant negative short-run effects of the growth rates of real total external 
debt stock on the growth rate of industry’s share of real GDP.
ii) Significant positive short-run effects of the growth rate of real long-term 
external debt stock on the growth rate of industry’s share of real GDP 
iii) Significant positive short-run effects of the growth rate of real foreign direct 
investment net inflows on the growth rate of industry’s share of real GDP.
The above first two pieces of empirical evidence authenticate this chapter’s first 
motivation by confirming the actual existence of the significant short-run effects of 
the growth rates of real total external debt and real long-term external debt stock on 
the growth rate of the real GDP share of industry. Moreover, the above empirical 
evidence not only signals the actual significant usage of the above external debt in 
the industrial sector in infrastructural projects (for example, construction of roads as 
mentioned earlier) thereby endorsing this chapter’s second motivation but also 
addresses this chapter’s third motivation by empirically showing that the short-run
effects of the growth rates of real total external debt and real long-term external debt 
stock on the growth rate of the real GPP share of industry are dissimilar.
Notably, a comparison of the estimation results of especially industry’s Real GDP 
Share Growth Model 2 in Table 4.5 and industry’s Real GDP Share Growth Model 2 
in Table 4.11 reflects the robustness of the empirical evidence of a significant 
positive short-run effect of the growth rate of real foreign direct investment net 
inflows on the growth rate of industry’s share of real GDP, to the addition of the 
growth rate of the total labour force and the first-differenced growth rate of real 
capital stock as control variables.
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As for the earlier analysis of the industrial sector, it is pertinent to consider the 
relationship in the form of the partial degree of responsiveness (partial elasticity) of 
industry’s share of real GDP to changes in its determinants, by means of estimating 
the double-log regression models of industry’s share of real GDP after adding two 
more control variables, total labour force and real capital stock, in the above vector of 
control variables ܼ௧ in equation 4.4.  While replicating the construction pattern of the 
double-log models of industry’s real GDP share in equation 4.4, the 16 double-log 
industry’s share of real GDP models are re-estimated by means of the OLS method 
using the pertinent stationary as well as nonstationary log time series.  
The estimation results of the 16 double-log industry’s share of real GDP models are 
presented in Table 4.12 in the appendix.  There is empirical evidence of the estimated 
absolute values of elasticities of industry’s share of real GDP with respect to all 
explanatory/control variables other than total labour force being less than one,
thereby implying that industry’s share of real GDP is inelastic.  There is also 
empirical evidence of the estimated absolute values of elasticities of industry’s share 
of real GDP with respect to total labour force being either less than one, in the case of 
the fifteen double-log industry’s share of real GDP models (Models 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 
9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16), thereby implying that industry share of real GDP is 
inelastic, or greater than one, in the case of one double-log industry’s share of real 
GDP model (Model 4), thereby implying that industry’s share of real GDP is elastic.  
Comparison of the estimation results of especially industry’s Real GDP Share 
Growth Model 2 in Table 4.5 and industry’s Real GDP Share Growth Model 2 in
Table 4.11 reflects the robustness of empirical evidence of a significant positive 
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short-run effect of the growth rate of real foreign direct investment net inflows on the
growth rate of industry’s share of real GDP.
4.2.1.3 Short-run econometric models of the growth rate of real GDP share of 
services 
The analysis in the previous two sections is replicated for the growth rate of the real 
GDP share of services, and the estimation results of the sixteen of services’ real GDP 
share growth models are presented in Table 4.7 in the appendix.
An econometric justification is found for only 5 of the above 16 of services’ real 
GDP share growth models, which simultaneously passed the tests associated with the 
aforementioned OLS residual and stability diagnostics at the 5% significance level in 
light of the empirical results of these diagnostics presented in Table 4.7.1 in the 
appendix.  Here it is pertinent to present the empirical results of the 5 of services’ real 
GDP share growth models (Models 1, 7, 12, 14, and 16), on the basis of the 
aforementioned selection criteria. 
4.2.1.3.1 Econometric modelling and estimation results
A generic form of the aforementioned services’ real GDP share growth models is 
presented below:
 ௧ܻሶ =  ᫔଴ + ᫔ଵ ܺ௧ሶ +  ᫔ଶ ܼ௧ሶ +  ߔ௧ (4.5)
In equation 4.5,  ௧ܻሶ signifies the growth rate of the services’ share of real GDP ( ௧ܻ),
 ܺ௧ሶ signifies the vector of the growth rates of explanatory variables (ܺ௧) including real 
total external debt stock, real long-term external debt stock, real short-term external 
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debt stock, and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports, and  ܼ௧ሶ signifies a
vector of the growth rates of controls (ܼ௧) including real foreign direct investment, 
real workers’ remittances and compensation of employees received, and money and 
quasi money.
In services’ Real GDP Share Growth Model 1, the growth rate of the services’ share 
of real GDP is assumed to vary in response to changes in the growth rates of real total 
external debt stock, real long-term external debt stock, real short-term external debt 
stock, and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports.  From the estimation results 
in Table 4.7, none of the above four external debt growth variables as the explanatory 
variables has a significant positive effect or negative effect on the growth rate of the 
services’ share of real GDP.
In services’ Real GDP Share Growth Model 7, the growth rate of the services’ share 
of real GDP is assumed to vary in response to changes in the growth rates of real total 
external debt stock, real short-term external debt stock, real workers’ remittances and 
compensation of employees received, real foreign direct investment net inflows, and 
money and quasi money.  From the estimation results in Table 4.7, only the growth 
rate of real workers’ remittances and compensation of employees received has a 
significant positive effect on the growth rate of the services’ share of real GDP.
In services’ Real GDP Share Growth Model 12, the growth rate of the services’ share 
of real GDP is assumed to vary in response to changes in the growth rate of real total 
external debt stock, real long-term external debt stock, real short-term external debt 
stock, real workers’ remittances and compensation of employees received, real 
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foreign direct investment net inflows, and money and quasi money.   From the 
estimation results in Table 4.7, only the growth rate of real workers’ remittances and 
compensation of employees received has a significant positive effect on the growth 
rate of the services’ share of real GDP.
For services’ Real GDP Share Growth Model 14, the growth rate of real long-term 
external debt stock is replaced by the growth rate of total debt servicing as a 
percentage of exports (vis-a-vis Model 12) and the equation is re-estimated.  From 
the estimation results in Table 4.7, only the growth rate of real workers’ remittances 
and compensation of employees received has a significant positive effect on the 
growth rate of the services’ share of real GDP.
In services’ Real GDP Share Growth Model 16, the growth rate of the services’ share 
of real GDP is assumed to vary in response to changes in the growth rates of real total 
external debt stock, real long-term external debt stock, real short-term external debt 
stock, total debt servicing as a percentage of exports, real workers’ remittances and 
compensation of employees received, real foreign direct investment net inflows, and 
money and quasi money. From the estimation results in Table 4.7, only the growth 
rate of real workers’ remittances and compensation of employees received has a
significant positive effect on the growth rate of the services’ share of real GDP.
Following the same format as in Section 4.2.1.1, it is pertinent to consider the 
relationship in the form of the partial degree of responsiveness (partial elasticity) of
the services’ share of real GDP to changes in its determinants, by means of 
estimating the double-log regression models of the services share of real GDP.  
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While replicating the construction pattern of the aforementioned 16 services’ real 
GDP share growth models, the 16 double-log services’ share of real GDP models are 
estimated by means of the OLS method using the pertinent stationary as well as 
nonstationary log time series.  
A generic form of the double-log services’ share of real GDP models is presented 
below:
݈݋݃ ௧ܻ =  ხ଴ +  ხଵ݈݋݃ ܺ௧ + ხଶ݈݋ܼ݃௧ +  ߬௧ (4.6)
In equation 4.6, ௧ܻ signifies the services’ share of real GDP, ܺ௧ is a vector of 
explanatory variables including real total external debt stock, real long-term external 
debt stock, real short-term external debt stock, and total debt servicing as a 
percentage of exports, and ܼ௧ is a vector of controls including real foreign direct 
investment, real workers’ remittances and compensation of employees received, and 
money and quasi money growth rate.
The estimation results of the 16 double-log services’ share of real GDP models are 
presented in Table 4.8 in the appendix.  It is pertinent to note that all the estimated 
absolute values of elasticities of services’ share of real GDP with respect to its 
explanatory external debt variables and control variables are less than one, thereby 
implying that the services’ share of real GDP is inelastic.
By means of the same modified approach of Cunningham (1993) used in previous 
two sections, here it is pertinent re-estimate regression equation 4.5 to determine the 
robustness of the above estimation results to the addition of two more control 
variables, stationary time series of the growth rate of the total labour force and the 
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first-differenced growth rate of real capital stock, to the above vector of control 
variables  ܼ௧ሶ .  In this amended modelling framework, equation 4.5 is re-estimated and 
the estimation results of the sixteen of the services’ real GDP share growth models 
are presented in Table 4.13 in the appendix.  An econometric justification is found 
for only 1 of the above 16 of the services’ real GDP share growth models (New 
Services’ Real GDP Share Growth Model 1), which simultaneously passed the tests 
associated with the aforementioned OLS residual and stability diagnostics at the 5% 
significance level in light of the empirical results of these diagnostics which are 
presented in Table 4.13.1 in the appendix.  Therefore, here it is pertinent to only 
present the estimation results of the New Services’ Real GDP Share Growth Model 1,
on the basis of the aforementioned selection criteria.
In New services’ Real GDP Share Growth Model 1, the growth rate of the services’
share of real GDP is assumed to vary in response to changes in the growth rate of real 
total external debt stock, real long-term external debt stock, real short-term external 
debt stock, total debt servicing as a percentage of exports and total labour force, and 
the first differenced growth rate of real capital stock.  From the estimation results in 
Table 4.13, none of the above four external debt growth variables as the explanatory 
variables has a significant short-run effect on the growth rate of the services’ share of 
real GDP.
Table 4.7 has documented the evidence of the existence of a significant positive 
short-run effect of the growth rate of real workers’ remittances and compensation of 
employees received on the growth rate of the services’ share of real GDP. Notably, a
comparison of the estimation results of especially services’ Real GDP Share Growth 
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Model 1 in Table 4.7 and New Services’ Real GDP Share Growth Model 1 in Table 
4.13 reflects their robustness to the addition of the growth rate of the total labour 
force and the first-differenced growth rate of real capital stock as control variables.
As for the earlier analysis of the services, it is pertinent to consider the relationship in 
the form of the partial degree of responsiveness (partial elasticity) of services’ share 
of real GDP to changes in its determinants, by means of estimating the double-log 
regression models of the services’ share of real GDP after adding two more control 
variables, total labour force and real capital stock, in the above vector of control 
variables ܼ௧ in equation 4.6.  While replicating the construction pattern of the double-
log models of the services’ real GDP share in equation 4.6, the 16 double-log 
services’ share of real GDP models are re-estimated and the estimation results are 
presented in Table 4.14 in the appendix.  It is pertinent to note that all the estimated 
absolute values of elasticities of the services’ share of real GDP with respect to its 
explanatory external debt variables and control variables are less than one, thereby 
implying that the services’ share of real GDP is inelastic.
A comparison of the estimation results of especially services’ Real GDP Share 
Growth Models 1, 7, 12, 14, and 16 in Table 4.7 reflects the robustness of empirical 
evidence of a significant positive short-run effect of the growth rate of real workers’ 
remittances and compensation of employees received on the growth rate of the 
services’ share of real GDP.
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4.2.2 Long-run effects of the external debt growth variables on sectoral real GDP 
share growth rates
While all the above growth variables and the first-differenced growth rate of real 
capital stock are stationary, not all their corresponding original variables (logarithms 
of agriculture’s share of real GDP, industry’s share of real GDP, the services’ share 
of real GDP, real total external debt stock, real long-term external debt stock, total 
debt servicing as a percentage of exports, real workers’ remittances and 
compensation of employees received, foreign direct investment net inflows, and total 
labour force) are stationary on the basis of the Phillips-Peron tests of nonstationarity 
at the 99% confidence level.  Therefore, there arises a technical justification for 
testing the existence of cointegration among the relevant sets of growth variables and, 
thereby, determining the long-run agriculture’s real GDP share growth effects of the 
above four external debt growth variables, the long-run industry’s real GDP share
growth effects of the external debt growth variables, and the long-run services’ real 
GDP share growth effects of the external debt growth variables via the Johansen 
cointegration test.  The Johansen cointegration test, employing a pertinent set of the 
above growth variables and the first-differenced growth rate of real capital stock, is 
used to test the null hypothesis of no cointegrating vector for determining whether 
there exists the possibility of the presence of a long-run stable equilibrium 
relationship among them.
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4.2.2.1 Long-run agriculture’s real GDP share growth effects of the external 
debt growth variables
The results of the Johansen’s multiple cointegration test, presented in Tables 4.15 and 
4.16 in the appendix, are based on the use of the five control variables (the growth 
rates of real workers’ remittances and compensation of employees received, real 
foreign direct investment net inflows, money and quasi money and total labour force, 
and the first-differenced growth rate of the real capital stock).  These results in Table 
4.15 confirm the presence of cointegration, implying the existence of a long-run 
stable equilibrium relationship between the growth rates of agriculture’s share of real 
GDP and the aforementioned external debt growth variables. 
In Table 4.15 in the appendix, the maximum-eigenvalue test indicates the existence 
of three cointegrating equations at the 0.05 significance level and the trace test 
indicates the existence of four cointegrating equations at the 0.05 significance level.
These tests confirm the existence of a long-run relationship among the growth 
variables, namely, the growth rates of the real GDP share of agriculture, real total 
external debt stock, real long-term external debt stock, real short-term external debt 
stock, and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports.   Here it is pertinent to note 
that the maximum-eigenvalue test is considered to be a more reliable test in the case 
of the small samples by Adebiyi and Adeyemi (2008).
For ensuring a clearer interpretation, especially of the long-run agriculture’s real 
GDP share growth effects of the four external debt growth variables, cointegrating 
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vectors are normalized with respect to the growth rate of agriculture’s share of real 
GDP, and presented in Table 4.16 in the appendix.  
On the basis of the aforementioned point of view that the maximum-eigenvalue test is 
considered to be a more reliable test in the case of small samples, here it is pertinent 
to interpret the normalized cointegrating coefficients in the cases of only one 
cointegrating equation, two cointegrating equations, and three cointegrating 
equations, as presented in Table 4.16, because they include the empirical evidence of 
the presence of certain significant long-run agriculture’s real GDP share growth 
effects (Adebiyi and Adeyemi, 2008).
In the case of one cointegration equation, which has associated with it a log-
likelihood value of 144.945, only the growth rate of real short-term external debt 
stock has a significant negative long-run effect on the growth rate of real GDP share 
of agriculture at the 5% significance level for the period 1981-2010. More 
specifically, the above cointegration equation implies that a unit individual increase 
in the growth rates of real short-term external debt stock culminated in a decrease in 
the growth rate of real GDP share of agriculture, amounting to 0.072 units.  
In the case of two cointegration equations, which have associated with them a log-
likelihood value of 166.207, only the growth rates of real short-term external debt 
stock and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports, respectively, have
significant negative and positive long-run effects on the growth rate of the real GDP 
share of agriculture at the 5% significance level for the period 1981-2010.  More 
specifically, the above cointegration equation implies that a unit individual increase 
197 
 
in the growth rate of real short-term external debt stock culminated in a decrease in 
the growth rate of the real GDP share of agriculture, amounting to 0.712 units; and 
that a unit individual increase in the growth rate of total debt servicing as a 
percentage of exports culminated in an increase in the growth rate of the real GDP 
share of agriculture, amounting to 3.192 units.
In the case of three cointegration equations, which have associated with them a log-
likelihood value of 178.124, only the growth rates of real short-term external debt 
stock and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports, respectively, have 
significant positive and negative long-run effects on the growth rate of the real GDP 
share of agriculture at the 5% significance level for the period 1981-2010.  More 
specifically, the above cointegration equation implies that a unit individual increase 
in the growth rate of real short-term external debt stock culminated in an increase in 
the growth rate of the real GDP share of agriculture, amounting to 0.413 units; and 
that a unit individual increase in the growth rate of total debt servicing as a 
percentage of exports culminated in a decrease in the growth rate of the real GDP 
share of agriculture, amounting to 2.303 units.
The above empirical evidence authenticates this chapter’s first motivation by 
confirming the actual existence of only the significant long-run effects of the growth 
rates of real short-term external debt stock and total debt servicing as a percentage of 
exports on the growth rate of the real GDP share of agriculture.  Moreover, the above 
empirical evidence not only signals the actual significant usage of the short-term 
external debt in the agricultural sector thereby endorsing this chapter’s second 
motivation but also addresses this chapter’s third motivation by empirically showing 
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that the long-run effects of the growth rates of real short-term external debt stock and 
total debt servicing as a percentage of exports on the growth rate of the real GDP
share of agriculture are mixed.
4.2.3.2 Long-run industry’s real GDP share growth effects of the external debt 
growth variables
The results of the Johansen’s multiple cointegration test, presented in Tables 4.17 and 
4.18 in the appendix, are based on the use of the five control variables (the growth 
rates of real workers’ remittances and compensation of employees received, real 
foreign direct investment net inflows, money and quasi money and total labour force, 
and the first- differenced growth rate of the real capital stock). These results confirm 
the presence of cointegration, implying the existence of a long-run stable equilibrium 
relationship between the growth rates of industry’s share of real GDP and the 
aforementioned external debt growth variables.  In Table 4.17 in the appendix, both 
the maximum-eigenvalue test and the trace test indicate the existence of four 
cointegrating equations at the 0.05 significance level. These tests confirm the 
existence of long-run relationships between the growth variables, namely, the growth 
rates of the real GDP share of industry, real total external debt stock, real long-term 
external debt stock, real short-term external debt stock, and total debt servicing as a 
percentage of exports. 
For ensuring a clearer interpretation, especially of the long-run industry’s real GDP 
share growth effects of the four external debt growth variables, cointegrating vectors 
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are normalized with respect to the growth rate of industry’s share of real GDP, and 
presented in Table 4.18 in the appendix.  
However, here it is pertinent to interpret the normalized cointegrating coefficients in 
the cases of only one cointegrating equation, two cointegrating equations, and three 
cointegrating equations, as presented in Table 4.18, because they include the 
empirical evidence of the presence of certain significant long-run industry’s real GDP 
share growth effects.
In the case of one cointegration equation, which has associated with it a log-
likelihood value of 145.448, only the growth rates of real short-term external debt 
stock and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports, respectively, have 
significant positive and negative long-run effects on the growth rate of the real GDP 
share of industry at the 5% significance level for the period 1981-2010.  More 
specifically, the above cointegration equation implies that a unit individual increase 
in the growth rate of real short-term external debt stock culminated in an increase in 
the growth rate of the real GDP share of industry, amounting to 0.054 units; and that 
a unit individual increase in the growth rate of total debt servicing as a percentage of 
exports culminated in a decrease in the growth rate of the real GDP share of industry,
amounting to 0.148 units.
In the case of two cointegration equations, which have associated with them a log-
likelihood value of 166.150, only the growth rates of real long-term external debt 
stock, real short-term external debt stock, and total debt servicing as a percentage of 
exports, respectively, have significant negative, positive, and negative long-run 
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effects on the growth rate of the real GDP share of industry at the 5% significance 
level for the period 1981-2010. More specifically, the above cointegration equation 
implies that a unit individual increase in the growth rate of real long-term external 
debt stock culminated in a decrease in the growth rate of the real GDP share of 
industry, amounting to 0.378 units; that a unit individual increase in the growth rate 
of real short-term external debt stock culminated in an increase in the growth rate of 
the real GDP share of industry, amounting to 0.177; and that a unit individual 
increase in the growth rate of total debt servicing as a percentage of exports 
culminated in a decrease in the growth rate of the real GDP share of industry,
amounting to 0.240 units.
In the case of three cointegration equations, which have associated with them a log-
likelihood value of 177.774, only the growth rates of real short-term external debt 
stock and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports, respectively, have 
significant positive and negative long-run effects on the growth rate of the real GDP 
share of industry at the 5% significance level for the period 1981-2010.  More 
specifically, the above cointegration equation implies that a unit individual increase 
in the growth rate of real short-term external debt stock culminated in an increase in 
the growth rate of the real GDP share of industry, amounting to 0.046 units; and that 
a unit individual increase in the growth rate of total debt servicing as a percentage of 
exports culminated in a decrease in the growth rate of the real GDP share of industry,
amounting to 0.295 units.
The above empirical evidence authenticates this chapter’s first motivation by 
confirming the actual existence of only the significant long-run effects of the growth 
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rates of real short-term external debt stock and total debt servicing as a percentage of 
exports on the growth rate of the real GDP share of industry.  The above empirical 
evidence also authenticates this chapter’s first motivation by confirming the actual 
existence of a significant long-run effects of the growth rates of real long-term 
external debt stock, in addition to the already reported empirical evidence of a 
significant short-run positive effect of the growth rates of real long-term external debt 
stock on the growth rate of the real GDP share of industry.   Moreover, the above 
empirical evidence signals the actual significant usage of both the long-term and the 
short-term external debt in the industrial sector thereby endorsing this chapter’s 
second motivation. In addition, the above empirical evidence also addresses this 
chapter’s third motivation by empirically showing that the short-run and the long-run
effects of the growth rates of real long-term external debt stock are dissimilar, that 
the long-run effects of the growth rates of real long-term external debt stock and total 
debt servicing as a percentage of exports on the growth rate of the real GDP share of 
industry are similar, and that the long-run effects of the growth rates of real short-
term external debt stock and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports on the 
growth rate of the real GDP share of industry are dissimilar.
4.2.3.3 Long-run services’ real GDP share growth effects of the external debt 
growth variables
The results of the Johansen’s multiple cointegration test, presented in Tables 4.19 and 
Table 4.20 in the appendix, are based on the use of the five control variables (the
growth rates of real workers’ remittances and compensation of employees received, 
real foreign direct investment net inflows, money and quasi money, total labour
202 
 
force, and the first-differenced growth rate of the real capital stock).  These results in 
Table 4.19 confirm the presence of cointegration, implying the existence of a long-
run stable equilibrium relationship between the growth rates of the services’ share of 
real GDP and the aforementioned external debt growth variables. 
In Table 4.19 in the appendix, both the maximum-eigenvalue test and the trace test 
indicate the existence of two cointegrating equations at the 0.05 significance level.  
These tests confirm the existence of a long-run relationship among the growth 
variables, namely, the growth rates of the services’ share of Real GDP, real total 
external debt stock, real long-term external debt stock, real short-term external debt 
stock, and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports.  
For ensuring a clearer interpretation, especially of the long-run services’ real GDP 
share growth effects of the four external debt growth variables, the cointegrating 
vectors are normalized with respect to the growth rate of the services’ real GDP 
share, and presented in Table 4.20 in the appendix.
Here it is pertinent to interpret the normalized cointegrating coefficients in the cases 
of only one cointegrating equation, and two cointegrating equations, as presented in 
Table 4.20, which include the empirical evidence of the presence of certain 
significant long-run services’ real GDP share growth effects.
In the case of one cointegration equation, which has associated with it a log-
likelihood value of 167.5154, only the growth rate of total debt servicing as a 
percentage of exports has a significant positive long-run effect on the growth rate of 
the real GDP share of services at the 5% significance level for the period 1981-2010.
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More specifically, the above cointegration equation implies that a unit individual 
increase in the growth rate of total debt servicing as a percentage of exports
culminated in an increase in the growth rate of the real GDP share of services,
amounting to 0.036 units.  
In the case of two cointegration equations, which have associated with them a log-
likelihood value of 188.878, only the growth rates of real long-term external debt 
stock, real short-term external debt stock and total debt servicing as a percentage of 
exports, respectively, have significant negative, positive, and positive long-run 
effects on the growth rate of the real GDP share of services at the 5% significance 
level for the period 1981-2010. More specifically, the above cointegration equation 
implies that a unit individual increase in the growth rate of real long-term external 
debt stock culminated in a decrease in the growth rate of the real GDP share of 
services amounting to 0.047 units; that a unit individual increase in the growth rate of 
real short-term external debt stock culminated in an increase in the growth rate of the 
real GDP share of services, amounting to 0.019 units; and that a unit individual 
increase in the growth rate of total debt servicing as a percentage of exports 
culminated in an increase in the growth rate of the real GDP share of services,
amounting to 0.051units.
The above empirical evidence authenticates this chapter’s first motivation by 
confirming the actual existence of only the significant long-run effects of the growth 
rates of real long-term external debt stock, real short-term external debt stock and 
total debt servicing as a percentage of exports on the growth rate of the real GDP
share of the services.  The above empirical evidence signals the actual significant 
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usage of both the long-term and the short-term external debt in the services thereby 
endorsing this chapter’s second motivation.  Moreover, the above empirical evidence 
also addresses this chapter’s third motivation by empirically showing that the long-
run effects of the growth rates of real long-term external debt stock and total debt 
servicing as a percentage of exports on the growth rate of the real GDP share of the 
services are dissimilar, and that the long-run effects of the growth rates of real short-
term external debt stock and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports on the 
growth rate of the real GDP share of the services are similar. 
The above empirical analysis of long-run effects establishes the empirical fact that 
there exists empirical evidence of the presence of cointegration among the above 
relevant growth variables, implying the existence of a long-run stable equilibrium 
relationship among them. 
The above empirical econometric analysis has generally confirmed certain important 
historical facts, which were highlighted in the already presented brief history of 
Pakistan’s economy, about the actual significant negative macroeconomic growth 
effects of the debt servicing burden in the form of external debt overhang and 
significant positive macroeconomic growth effects of external debt, FDI, and 
remittances sent by overseas Pakistani workers. For example, there is empirical 
evidence of a significant negative long-run effect of the growth rate of total debt 
servicing as a percentage of exports on the growth rate of real GDP share of the 
industrial sector and there is at least partial empirical evidence of a significant 
negative long-run effect of the growth rate of total debt servicing as a percentage of 
exports on the growth rate of real GDP share of the agricultural sector.  Similarly, 
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there is empirical evidence of a significant positive short-run effect of the growth 
rates of the growth rate of real foreign direct investment net inflows on the growth 
rate of industry’s share of real GDP and there is evidence of a significant short-run 
positive effect of the growth rate of real workers’ remittances and compensation of 
employees received on the growth rate of the services’ share of real GDP.  In 
addition, there is empirical evidence of a significant positive effect of the growth rate 
of external debt (in the form of either real total external debt stock or real long term 
external debt stock or real long term external debt stock) on the growth rates of the 
real GDP shares of agriculture, industry, and the services.
4.3 Conclusions and policy recommendations
The present analysis of the effects of the above external debt growth variables on the 
growth rates of the real GDP shares of agriculture/industry/services, being a new 
empirical study in the area of macroeconomic effects of external debt in Pakistan, has 
extended the literature on the growth effects of Pakistan’s external debt.  Therefore, 
in contrast to the previous chapter, no reference is made to the previous studies in this 
chapter.   The unit root tests of the pertinent times series of all the aforementioned 
growth variables confirmed the stationarity of the pertinent time series.  
There is empirical evidence of the robust significant positive short-run effects of the 
growth rate of real total external debt stock on the growth rate of agriculture’s share 
of real GDP in the cases of both three and five control variables.  This evidence is 
consistent with the already reported empirical evidence of positive short-run real 
GDP growth effect of the growth rate of real total external debt stock. This empirical 
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evidence leads to a short-run policy recommendation of accelerating the growth rate 
of agriculture by promoting not only an equitable-cum-efficient allocation of real 
total external debt stock external stock between the majority of the needy small 
agricultural farm owners and a minority of resourceful large farm owners but also the 
actual investment of the real total external debt stock by its beneficiaries.  In addition, 
it is recommended for the Government of Pakistan to ensure the equitable access to 
credit of all economic agents for eliminating their liquidity constraints and, thereby, 
breaking the exploitative vicious circle of interlocking factor markets prevalent 
within the agriculture sector of Pakistan by simultaneously launching an official 
program of effective credit reforms (Todaro and Smith, 2009). This policy 
recommendation echoes as well as reinforces the earlier short-run policy 
recommendation of accelerating real GDP growth by ensuring the most judicious, 
strictly merit-based, equitable, transparent, and efficient allocation as well as 
investment of the requisite real total external debt stock only and only in the highly 
prioritized development projects of all sectors (agriculture, industry, and the 
services), provinces, and regions of the Pakistan’ economy for achieving the 
desirable patterns of sustainable balanced growth.
There is also empirical evidence of the robust significant negative short-run effects of 
the growth rate of real long-term external debt stock on the growth rate of 
agriculture’s share of real GDP in the cases of both three and five control variables. 
This empirical evidence, which is inconsistent with the already reported empirical 
evidence of positive short-run real GDP growth effect of the growth rate of real long-
term external debt stock, leads to the policy recommendation of ensuring sufficient 
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improvement in the degree of efficiency of investment of real long-term external debt 
stock for reinforcing the growth in the real GDP share of agriculture.  This policy 
recommendation echoes the spirit of the above policy recommendation made in the 
context of the real total external debt stock. 
In contrast to no empirical evidence of any significant short-run effects of both the 
growth rates of real short-term debt stock and total debt servicing as a percentage of 
exports on the growth rate of agriculture’s share of real GDP in both cases of three 
and five control variables in the selected pertinent agriculture’s share of real GDP 
growth models, there is mixed empirical evidence of both the significant negative and 
positive long-run effects of the growth rates of real short-term external debt stock and 
total debt servicing as a percentage of exports on the growth rate of agriculture’s 
share of real GDP. In the selected pertinent four and one short-run agriculture’s 
share of real GDP growth models, respectively, in Tables 4.2 and 4.9, there is no 
evidence of any significant short-run effects of five control variables on the growth 
rate of agriculture’s share of real GDP. 
There is also empirical evidence of a significant positive short-run effect of the 
growth rate of real long-term external debt stock on the growth rate of industry’s 
share of real GDP in the case of five control variables.  This empirical evidence,
which is consistent with a positive effect of the growth rate of real long-term external 
debt stock on the growth rate of real GDP, leads to a short-run policy 
recommendation of accelerating the growth rate of industry by ensuring additional 
efficient investment of the real long-term external debt stock in the industrial projects 
of the Government of Pakistan as well as in the requisite industrial infrastructure (for 
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example, modern means of communication, rapid transportation, and efficient power 
generation and transmission system). This policy recommendation is also compatible 
with an earlier policy recommendation about the reinforcement of the positive role of 
the growth rate of real long-term external debt stock in accelerating the growth rate 
of real GDP.
In contrast to no evidence of any significant positive or negative short-run effects of 
the growth rate of real short-term external debt stock on the growth rate of industry’s 
share of real GDP in the cases of both three and five control variables in the selected 
models, there is empirical evidence of a significant positive long-run effect of the 
growth rate of real short-term external debt stock on the growth rate of industry’s 
share of real GDP.  This empirical evidence, in contrast to the mixed empirical 
evidence of significant positive and negative effects of the growth rate of rate of real 
short-term external debt on the growth rate of real GDP share of agriculture, leads to 
the long-run policy recommendation of accelerating the growth rate of the industry 
by promoting the most efficient-cum-economical investment of real short-term debt
in both the industrial infrastructure and the industrial projects of the Government of 
Pakistan.
In contrast to no evidence of any significant positive or negative short-run effects of 
the growth rate of total debt servicing as a percentage of exports on the rate of growth 
of industry’s share of real GDP in the selected pertinent five and one short-run 
industry’s share of real GDP growth models, respectively, in Tables 4.5 and 4.11, 
there is evidence of a significant negative long-run effect of the growth rate of total 
debt servicing as a percentage of exports on the rate of growth of industry’s share of 
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real GDP. This empirical evidence, which is consistent with a negative short-run and 
long-run effect of the growth rate of total debt servicing as a percentage of exports on
the growth rate of real GDP, leads to a long-run policy recommendation of 
accelerating the growth rate of industry by both radically reducing the external debt 
stock through comprehensive macroeconomic reforms for minimizing the external 
debt burden and significantly increasing inflows of FDI in the industrial sector. This 
policy recommendation is compatible with a similar earlier policy recommendation, 
which was presented as a solution to the problem of external debt overhang in 
Chapter 3.
Out of five control variables, there is evidence of only significant short-run positive 
effects of the growth rate of real foreign direct investment net inflows on the growth 
rate of industry’s share of real GDP in Table 4.11. This empirical evidence leads to a
policy recommendation of accelerating the growth rate of real foreign direct 
investment net inflows for ensuring growth in real GDP share of industry in Pakistan 
from the point of view of accelerating the pace of economic development-oriented 
structural change in Pakistan. This policy recommendation is compatible with a 
similar earlier policy recommendation for accelerating the growth rate of real GDP. 
In contrast to no evidence of significant short-run effects of the four external debt 
growth variables on the growth rate of the services’ share of real GDP in the selected 
pertinent five and one short-run services’ share of real GDP growth models,
respectively, in Tables 4.7 and 4.13, there is evidence of a significant negative long-
run effect of the growth rate of real long-term external debt and significant positive 
long-run effects of both the growth rates of real short-term external debt and total 
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debt servicing as a percentage of exports on the rate of growth of the services’ share 
of real GDP. The empirical evidence of a significant positive long-run effect of the 
growth rate of real short-term external debt, which is consistent with the significant 
positive effect of the growth rate of rate of real short-term external debt on the 
growth rate of industry and partially inconsistent with the mixed empirical evidence 
of both the significant negative and positive long-run effects of the growth rates of 
real short-term external debt stock on the growth rate of agriculture’s share of real 
GDP, leads to the long-run policy recommendation of accelerating the growth rate of 
the services by promoting the most efficient-cum-economical investment of real 
short-term debt in both the infrastructure of the services sector and the services’ 
projects of the Government of Pakistan. 
However, there is evidence of a significant short-run positive effect of the growth
rate of real workers’ remittances and compensation of employees received on the 
growth rate of the services’ share of real GDP but only in the cases of the selected 
models in Table 4.7.  This empirical evidence leads to a policy recommendation of 
accelerating the growth rate of real workers’ remittances and compensation of 
employees received for ensuring growth in real GDP share of the services in Pakistan 
from the point of view of accelerating the pace of economic development-oriented 
structural change in Pakistan. This policy recommendation is also compatible with a 
similar earlier policy recommendation for accelerating the growth rate of real GDP.
The empirical evidence authenticated this chapter’s first motivation by confirming 
the following facts:
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a) There is empirical evidence of the significant short-run effects of the growth 
rates of real total external debt and real long-term external debt stock on the 
growth rate of the real GDP share of agriculture.
b) There is empirical evidence of the of the significant short-run effects of the 
growth rates of real total external debt and real long-term external debt stock on 
the growth rate of the real GDP share of industry. 
c) There is empirical evidence of only the significant long-run effects of the 
growth rates of real short-term external debt stock and total debt servicing as a 
percentage of exports on the growth rate of the real GDP share of agriculture.  
d) There is empirical evidence of the actual existence of only the significant long-
run effects of the growth rates of real short-term external debt stock and total 
debt servicing as a percentage of exports on the growth rate of the real GDP
share of industry.  
e) There is empirical evidence of a significant long-run effect of the growth rates 
of real long-term external debt stock, in addition to the already reported 
empirical evidence of a significant short-run positive effect of the growth rates 
of real long-term external debt stock, on the growth rate of the real GDP share 
of industry.  
f) There is empirical evidence of only the significant long-run effects of the 
growth rates of real long-term external debt stock, real short-term external debt 
stock and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports on the growth rate of 
the real GPP share of the services.
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Moreover, the empirical evidence signalled the actual significant usage of the 
external debt in the agriculture, industry and the services thereby endorsing this 
chapter’s second motivation. The following reported empirical facts addressed this 
chapter’s third motivation: 
a) The short-run effects of the growth rates of real total external debt and real 
long-term external debt stock on the growth rate of the real GDP share of 
agriculture are dissimilar.
b) The short-run effects of the growth rates of real total external debt and real 
long-term external debt stock on the growth rate of the real GDP share of 
industry are dissimilar.
c) The long-run effects of the growth rates of real short-term external debt stock 
and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports on the growth rate of the real 
GDP share of agriculture are mixed.
d) The short-run and the long-run effects of the growth rates of real long-term 
external debt stock are dissimilar.
e) The long-run effects of the growth rates of real long-term external debt stock 
and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports on the growth rate of the real 
GDP share of industry are similar.
f) The long-run effects of the growth rates of real short-term external debt stock 
and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports on the growth rate of the real 
GDP share of industry are dissimilar.
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g) The long-run effects of the growth rates of real long-term external debt stock 
and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports on the growth rate of the real 
GDP share of the services are dissimilar.
h) The long-run effects of the growth rates of real short-term external debt stock 
and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports on the growth rate of the real 
GDP share of the services are similar.
The empirical econometric analysis of the determinants of the growth rates of the real 
GDP shares of agriculture, industry, and the services has generally confirmed certain 
Pakistan-specific historical facts about the actual significant negative effects of the
debt servicing burden in the form of external debt overhang in industry in particular 
and significant positive effect of external debt (in the form of either real total external 
debt stock or real long-term external debt stock or real short-term external debt stock) 
on the growth rates of the real shares of agriculture, industry, and the services.
Moreover, there was empirical evidence of a significant positive short-run effect of 
the growth rate of real foreign direct investment net inflows on the growth rate of 
industry’s share of real GDP and there was evidence of a significant short-run 
positive effect of the growth rate of real workers’ remittances and compensation of 
employees received on the growth rate of the services’ share of real GDP.
The strength of this empirical study is attributable to the use of World Development 
Indicators 2012 of the World Bank as its data source, and the use of a comprehensive 
set of the pertinent four distinct external debt time series as the main explanatory 
variables, along with a comprehensive set of control variables for separately 
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determining their short and long-run effects on the growth rates of real GDP shares of 
the agriculture, industry, and services sectors of Pakistan over the past thirty years 
(1981-2010).  
Keeping in view the facts that the growth rates of agriculture, industry, and the 
services are not only complementary to one another but also have a direct positive 
relationship with the growth rate of real GDP, generally the above sector-level policy 
recommendations are not only mutually compatible and capable of realizing synergy 
among agriculture, industry, and the services, but are also complementary to the 
earlier policy recommendations, which aim at accelerating the growth rate real GDP 
by means of accelerating different types of the requisite inflows of foreign capital.
One limitation of this empirical study is the small dataset covering the period 1981-
 ņ D SUDFWLFDO PDQLIHVWDWLRQ RI D ³VPDOO VDPSOHV SUREOHP´ ZKLFK LV XVXDOO\
encountered in applied macroeconomics because macroeconomic variables, such as 
budget deficits, are generally measured on yearly basis (Brooks, 2008, p. 2).
Therefore, there is scope for overcoming the aforementioned limitation and, thereby, 
improving the estimation results of the above sectoral real GDP share growth models,
by replicating the above empirical study in the future using a larger data set and
covering a longer time period than the above 30-year period.
Another limitation of this empirical study may be the existence of a small number of 
the significant effects of the four external debt growth variables on the growth rates 
of the real GDP shares of the agriculture, industry, and services sectors of Pakistan.
This is mainly due to the absence of sufficient over-time variations in the above 
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annual sectoral GDP share growth time series against the background of a stagnating 
developing country-specific characteristic of a very slow pace of annual change in 
the sectoral composition of the economy. The following graphs illustrate Pakistan’s 
GDP shares of agriculture, industry, and services (measured along the vertical axis,
and with years shown along the horizontal axis), respectively, in Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 
4.3:
Figure 4.1
Data Source: World Bank 2012, World development indicators 2012.
Figure 4.2
            Data Source: World Bank 2012, World development indicators 2012.
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Figure 4.3
            Data Source: World Bank 2012, World development indicators 2012.
In light of the aforementioned facts, there is scope for improving the estimation 
results of the three sets of the above sectoral real GDP share growth models by 
replicating the above empirical study with a larger data set covering a sufficiently 
longer time period than the above 30-year period, and by using three-year averages of 
time series in the future.
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Appendix to Chapter 4
Table 4.1 Results of Unit Root Tests of Stationarity of Variables in Levels
Variable ADF Test Statistic PP Test Statistic
Growth rate of agriculture’s share of 
real GDP
-5.102*** -5.102***
Growth rate of industry’s share of 
real GDP
-5.663*** -5.663***
Growth rate of services’ share of 
real GDP
-3.849*** -4.819***
Growth rate of
real total external 
debt stock
-7.367*** -11.409***
Growth rate of real long-term 
external debt stock
-7.361*** -10.214***
Growth rate of real short-term 
external debt stock
-6.671*** -7.583***
Growth rate of total debt servicing 
as a percentage of exports
-6.881*** -6.860***
Growth rate of real workers’ 
remittances and compensation of 
employees received
-6.086*** -6.371***
Growth rate of real foreign direct 
investment net inflows
-6.633*** -7.656***
Money and quasi money growth rate -4.218*** -4.406***
Growth rate of the total labour force -4.920*** -4.920***
Growth rate of real capital stock -0.477 -1.143
The first-differenced growth rate of 
real capital stock
-1.473 -7.963***
Notes: ADF stands for Augmented Dickey-Fuller; PP stands for Phillips-Peron; ***99%, **95%, and *90%
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Table 4.2 Estimation Results of Short-Run Models of Growth in Agriculture’s Share of Real GDP 
Dependent Variable:  Growth rate of agriculture’s share of real GDP
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 
7
Model 8 Model 9  Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16
Growth rate of
real total 
external 
debt stock
0.542*
(0.270)
0.021
(0.044)
0.420*
(0.239)
0.006
(0.057)
0.020
(0.044)
0.500
(0.301)
0.400
(0.239)
0.004
(0.056)
0.468 
(0.302)
Growth rate of 
real long-term 
external debt 
stock
-0.517*
(0.252)
0.007
(0.044)
-0.401
(0.236)
-0.010
(0.052)
0.007
(0.043)
-0.463
(0.277)
-0.381
(0.236)
-0.011
(0.052)
-0.435
(0.279)
Growth rate of 
real-short term 
external debt 
stock
-0.027
(0.032)
0.016
(0.026)
0.014
(0.033)
0.019
(0.031)
0.016
(0.026)
-0.017
(0.037)
0.015
(0.033)
0.020
(0.031)
-0.014
(0.037)
Growth rate of 
total debt 
servicing as a 
percent of 
exports
0.047
(0.034)
0.043
(0.037)
0.043
(0.038)
0.043
(0.038)
0.043
(0.037)
0.038
(0.036)
0.043
(0.038)
0.043
(0.038)
0.037
(0.037)
Growth rate of 
real workers’ 
remittances 
and 
compensation 
of employees 
received
0.008
(0.036)
0.017
(0.035)
0.012
(0.025)
0.018
(0.019)
0.004
(0.035)
0.009
(0.037)
0.005
(0.036)
0.017
(0.036)
0.013
(0.035)
0.008
(0.025)
0.002
(0.036)
0.002
(0.035)
0.006
(0.037)
0.013
(0.036)
-0.000
(0.036)
Growth rate of 
real foreign 
direct 
investment net 
inflows
-0.034*
(0.018)
-0.032*
(0.018)
-0.036*
(0.018)
-0.025
(0.017)
-0.028
(0.017)
-0.036*
(0.019)
-0.028
(0.018)
-0.035*
(0.019)
-0.027
(0.018)
-0.031
(0.019)
-0.025
(0.019)
-0.024
(0.018)
-0.031
(0.019)
-0.030
(0.019)
-0.021
(0.020)
Money and 
quasi money 
growth rate
0.028
(0.146)
0.024
(0.147)
0.019
(0.146)
-0.005
(0.145)
0.047
(0.141)
0.021 
(0.150)
0.000
(0.148)
0.016
(0.149)
-0.004
(0.148)
-0.009
(0.147)
0.058
(0.146)
0.021
0.143
-0.008
(0.151)
-0.012 
(0.151)
0.032
(0.149)
C -0.013 
(0.008)
-0.014
(0.024)
-0.013
(0.024)
-0.012
(0.023)
-0.008
(0.023)
-0.018
(0.023)
-0.012
(0.024)
-0.009
(0.024)
-0.011
(0.024)
-0.009
(0.024)
-0.007
(0.024)
-0.021
(0.024)
-0.014
(0.023)
-0.008
(0.025)
-0.007
(0.024) -0.016 
(0.024)
Adjusted R2 0.110 0.003 -0.005 0.010 0.047 0.075 -0.033 0.014 -0.031 0.007 0.023 0.042 0.079 -0.021 -0.019 0.042
Notes:  Figures in parentheses are standard errors; ***99%, **95%, and *90%
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Table 4.2.1 The OLS Residual and Stability Diagnostics of Short-Run Models of Growth in Agriculture’s Share of Real GDP
Model Jarque
-Bera 
(JB)
Probability 
of Jarque-
Bera (JB)
Breusch-Godfrey
Serial Correlation
LM Test-:
Prob. of 
F-Statistic
Breusch-Godfrey
Serial Correlation
LM Test:
Probability of 
Chi-Square-
Statistic
Breusch-Pagan-
Godfrey
Test of 
Heteroskedasticity:
Probability of 
F-Statistic 
Breusch-Pagan-
Godfrey
Test of 
Heteroskedasticity:
Prob. of Chi-
Square-Statistic
Heteroskedasticity 
Test for ARCH 
Effects: 
Prob. of  Chi-
Square-Statistic
Chow Test of 
structural break at 
1998: 
Prob. of F-Statistic
M1 0.645 0.7245 0.4143 0.3275 0.1851 0.1730 0.7934 0.7490  
M2 0.341 0.8434 0.3201 0.2402 0.4758 0.4327 0.3330 0.3587
M3 0.427 0.8078 0.4003 0.3141 0.4995 0.4553 0.3326 0.0285
M4 0.216 0.8977 0.3641 0.2801 0.3435 0.3111 0.5251 0.6105
M5 0.539 0.7637 0.3431 0.2609 0.1979 0.1839 0.7051 0.9443
M6 0.075 0.9632 0.2150 0.1388 0.5013 0.4510 0.5112 0.5092
M7 0.208 0.9013 0.3292 0.2332 0.4184 0.3751 0.4950 0.1252
M8 0.396 0.8205 0.2663 0.1797 0.2575 0.2354 0.6606 0.0987
M9 0.232 0.8990 0.3624 0.2629 0.4200 0.3766 0.5855 0.0757
M10 0.491 0.7824 0.3134 0.2194 0.2949 0.2671 0.6768 0.0538
M11 0.466 0.7920 0.2724 0.1847 0.1754 0.1667 0.9764 0.8387
M12 0.122 0.9407 0.2254 0.1344 0.5927 0.5311 0.4025 0.0514
M13 0.394 0.8212 0.2238 0.1332 0.3223 0.2897 0.9659 0.1211
M14 0.445 0.8006 0.2726 0.1708 0.2483 0.2285 0.9850 0.1930
M15 0.528 0.7680 0.2899 0.1847 0.2731 0.2488 0.8645 0.1264
M16 0.325 0.8499 0.2458 0.1365 0.3722 0.3302 0.7855 0.1339
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Table 4.3 Results of Unit Root Tests of Stationarity of Variables in Levels
Variable ADF Test Statistic PP Test Statistic
Log of agriculture’s share of real 
GDP
-1.335 -1.323
Log of industry’s share of real GDP -1.992 -2.046
Log of services’ share of real GDP 0.457 -0.561
Log of real total external 
debt stock
-3.566** -3.452**
Log of real long-term external debt 
stock
-3.440** -3.321**
Log of real short-term external debt 
stock
-3.758*** -3.756***
Log of total debt servicing as a 
percentage of exports
-1.288 -1.267
Log of real workers’ remittances and 
compensation of employees received
-2.340 -2.401
Log of real foreign direct investment 
net inflows
-1.419 -1.739
Log of Money and quasi money 
growth rate
-4.416*** -5.369***
Log of total labour force 1.461 1.667
Log of real capital stock -7.282*** -5.110***
Notes: ADF stands for Augmented Dickey-Fuller; PP stands for Phillips-Peron; ***99%, **95%, and *90%
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Table 4.4 Estimation Results of Double-log Agriculture’s Share of Real GDP Models
Dependent Variable: log of agriculture’s share of real GDP
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9  Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16
Log of real total 
external 
debt stock
0.181
(0.347)
0.064*
(0.033)
0.277
(0.274)
0.024
(0.043)
0.009
(0.040)
0.098
(0.309)
0.168
(0.263)
-0.005
(0.045)
0.096
(0.298)
Log of real long-
term external 
debt stock
-0.255
(0.330)
0.061*
(0.033)
-0.214
(0.274)
0.021
(0.041)
0.005
(0.040)
-0.072
(0.295)
-0.158
(0.259)
-0.007
(0.043)
-0.097
(0.285)
Log of real 
short-term 
external debt 
stock
0.005
(0.031)
0.042**
(0.017)
0.034
(0.023)
0.035
(0.022)
0.017
(0.022)
0.031
(0.026)
0.018
(0.024)
0.019
(0.024)
0.015
(0.027)
Log of total debt 
servicing as a 
percentage of 
exports
0.208***
(0.040)
0.113***
(0.037)
0.106**
(0.049)
0.109**
(0.049)
0.088*
(0.049)
0.102*
(0.050)
0.090
(0.054)
0.091
(0.054)
0.091
(0.055)
Log of real 
workers’ 
remittances and 
compensation of 
employees 
received
-0.013
(0.018)
-0.012
(0.018)
-0.002
(0.015)
0.009
(0.015)
-0.012
(0.018)
-0.008
(0.018)
0.007
(0.019)
-0.007
(0.018)
0.008
(0.019)
0.005
(0.015)
-0.008
(0.018)
0.007
(0.019)
0.007
(0.019)
0.007
(0.019)
0.007
(0.020)
Log of real 
foreign direct 
investment net 
inflows
-0.105***
(0.013)
-0.105***
(0.013)
-0.090***
(0.009)
-0.064***
(0.012)
-0.101***
(0.014)
-0.095***
(0.014)
-0.068***
(0.021)
-0.095***
(0.014)
-0.066***
(0.021)
-0.070***
(0.014)
-0.095***
(0.015)
-0.066***
(0.021)
-0.068***
(0.021)
-0.067***
(0.021)
-0.067***
(0.022)
Log of money 
and quasi money 
growth rate
0.003
(0.023)
0.004
(0.024)
-0.004
(0.023)
-0.001
(0.022)
0.001
(0.024)
-0.003
(0.023)
-0.001
(0.022)
-0.003
(0.023)
-0.001
(0.022)
-0.003
(0.022)
-0.003
(0.024)
-0.002
(0.022)
-0.003
(0.022)
-0.003
(0.022)
-0.003
(0.023)
C 0.353 
(0.518)
-0.665
(0.487)
-0.585
(0.475)
-0.550
(0.383)
-0.268
(0.287)
-0.774
(0.510)
-0.704
(0.477)
-0.351
(0.478)
-0.681
(0.465)
-0.310
(0.457)
-0.453
(0.371)
-0.738
(0.506)
-0.441
(0.507)
-0.418
(0.491)
-0.406
(0.477)
-0.461
(0.516)
Adjusted R2 0.728 0.787 0.783 0.802 0.821 0.784 0.796 0.814 0.796 0.813 0.818 0.788 0.809 0.810 0.810 0.803
Notes:  Figures in parentheses are standard errors; ***99%, **95%, and *90%
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Table 4.5  Estimation Results of Short-Run Models of Growth in Industry’s Share of Real GDP 
Dependent Variable:  Growth rate of industry’s share of real GDP
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9  Model 
10
Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16
Growth rate of
real total 
external 
debt stock
-0.472*
(0.259)
-0.009
(0.038)
-0.232
(0.213)
-0.003
(0.049)
-0.009
(0.039)
-0.295
(0.268)
-0.237
(0.218)
-0.004
(0.050)
-0.304
(0.275)
Growth rate of 
real long- term 
external debt 
stock
0.432*
(0.242)
-0.002
(0.038)
0.224
(0.210)
0.006
(0.045)
-0.002
(0.038)
0.273
(0.247)
0.229
(0.215)
0.006
(0.046)
0.281
(0.254)
Growth rate of 
real short-term 
external debt 
stock
0.038
(0.031)
-0.006
(0.022)
-0.005
(0.029)
-0.008
(0.027)
-0.006
(0.023)
0.013
(0.033)
-0.005
(0.029)
-0.008
(0.027)
0.014
(0.034)
Growth rate of 
total debt 
servicing as a 
percentage of 
exports
-0.004
(0.033)
0.007
(0.033)
0.007
(0.033)
0.007
(0.033)
0.007
(0.033)
0.010
(0.033)
0.007
(0.034)
0.006
(0.034)
0.010
(0.034)
Growth rate of 
real workers’ 
remittances 
and 
compensation 
of employees 
received
-0.029
(0.031)
-0.034
(0.030)
-0.031
(0.021)
-0.035**
(0.017)
-0.027
(0.031)
-0.029
(0.032)
-0.029
(0.032)
-0.034
(0.031)
-0.034
(0.031)
-0.031
(0.022)
-0.025
(0.032)
-0.027
(0.032)
-0.030
(0.032)
-0.034
(0.032)
-0.026
(0.032)
Growth rate of 
real foreign 
direct 
investment net 
inflows
0.038**
(0.015)
0.037**
(0.015)
0.039**
(0.016)
0.037**
(0.015)
0.035**
(0.015)
0.039**
(0.016)
0.039**
(0.016)
0.038**
(0.016)
0.038**
(0.016)
0.039**
(0.017)
0.032*
(0.017)
0.036**
(0.016)
0.039**
(0.017)
0.039**
(0.017)
0.033*
(0.018)
Money and 
quasi money 
growth rate
0.031
(0.126)
0.033
(0.126)
0.035
(0.126)
0.030
(0.127)
0.021
(0.126)
0.034
(0.129)
0.027
(0.130)
0.037
(0.129)
0.029
(0.130)
0.031
(0.130)
0.012
(0.130)
0.015
(0.131)
0.030
(0.134)
0.033
(0.134)
0.005
(0.135)
C 0.004
(0.008)
-0.004
(0.020)
-0.005
(0.020)
-0.005
(0.020)
-0.004
(0.021)
-0.002
(0.020)
-0.005
(0.021)
-0.004
(0.021)
-0.006
(0.021)
-0.004
(0.021)
-0.005
(0.021)
0.000
(0.021)
-0.001
(0.021)
-0.004
(0.022)
-0.005
(0.022)
0.001
(0.022)
Adjusted R2 -0.012 0.090 0.088 0.092 0.090 0.096 0.052 0.053 0.053 0.050 0.054 0.061 0.058 0.011 0.011 0.021
Notes:  Figures in parentheses are standard errors; ***99%, **95%, and *90%
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Table 4.5.1 The OLS Residual and Stability Diagnostics of Short-Run Models of Growth in Industry’s Share of Real GDP
Model Jarque
-Bera 
(JB)
Probability 
of Jarque-
Bera (JB)
Breusch- Godfrey
Serial Correlation
LM Test-:
Prob. of 
F-Statistic
Breusch-Godfrey
Serial Correlation
LM Test:
Probability of 
Chi-Square-
Statistic
Breusch-Pagan-
Godfrey
Test of 
Heteroskedasticity:
Probability of 
F-Statistic 
Breusch-Pagan-
Godfrey
Test of 
Heteroskedasticity:
Prob. of Chi-
Square-Statistic
Heteroskedasticity 
Test for ARCH 
Effects: 
Prob. of  Chi-
Square-Statistic
Chow Test of 
structural break at 
1998: 
Prob. of F-Statistic
M1 6.768 0.0339 0.1281 0.0845 0.2422 0.2220 0.8529 0.6344
M2 1.085 0.5814 0.3401 0.2581 0.9425 0.9274 0.7276 0.0893
M3 1.347 0.5099 0.4212 0.3341 0.9244 0.9056 0.6976 0.0761
M4 1.010 0.6035 0.3978 0.3118 0.9077 0.8857 0.7599 0.1044
M5 1.521 0.4675 0.5045 0.4171 0.2027 0.1880 0.6649 0.0738
M6 0.600 0.7407 0.2380 0.1568 0.9445 0.9251 0.7871 0.2094
M7 0.972 0.6152 0.3698 0.2696 0.9453 0.9261 0.7616 0.0961
M8 1.214 0.5451 0.3712 0.2709 0.3538 0.3180 0.6960 0.1173
M9 1.078 0.5834 0.4373 0.3334 0.9346 0.9126 0.7537 0.0735
M10 1.471 0.4792 0.4568 0.3526 0.3210 0.2895 0.6700 0.1005
M11 1.106 0.5753 0.4333 0.3295 0.3004 0.2718 0.7295 0.1065
M12 0.741 0.6905 0.2024 0.1176 0.9687 0.9531 0.7791 0.1064
M13 0.530 0.7673 0.2810 0.1776 0.3878 0.3453 0.7252 0.2202
M14 1.073 0.5847 0.4013 0.2822 0.4125 0.3667 0.7298 0.1090
M15 1.154 0.5615 0.4728 0.3511 0.3797 0.3383 0.7252 0.0774
M16 0.647 0.7238 0.2437 0.1350 0.5216 0.4589 0.7061 0.0788
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Table 4.6 Estimation Results of Double-log Industry’s Share of Real GDP Models
Dependent Variable: log of industry’s share of real GDP
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9  Model 
10
Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16
Log of real 
total 
external 
debt stock
-0.506**
(0.209)
-0.040*
(0.021)
-0.269
(0.172)
-0.062**
(0.028)
-0.025
(0.028)
-0.447**
(0.184)
-0.243
(0.178)
-0.045
(0.029)
-0.445**
(0.177)
Log of real 
long-term 
external 
debt stock
0.478**
(0.199)
-0.036
(0.022)
0.231
(0.172)
-0.051*
(0.027)
-0.019
(0.028)
0.373**
(0.176)
0.218
(0.175)
-0.034
(0.029)
0.388**
(0.170)
Log of real 
short-term 
external 
debt stock
0.046**
(0.019)
-0.003
(0.012)
0.018
(0.015)
0.013
(0.015)
0.017
(0.015)
0.031*
(0.015)
0.027
(0.016)
0.024
(0.016)
0.041**
(0.016)
Log of total 
debt
servicing as 
a
percentage
of exports
-0.112***
(0.024)
-0.048*
(0.026)
-0.028
(0.034)
-0.033
(0.034)
-0.072**
(0.034)
-0.024
(0.034)
-0.051
(0.036)
-0.056
(0.036)
-0.055
(0.033)
Log of real 
workers’ 
remittances 
and 
compensati
on of 
employees 
received
-0.008
(0.012)
-0.008
(0.012)
-0.018
(0.011)
-0.020*
(0.010)
-0.009
(0.012)
-0.005
(0.012)
-0.013
(0.013)
-0.007
(0.012)
-0.015
(0.013)
-0.024**
(0.011)
-0.005
(0.011)
-0.013
(0.013)
-0.013
(0.013)
-0.015
(0.013)
-0.013
(0.012)
Log of real 
foreign 
direct 
investment 
net inflows
0.051***
(0.008)
0.050***
(0.009)
0.040***
(0.007)
0.030***
(0.008)
0.046***
(0.009)
0.055***
(0.009)
0.041***
(0.015)
0.054***
(0.010)
0.038**
(0.015)
0.024**
(0.010)
0.052***
(0.009)
0.038**
(0.015)
0.040***
(0.014)
0.037**
(0.014)
0.035**
(0.013)
Log of
money and 
quasi 
money 
growth rate
0.002
(0.015)
0.002
(0.015)
0.003
(0.016)
0.004
(0.015)
0.005
(0.015)
-0.001
(0.015)
0.003
(0.015)
0.000
(0.016)
0.003
(0.015)
0.002
(0.015)
0.001
(0.014)
0.005
(0.015)
0.000
(0.015)
0.000
(0.015)
0.001
(0.014)
C -1.750***
(0.312)
-1.300***
(0.313)
-1.366***
(0.307)
-1.720***
(0.272)
-1.616***
(0.202)
-1.183***
(0.321)
-1.321***
(0.311)
-1.384***
(0.331) -1.402***
(0.311)
-
1.449**
*
(0.319)
-1.801***
(0.257)
-1.146***
(0.302)
-1.260***
(0.343)
-1.484***
(0.325)
-1.571***
(0.322)
-1.315***
(0.307)
Adjusted R2 0.563 0.608 0.599 0.556 0.607 0.620 0.616 0.603 0.596 0.598 0.611 0.664 0.612 0.632 0.617 0.689
Notes:  Figures in parentheses are standard errors; ***99%, **95%, and *90% 
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Table 4.7 Estimation Results of Short-Run Models of Growth in the Services’ Share of Real GDP 
Dependent Variable:  Growth rate of the services’ share of real GDP
Variable Model 1 Model 
2
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9  Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16
Growth rate of
real total 
external 
debt stock
-0.075
(0.127)
-0.022
(0.018)
-0.093
(0.104)
-0.030
(0.023)
-0.022
(0.019)
-0.176
(0.128)
-0.094
(0.106)
-0.030
(0.024)
-0.178
(0.131)
Growth rate of 
real long-term 
external debt 
stock
0.068
(0.118)
-0.019
(0.018)
0.072
(0.102)
-0.023
(0.022)
-0.019
(0.019)
0.137
(0.118)
0.073
(0.105)
-0.023
(0.022)
0.139
(0.121)
Growth rate of 
real short-term 
external debt 
stock
0.006
(0.015)
-0.003
(0.011)
0.008
(0.014)
0.005
(0.013)
-0.003
(0.011)
0.017
(0.016)
0.008
(0.014)
0.005
(0.013)
0.017
(0.016)
Growth rate of 
total debt 
servicing as a 
percentage of 
exports
0.007
(0.016)
0.001
(0.016)
0.001
(0.016)
0.001
(0.016)
0.001
(0.016)
0.002
(0.016)
0.001
(0.016)
0.001
(0.016)
0.003
(0.016)
Growth rate of 
real workers’ 
remittances 
and 
compensation 
of employees 
received
0.027*
(0.015)
0.025
(0.015)
0.014
(0.011)
0.012
(0.008)
0.028*
(0.015)
0.028*
(0.015)
0.027*
(0.015)
0.025
(0.015)
0.025
(0.015)
0.014
(0.011)
0.030*
(0.015)
0.027*
(0.015)
0.028*
(0.016)
0.025
(0.015)
0.030*
(0.016)
Growth rate of 
real foreign 
direct 
investment net 
inflows
-0.008
(0.007)
-0.008
(0.007)
-0.010
(0.008)
-0.011
(0.007)
-0.009
(0.008)
-0.009
(0.008)
-0.007
(0.008)
-0.009
(0.008)
-0.008
(0.008)
-0.010
(0.008)
-0.012
(0.008)
-0.008
(0.008)
-0.009
(0.008)
-0.008
(0.008)
-0.012
(0.009)
Money and 
quasi money 
growth rate
-0.030
(0.061)
-0.028
(0.061)
-0.023
(0.062)
-0.024
(0.063)
-0.033
(0.061)
-0.034
(0.062)
-0.030
(0.063)
-0.030
(0.062)
-0.028
(0.063)
-0.023
(0.064)
-0.045
(0.062)
-0.034
(0.064)
-0.034
(0.064)
-0.030
(0.065)
-0.047
(0.065)
C 0.006
(0.004)
0.011
(0.010)
0.010
(0.010)
0.010
(0.010)
0.010
(0.010)
0.012
(0.010)
0.012
(0.010)
0.011
(0.010)
0.011
(0.010)
0.011
(0.010)
0.010
(0.010)
0.014
(0.010)
0.012
(0.010)
0.012
(0.010)
0.011
(0.010)
0.015
(0.011)
Adjusted R2 -0.142 0.004 -0.009 -0.052 -0.054 -0.017 -0.024 -0.039 -0.048 -0.053 -0.097 -0.008 -0.063 -0.070 -0.095 -0.054
Notes:  Figures in parentheses are standard errors; ***99%, **95%, and *90%
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Table 4.7.1 The OLS Residual and Stability Diagnostics of Short-Run Models of Growth in the Services’ Share of Real GDP
Model Jarque
-Bera 
(JB)
Probability 
of Jarque-
Bera (JB)
Breusch-Godfrey
Serial Correlation
LM Test-:
Prob. of 
F-Statistic
Breusch-Godfrey
Serial Correlation
LM Test:
Probability of 
Chi-Square-
Statistic
Breusch-Pagan-
Godfrey
Test of
Heteroskedasticity:
Probability of 
F-Statistic 
Breusch-Pagan-
Godfrey
Test of 
Heteroskedasticity:
Prob. of Chi-
Square-Statistic
Heteroskedasticity 
Test for ARCH 
Effects: 
Prob. of  Chi-
Square-Statistic
Chow Test of 
structural break at 
1998: 
Prob. of F-Statistic
M1 0.729 0.6947 0.1044 0.0677 0.6551 0.6090 0.3401 0.6464
M2 0.029 0.9854 0.0634 0.0401 0.6499 0.6037 0.4363 0.5352
M3 0.007 0.9968 0.0524 0.0331 0.6987 0.6541 0.3500 0.4839
M4 0.023 0.9884 0.0270 0.0173 0.7654 0.7250 0.3248 0.9106
M5 0.042 0.9795 0.0300 0.0191 0.8508 0.8198 0.2793 0.7842
M6 0.082 0.9599 0.0788 0.0443 0.7898 0.7425 0.7117 0.5625
M7 0.005 0.9976 0.0979 0.0562 0.7225 0.6700 0.3201 0.2414
M8 0.036 0.9820 0.0703 0.0392 0.7038 0.6504 0.4170 0.3040
M9 0.001 0.9996 0.0675 0.0375 0.7447 0.6936 0.7537 0.2897
M10 0.007 0.9965 0.0590 0.0325 0.7728 0.7239 0.3402 0.2578
M11 0.023 0.9886 0.0313 0.0170 0.8673 0.8308 0.3213 0.8357
M12 0.129 0.9374 0.2042 0.1189 0.8396 0.7900 0.5917 0.1592
M13 0.106 0.9484 0.0864 0.0429 0.8081 0.7541 0.6543 0.4318
M14 0.011 0.9945 0.1064 0.0544 0.7556 0.6962 0.3060 0.1083
M15 0.000 0.9999 0.0754 0.0368 0.8069 0.7527 0.2712 0.1159
M16 0.169 0.9191 0.2130 0.1132 0.8119 0.7494 0.5170 0.1455
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Table 4.8 Estimation Results of Double-log Services’ Share of Real GDP Models
Dependent Variable: log of services’ share of real GDP
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9  Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16
Log of real 
total external 
debt stock
0.250*
(0.139)
-0.001
(0.016)
0.097
(0.133)
0.026
(0.020)
0.013
(0.021)
0.272*
(0.134)
0.128
(0.135)
0.028
(0.022)
0.272*
(0.137)
Log of real 
long-term 
external debt 
stock
-0.194
(0.132)
-0.003
(0.016)
-0.099
(0.133)
0.020
(0.019)
0.009
(0.021)
-0.238*
(0.128)
-0.115
(0.133)
0.021
(0.021)
-0.237*
(0.131)
Log of real 
short-term 
external debt 
stock
-0.027**
(0.012)
-0.013
(0.008)
-0.022**
(0.011)
-0.020*
(0.010)
-0.015
(0.011)
-0.031**
(0.011)
-0.021*
(0.012)
-0.019
(0.012)
-0.029**
(0.012)
Log of total 
debt 
servicing as a 
percentage of 
exports
-0.039**
(0.016)
-0.017
(0.019)
-0.026
(0.026)
-0.024
(0.025)
0.005
(0.025)
-0.029
(0.026)
-0.008
(0.027)
-0.006
(0.027)
-0.006
(0.025)
Log of real 
workers’ 
remittances 
and 
compensatio
n of 
employees 
received
0.004 
(0.009)
0.005
(0.009)
0.006
(0.007)
0.003
(0.008)
0.005
(0.009)
0.001
(0.008)
-0.001
(0.010)
0.002
(0.009)
0.000
(0.010)
0.007
(0.008)
0.001
(0.008)
0.000
(0.010)
-0.001
(0.010)
0.001
(0.010)
-0.000
(0.009)
Log of real 
foreign direct 
investment 
net inflows
0.024***
(0.006)
0.025***
(0.006)
0.025***
(0.004)
0.020***
(0.006)
0.026***
(0.007)
0.018***
(0.007)
0.015
(0.011)
0.019***
(0.007)
0.016
(0.011)
0.026***
(0.007)
0.020***
(0.006)
0.016
(0.011)
0.016
(0.010)
0.018
(0.011)
0.019*
(0.010)
Log of
money and 
quasi money 
growth rate
-0.004
(0.011)
-0.004
(0.011)
-0.001
(0.011)
-0.003
(0.011)
-0.004
(0.012)
0.000
(0.011)
-0.003
(0.011)
0.000
(0.011)
-0.003
(0.011)
-0.001
(0.011)
-0.001
(0.010)
-0.004
(0.012)
0.000
(0.011)
0.000
(0.011)
-0.001
(0.011)
C -1.501***
(0.208)
-1.181***
(0.236)
-1.165***
(0.228)
-0.989***
(0.183)
-1.141***
(0.150)
-1.231***
(0.248)
-1.155***
(0.222)
-1.259***
(0.248)
-1.111***
(0.219)
-1.225***
(0.237)
-0.983***
(0.189)
-1.267***
(0.220)
-1.324***
(0.260)
-1.182***
(0.242)
-1.128***
(0.238)
-1.285***
(0.238)
Adjusted R2 0.600 0.542 0.542 0.585 0.555 0.534 0.596 0.543 0.585 0.540 0.568 0.633 0.538 0.580 0.568 0.617
Notes:  Figures in parentheses are standard errors; ***99%, **95%, and *90%
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Table 4.9 Estimation Results of Short-Run Models of Growth in Agriculture’s Share of Real GDP                                                                                
Dependent Variable:  Growth rate of agriculture’s share of real GDP
Variable Original 
Model 1
New 
Model 1 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16
Growth rate of real 
total
external 
debt stock
0.542*
(0.270)
0.616*
(0.331)
0.022
(0.050)
0.477*
(0.268)
-0.013
(0.067)
0.025
(0.049)
0.604
(0.406)
0.482*
(0.265)
-0.005
(0.068)
0.663
(0.403)
Growth rate of real 
long-term external debt 
stock
-0.517*
(0.252)
-0.588*
(0.305)
0.008
(0.048)
-0.449
(0.261)
-0.025
(0.059)
0.010
(0.048)
-0.551
(0.357)
-0.452*
(0.258)
-0.020
(0.059)
-0.595
(0.354)
Growth rate of real 
short-term external 
debt stock
-0.027
(0.032)
-0.032
(0.045)
0.027
(0.030)
0.032
(0.042)
0.036
(0.038)
0.026
(0.030)
-0.023
(0.054)
0.028
(0.042)
0.033
(0.038)
-0.033
(0.054)
Growth rate of total 
debt servicing as a 
percentage of exports
0.047
(0.034)
0.053
(0.037)
0.046
(0.042)
0.047
(0.043)
0.047
(0.043)
0.045
(0.042)
0.048
(0.040)
0.044
(0.043)
0.043
(0.043)
0.052
(0.042)
Growth rate of real 
workers’ remittances 
and compensation of 
employees received
0.007
(0.041)
0.017
(0.039)
0.009
(0.027)
0.016
(0.023)
-0.002
(0.039)
0.015
(0.042)
-0.001
(0.041)
0.021
(0.040)
0.009
(0.040)
0.003
(0.028)
-0.010
(0.043)
-0.011
(0.039)
0.006
(0.043)
0.013
(0.040)
-0.022
(0.044)
Growth rate of real 
foreign direct 
investment net inflows
-0.028
(0.022)
-0.025
(0.022)
-0.031
(0.021)
-0.020
(0.019)
-0.025
(0.021)
-0.030
(0.022)
-0.024
(0.022)
-0.028
(0.022)
-0.022
(0.022)
-0.027
(0.021)
-0.023
(0.022)
-0.022
(0.021)
-0.027
(0.022)
-0.025
(0.022)
-0.018
(0.022)
Money and quasi 
money growth rate
0.023
(0.161)
0.020
(0.162)
0.012
(0.159)
-0.023
(0.161)
0.034
(0.154)
0.008
(0.164)
-0.019
(0.164)
0.005
(0.163)
-0.021
(0.165)
-0.028
(0.162)
0.047
(0.160)
-0.008
(0.156)
-0.029
(0.168)
-0.032
(0.167)
0.007
(0.161)
Growth rate of total 
labour force
1.027
(0.908)
0.639
(0.982)
0.564
(0.978)
0.708
(0.960)
0.653
(0.937)
0.961
(0.956)
0.682
(0.994)
0.774
(0.984)
0.666
(0.986)
0.695
(0.981)
0.815
(0.962)
1.002
(0.982)
1.099
(0.953)
0.803
(1.000)
0.778
(0.992)
1.169
(0.977)
The first-differenced 
growth rate of real 
capital stock
1.182
(4.111)
-1.686
(3.841)
-1.897
(3.836)
-2.770
(3.837)
-0.675
(3.877)
-0.369
(3.744)
-3.088
(4.281)
-0.319
(4.011)
-3.295
(4.107)
-0.561
(4.010)
-1.475
(4.013)
0.928
(4.886)
1.019
(3.886)
-1.617
(4.512)
-1.926
(4.326)
2.960
(5.088)
C -0.013 
(0.008)
-0.048
(0.030)
-0.035
(0.041)
-0.032
(0.040)
-0.034
(0.039)
-0.028
(0.039)
-0.048
(0.039)
-0.032
(0.041)
-0.033
(0.040)
-0.031
(0.040)
-0.030
(0.040)
-0.031
(0.039)
-0.053
(0.042)
-0.046
(0.039)
-0.031
(0.041)
-0.029
(0.041)
-0.052
(0.041)
Adjusted R2 0.110 0.068 -0.116 -0.126 -0.084 -0.062 -0.016 -0.139 -0.103 -0.130 -0.116 -0.077 -0.062 0.005 -0.136 -0.130 -0.031
Notes:  Figures in parentheses are standard errors; ***99%, **95%, and *90%
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Table 4.9.1 The OLS Residual and Stability Diagnostics of Short-Run Models of Growth in Agriculture’s Share of Real GDP
Model Jarque
-Bera 
(JB)
Probability 
of Jarque-
Bera (JB)
Breusch-Godfrey
Serial Correlation
LM Test-:
Prob. of 
F-Statistic
Breusch-Godfrey
Serial Correlation
LM Test:
Probability of 
Chi-Square-
Statistic
Breusch-Pagan-
Godfrey
Test of 
Heteroskedasticity:
Probability of 
F-Statistic 
Breusch-Pagan-
Godfrey
Test of 
Heteroskedasticity:
Prob. of Chi-
Square-Statistic
Heteroskedasticity 
Test for ARCH 
Effects: 
Prob. of  Chi-
Square-Statistic
Chow Test of 
structural break at 
1998: 
Prob. of F-Statistic
M1 1.843 0.3979 0.9016 0.8568 0.5846 0.5184 0.8259 0.6801  
M2 1.281 0.5271 0.7224 0.6194 0.5827 0.5165 0.3475 0.1818
M3 1.347 0.5100 0.7950 0.7119 0.5825 0.5164 0.2861 0.1559
M4 0.999 0.6070 0.7448 0.6474 0.1865 0.1778 0.6246 0.2155
M5 1.305 0.5208 0.6412 0.5218 0.5310 0.4683 0.6638 0.4600
M6 1.156 0.5610 0.6348 0.4951 0.6885 0.6115 0.7241 0.1549
M7 1.048 0.5920 0.7401 0.6252 0.1261 0.1337 0.6439 0.3216
M8 1.193 0.5508 0.5867 0.4400 0.5866 0.5130 0.8438 0.2030
M9 1.131 0.5681 0.6978 0.5714 0.1998 0.1911 0.6906 0.2351
M10 1.269 0.5303 0.6310 0.4907 0.6257 0.5498 0.7000 0.2007
M11 1.280 0.5274 0.5757 0.4278 0.1755 0.1723 0.6963 0.3071
M12 1.327 0.5151 0.6321 0.4712 0.5946 0.5132 0.6384 0.1389
M13 1.277 0.5281 0.5465 0.3746 0.6433 0.5586 0.5341 0.2270
M14 1.319 0.5172 0.5898 0.4223 0.1303 0.1414 0.6819 0.3933
M15 1.441 0.4866 0.5631 0.3926 0.2189 0.2084 0.6267 0.3061
M16 1.381 0.5014 0.5592 0.3654 0.4962 0.4225 0.6785 0.0908
230 
 
Table 4.10 Estimation Results of Double-log Agriculture’s Share of Real GDP Models                                                                                         
Dependent Variable: log of agriculture’s share of real GDP
Variable Original 
Model 1
New 
Model 1 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16
Log of real 
total extern-
al debt stock
0.181
(0.347)
0.566*
(0.280)
0.067
(0.044)
0.201
(0.263)
0.162***
(0.053)
0.060
(0.045)
0.850***
(0.259)
0.182
(0.268)
0.156***
(0.053)
0.834***
(0.259)
Log of real 
long-term 
external 
debt stock
-0.255
(0.330)
-0.500*
(0.262)
0.061
(0.043)
-0.133
(0.257)
0.123**
(0.050)
0.054
(0.044)
-0.631**
(0.233)
-0.121
(0.262)
0.118**
(0.051)
-0.620**
(0.233)
Log of real 
short-term 
external debt 
stock
0.005
(0.031)
-0.079***
(0.026)
-0.015
(0.024)
-0.072**
(0.027)
-0.055*
(0.027)
-0.020
(0.024)
-0.114***
(0.028)
-0.074**
(0.028)
-0.057**
(0.027)
-0.114***
(0.029)
Log of total 
debt 
servicing as 
percentage of 
exports
0.208***
(0.040)
0.054
(0.048)
0.057
(0.056)
0.040
(0.057)
0.043
(0.057)
0.066
(0.058)
0.038
(0.058)
0.049
(0.050)
0.053
(0.053)
0.044
(0.044)
Log of real 
workers’ 
remittances 
and compe-
nsation of 
employees 
received
-0.040
(0.031)
-0.037
(0.031)
0.003
(0.020)
-0.008
(0.020)
-0.039
(0.032)
-0.076**
(0.031)
-0.041
(0.031)
-0.059*
(0.031)
-0.038
(0.032)
-0.004
(0.020)
-0.093***
(0.028)
-0.040
(0.032)
-0.078**
(0.031)
-0.062*
(0.031)
-0.094***
(0.028)
Log of real 
foreign direct 
investment 
net inflows
-0.044**
(0.018)
-0.044**
(0.018)
-0.029
(0.022)
-0.028
(0.020)
-0.043**
(0.019)
-0.019
(0.019)
-0.037*
(0.021)
-0.025
(0.020)
-0.037*
(0.021)
-0.017
(0.024)
-0.001
(0.018)
-0.037*
(0.021)
-0.010
(0.021)
-0.015
(0.022)
0.007
(0.019)
Log of
money and 
quasi money 
growth rate
-0.001
(0.019)
-0.002
(0.020)
-0.006
(0.020)
-0.005
(0.020)
-0.002
(0.020)
0.008
(0.018)
-0.001
(0.020)
0.005
(0.019)
-0.001
(0.020)
-0.004
(0.020)
0.010
(0.015)
-0.001
(0.020)
0.009
(0.018)
0.007
(0.019)
0.011
(0.015)
Log of total 
labour force
-1.034*
(0.601)
-0.038
(0.779)
-0.140
(0.766)
-1.247*
(0.642)
-0.383
(0.774)
0.011
(0.798)
0.057
(0.692)
0.291
(0.914)
-0.217
(0.717)
0.218
(0.910)
-0.634
(0.832)
0.340
(0.615)
0.319
(0.934)
0.456
(0.805)
0.223
(0.842)
0.692
(0.710)
Log of real 
capital stock
-0.190
(0.172)
0.081
(0.250)
0.049
(0.247)
-0.293
(0.193)
-0.045
(0.238)
0.094
(0.256)
0.180
(0.225)
0.176
(0.287)
0.078
(0.231)
0.153
(0.285)
-0.108
(0.250)
0.298
(0.202)
0.183
(0.293)
0.297
(0.256)
0.208
(0.265)
0.401*
(0.227)
C 0.353 
(0.518)
21.883
(15.061)
-2.833
(20.605)
-0.092
(20.242)
29.082*
(16.392)
7.237
(19.827)
-4.104
(21.102)
-7.591
(18.361)
-11.045
(23.853)
0.275
(18.923)
-9.068
(23.721)
13.450
(21.230)
-16.331
(16.414)
-11.814
(24.371)
-17.624
(21.080)
-10.817
(21.971)
-25.166
(18.677)
Adjusted R2 0.728 0.879 0.861 0.859 0.849 0.853 0.856 0.891 0.858 0.877 0.856 0.851 0.916 0.853 0.891 0.877 0.916
Notes:  Figures in parentheses are standard errors; ***99%, **95%, and *90%
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Table 4.11 Estimation Results of Short-Run Models of Growth in Industry’s Share of Real GDP                                                                                  
Dependent Variable:  Growth rate of industry’s share of real GDP
Variable Original 
Model 1
New 
Model 1 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16
Growth rate of real 
total
external 
debt stock
-0.472*
(0.259)
-0.668*
(0.321)
-0.019
(0.043)
-0.322
(0.240)
-0.014
(0.059)
-0.019
(0.044)
-0.573
(0.356)
-0.322
(0.247)
-0.014
(0.061)
-0.580
(0.369)
Growth rate of real 
long-term external debt 
stock
0.432*
(0.242)
0.609*
(0.296)
-0.009
(0.042)
0.299
(0.234)
0.001
(0.052)
-0.009
(0.043)
0.499
(0.314)
0.299
(0.240)
0.001
(0.054)
0.504
(0.324)
Growth rate of real 
short-term external 
debt stock
0.038
(0.031)
0.065
(0.044)
-0.010
(0.027)
-0.005
(0.037)
-0.011
(0.033)
-0.010
(0.027)
0.045
(0.047)
-0.005
(0.038)
-0.011
(0.034)
0.046
(0.049)
Growth rate of total 
debt servicing as a 
percentage of exports
-0.004
(0.033)
-0.016
(0.036)
0.000
(0.037)
-0.001
(0.038)
0.000
(0.038)
0.001
(0.038)
-0.001
(0.038)
0.000
(0.039)
0.001
(0.039)
-0.006
(0.038)
Growth rate of real 
workers’ remittances 
and compensation of 
employees received
-0.022
(0.035)
-0.029
(0.034)
-0.029
(0.024)
-0.034
(0.021)
-0.016
(0.035)
-0.023
(0.037)
-0.022
(0.037)
-0.030
(0.035)
-0.029
(0.036)
-0.029
(0.025)
0.000
(0.038)
-0.015
(0.037)
-0.023
(0.039)
-0.030
(0.037)
0.001
(0.040)
Growth rate of real 
foreign direct 
investment net inflows
0.042**
(0.019)
0.040**
(0.019)
0.042**
(0.018)
0.039**
(0.017)
0.040**
(0.018)
0.042**
(0.019)
0.042**
(0.019)
0.041**
(0.020)
0.040*
(0.019)
0.042**
(0.019)
0.036*
(0.019)
0.040**
(0.019)
0.042**
(0.020)
0.041*
(0.020)
0.035*
(0.020)
Money and quasi 
money growth rate
0.041
(0.140)
0.043
(0.140)
0.047 
(0.140)
0.045
(0.144)
0.034
(0.138)
0.043
(0.144)
0.042
(0.147)
0.048
(0.144)
0.043
(0.148)
0.046
(0.147)
0.008
(0.141)
0.034
(0.145)
0.043
(0.152)
0.047
(0.152)
0.013
(0.148)
Growth rate of total 
labour force
-0.764
(0.881)
-0.528
(0.853)
-0.475
(0.849)
-0.507 
(0.847)
-0.439
(0.838)
-0.742
(0.856)
-0.534
(0.876)
-0.529
(0.882)
-0.505
(0.873)
-0.475
(0.877)
-0.505
(0.874)
-0.825
(0.862)
-0.745
(0.886)
-0.534
(0.906)
-0.503
(0.903)
-0.844
(0.895)
The first-differenced 
growth rate of real 
capital stock
-4.136
(3.986)
-1.434
(3.335)
-1.280
(3.328)
-0.885
(3.384)
-1.182
(3.467)
-2.311
(3.353)
-1.224
(3.774)
-1.448
(3.594)
-0.862
(3.639)
-1.281
(3.586)
-0.857
(3.643)
-4.864
(4.291)
-2.335
(3.613)
-1.223
(4.091)
-0.829
(3.939)
-5.101
(4.661)
C 0.004
(0.008)
0.031
(0.029)
0.011
(0.035)
0.009
(0.035)
0.009
(0.035)
0.007
(0.035)
0.020
(0.035)
0.010
(0.036)
0.011
(0.036)
0.009
(0.036)
0.009
(0.036)
0.009
(0.035)
0.029
(0.037)
0.020
(0.036)
0.010
(0.037)
0.009
(0.037)
0.029
(0.038)
Adjusted R2 -0.012 -0.046 -0.004 -0.012 -0.006 -0.014 0.027 -0.056 -0.057 -0.059 -0.065 -0.059 0.023 -0.027 -0.115 -0.118 -0.033
Notes:  Figures in parentheses are standard errors; ***99%, **95%, and *90%
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Table 4.11.1  The OLS Residual and Stability Diagnostics of Short-Run Models of Growth in the Industry’s Share of Real GDP
Model Jarque
-Bera 
(JB)
Probability 
of Jarque-
Bera (JB)
Breusch-Godfrey
Serial Correlation
LM Test-:
Prob. of 
F-Statistic
Breusch-Godfrey
Serial Correlation
LM Test:
Probability of 
Chi-Square-
Statistic
Breusch-Pagan-
Godfrey
Test of 
Heteroskedasticity:
Probability of 
F-Statistic 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey
Test of 
Heteroskedasticity:
Prob. of Chi-
Square-Statistic
Heteroskedasticity 
Test for ARCH 
Effects: 
Prob. of  Chi-
Square-Statistic
Chow Test of 
structural break at 
1998: 
Prob. of F-Statistic
M1 4.662 0.0972 0.2318 0.1321 0.4319 0.3800 0.8847 0.6297
M2 -0.443 0.8012 0.6763 0.5632 0.4496 0.3954 0.9821 0.0578
M3 0.646 0.7241 0.7516 0.6561 0.4237 0.3729 0.9155 0.0540
M4 0.351 0.8390 0.7907 0.7064 0.2467 0.2259 0.9996 0.0470
M5 0.828 0.6610 0.8182 0.7426 0.1440 0.1440 0.8601 0.0434
M6 0.171 0.9180 0.6261 0.4850 0.5555 0.4844 0.9873 0.0146
M7 0.328 0.8486 0.7146 0.5925 0.1731 0.1704 0.9824 0.1031
M8 0.438 0.8035 0.6728 0.5406 0.2781 0.2520 0.9826 0.1144
M9 0.356 0.8372 0.8001 0.7050 0.2359 0.2190 0.9969 0.0641
M10 0.645 0.7242 0.7491 0.6369 0.2482 0.2287 0.9156 0.1067
M11 0.349 0.8598 0.7971 0.7009 0.1305 0.1372 0.9996 0.1004
M12 1.335 0.5131 0.4815 0.3077 0.3716 0.3253 0.7494 0.0098
M13 0.166 0.9203 0.6379 0.4782 0.3447 0.3042 0.9868 0.0288
M14 0.329 0.8486 0.7156 0.5751 0.1147 0.1293 0.9824 0.1370
M15 0.353 0.8380 0.8061 0.6985 0.1409 0.1496 0.9966 0.0757
M16 1.139 0.5659 0.4617 0.2666 0.2867 0.2609 0.7442 0.0193
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Table 4.12 Estimation Results of Double-log Industry’s Share of Real GDP Models                                                                                            
Dependent Variable: log of industry’s share of real GDP
Variable Original 
Model 1
New 
Model 1 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16
Log of real 
total extern-
al debt stock
-0.506**
(0.209)
-0.609***
(0.198)
-0.024
(0.036)
-0.179
(0.214)
-0.088*
(0.045)
-0.017
(0.037)
-0.654***
(0.226)
-0.161
(0.217)
-0.082*
(0.046)
-0.638**
(0.226)
Log of real 
long-term 
external 
debt stock
0.478**
(0.199)
0.519**
(0.185)
-0.018
(0.035)
0.155
(0.210)
-0.061
(0.042)
-0.012
(0.036)
0.518**
(0.204)
0.143
(0.212)
-0.056
(0.042)
0.508**
(0.203)
Log of real 
short-term 
external debt 
stock
0.046**
(0.019)
0.082***
(0.019)
0.018
(0.018)
0.049**
(0.024)
0.038
(0.022)
0.022
(0.019)
0.083****
(0.025)
0.051**
(0.024)
0.040*
(0.022)
0.084***
(0.025)
Log of total 
debt 
servicing as 
percentage of 
exports
-0.112***
(0.024)
-0.055
(0.034)
-0.045
(0.044)
-0.040
(0.046)
-0.042
(0.046)
-0.055
(0.045)
-0.038
(0.047)
-0.046
(0.043)
-0.049
(0.044)
-0.042
(0.038)
Log of real 
workers’ 
remittances 
and compe-
nsation of 
employees 
received
-0.017
(0.025)
-0.020
(0.025)
-0.035**
(0.015)
-0.025
(0.015)
-0.018
(0.026)
0.008
(0.027)
-0.016
(0.026)
-0.004
(0.026)
-0.018
(0.026)
-0.030*
(0.016)
0.022
(0.024)
-0.017
(0.026)
0.010
(0.026)
-0.002
(0.026)
0.023
(0.024)
Log of real 
foreign direct 
investment 
net inflows
0.049***
(0.015)
0.048***
(0.015)
0.037**
(0.017)
0.039**
(0.016)
0.048***
(0.015)
0.032*
(0.016)
0.042**
(0.017)
0.035**
(0.016)
0.041**
(0.017)
0.027
(0.019)
0.017
(0.016)
0.041**
(0.017)
0.024
(0.018)
0.026
(0.018)
0.009
(0.017)
Log of
money and 
quasi money 
growth rate
0.005
(0.016)
0.005
(0.016)
0.006
(0.015)
0.005
(0.016)
0.006
(0.016)
-0.002
(0.015)
0.004
(0.016)
0.000
(0.016)
0.004
(0.016)
0.004
(0.015)
-0.003
(0.013)
0.005
(0.016)
-0.003
(0.015)
-0.001
(0.016)
-0.004
(0.013)
Log of total 
labour force
0.187
(0.425)
0.382
(0.638)
0.460
(0.625)
1.025*
(0.498)
0.239
(0.608)
0.325
(0.649)
0.318
(0.596)
0.053
(0.744)
0.513
(0.601)
0.109
(0.738)
0.513
(0.643)
0.085
(0.538)
0.019
(0.756)
-0.060
(0.690)
0.105
(0.703)
-0.254
(0.618)
Log of real 
capital stock
-0.003
(0.121)
0.120
(0.205)
0.144
(0.201)
0.309*
(0.150)
0.085
(0.187)
0.105
(0.208)
0.052
(0.194)
0.024
(0.233)
0.125
(0.194)
0.042
(0.232)
0.155
(0.194)
-0.044
(0.177)
0.016
(0.237)
-0.059
(0.219)
0.004
(0.222)
-0.143
(0.198)
C -1.750***
(0.312)
-4.167
(10.649)
-11.350 
(16.877)
-13.455
(16.518)
-28.032**
(12.728)
-8.173
(15.580)
-9.870
(17.172)
-8.126
(15.807)
-3.122
(19.422)
-13.708
(15.878)
-4.639
(19.241)
-14.984
(16.404)
-0.945
(14.361)
-2.213
(19.726)
1.377
(18.058)
-3.417
(18.334)
7.555
(16.252)
Adjusted R2 0.563 0.743 0.603 0.600 0.612 0.613 0.595 0.655 0.599 0.631 0.597 0.622 0.727 0.588 0.658 0.635 0.729
Notes:  Figures in parentheses are standard errors; ***99%, **95%, and *90%
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Table 4.13 Estimation Results of Short-Run Models of Growth in the Services’ Share of Real GDP
Dependent Variable:  Growth rate of the services’ share of real GDP
Variable Original 
Model 1
New 
Model 1 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16
Growth rate of real total
external 
debt stock
-0.075
(0.127)
0.004
(0.156)
-0.021
(0.019)
-0.106
(0.112)
-0.018
(0.027)
-0.021
(0.020)
-0.165
(0.169)
-0.106
(0.115)
-0.018
(0.028)
-0.164
(0.175)
Growth rate of real long-
term external debt stock
0.068
(0.118)
0.001
(0.144)
-0.018
(0.019)
0.084
(0.109)
-0.013
(0.024)
-0.018
(0.020)
0.131
(0.148)
0.084
(0.112)
-0.012
(0.025)
0.130
(0.154)
Growth rate of real short-
term external debt stock
0.006
(0.015)
-0.012
(0.021)
-0.010
(0.012)
-0.003
(0.017)
-0.006
(0.015)
-0.010
(0.013)
0.011
(0.022)
-0.003
(0.017)
-0.006
(0.016)
0.010
(0.023)
Growth rate of total debt 
servicing as a percentage of 
exports
0.007
(0.016)
0.010
(0.017)
0.003
(0.017)
0.002
(0.017)
0.002
(0.017)
0.003
(0.017)
0.002
(0.018)
0.002
(0.018)
0.003
(0.018)
0.001
(0.018)
Growth rate of real 
workers’ remittances and 
compensation of employees 
received
0.026
(0.016)
0.024
(0.016)
0.017
(0.011)
0.012
(0.010)
0.028*
(0.016)
0.026
(0.017)
0.026
(0.017)
0.023
(0.016)
0.023
(0.016)
0.017
(0.011)
0.032*
(0.018)
0.028
(0.017)
0.025
(0.018)
0.023
(0.017)
0.031
(0.019)
Growth rate of real foreign 
direct investment net 
inflows
-0.012
(0.008)
-0.013
(0.009)
-0.013
(0.008)
-0.016*
(0.008)
-0.013
(0.009)
-0.012
(0.009)
-0.012
(0.009)
-0.012
(0.009)
-0.012
(0.009)
-0.013
(0.009)
-0.014
(0.009)
-0.012
(0.009)
-0.012
(0.009)
-0.012
(0.009)
-0.014
(0.009)
Money and quasi money 
growth rate
-0.018
(0.063)
-0.017
(0.064)
-0.011
(0.064)
-0.016
(0.067)
-0.020
(0.064)
-0.017
(0.065)
-0.020
(0.067)
-0.015
(0.066)
-0.019
(0.067)
-0.014
(0.067)
-0.026
(0.067)
-0.021
(0.068)
-0.019
(0.069)
-0.017
(0.069)
-0.026 
(0.070)
Growth rate of total labour
force
-0.154
(0.427)
-0.192
(0.386)
-0.164
(0.386)
-0.158
(0.387)
-0.086
(0.388)
-0.252
(0.398)
-0.195
(0.396)
-0.187
(0.399)
-0.179
(0.397)
-0.158
(0.399)
-0.150
(0.399)
-0.271
(0.408)
-0.247
(0.411)
-0.189
(0.410)
-0.173
(0.410)
-0.269
(0.424)
The first-differenced 
growth rate of real capital 
stock
1.753
(1.935)
1.077
(1.509)
1.171
(1.512)
1.648
(1.548)
1.428
(1.606)
0.830
(1.558)
1.188
(1.708)
1.131
(1.626)
1.386
(1.653)
1.229
(1.629)
1.747
(1.665)
0.235
(2.031)
0.882
(1.678)
1.260
(1.851)
1.468
(1.788)
       0.259
(2.208)
C 0.006
(0.004)
0.010
(0.014)
0.016
(0.016)
0.015
(0.016)
0.013
(0.016)
0.012
(0.016)
0.018
(0.016)
0.016
(0.016)
0.016
(0.016)
0.015
(0.016)
0.015
(0.016)
0.013
(0.016)
0.020
(0.017)
0.018
(0.017)
0.016
(0.017)
0.015
(0.017)
0.020
(0.018)
Adjusted R2 -0.142 -0.213 -0.013 -0.028 -0.036 -0.071 -0.033 -0.065 -0.065 -0.075 -0.082 -0.088 -0.077 -0.090 -0.123 -0.133 -0.141
Notes:  Figures in parentheses are standard errors; ***99%, **95%, and *90%
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Table 4.13.1  The OLS Residual and Stability Diagnostics of Short-Run Models of Growth in the Services’ Share of Real GDP
Model Jarque
-Bera 
(JB)
Probability 
of Jarque-
Bera (JB)
Breusch- Godfrey
Serial Correlation
LM Test-:
Prob. of 
F-Statistic
Breusch-Godfrey
Serial Correlation
LM Test:
Probability of 
Chi-Square-
Statistic
Breusch-Pagan-
Godfrey
Test of 
Heteroskedasticity:
Probability of 
F-Statistic 
Breusch-Pagan-
Godfrey
Test of 
Heteroskedasticity:
Prob. of Chi-
Square-Statistic
Heteroskedasticity 
Test for ARCH 
Effects: 
Prob. of  Chi-
Square-Statistic
Chow Test of 
structural break at 
1998: 
Prob. of F-Statistic
M1 0.618 0.7342 0.1634 0.0853 0.8521 0.8003 0.3534 0.2923
M2 0.061 0.9700 0.0872 0.0405 0.8026 0.7430 0.3403 0.3536
M3 0.093 0.9844 0.0864 0.0401 0.8743 0.8272 0.3117 0.2701
M4 0.267 0.8751 0.0681 0.0307 0.9198 0.8845 0.4448 0.5187
M5 0.225 0.8938 0.0676 0.0304 0.9196 0.8843 0.3734 0.5274
M6 0.106 0.9486 0.0702 0.0267 0.7966 0.7263 0.4794 0.3959
M7 0.079 0.9615 0.0970 0.0392 0.8633 0.8045 0.3642 0.3970
M8 0.062 0.9695 0.0417 0.0148 0.8365 0.7723 0.3338 0.1691
M9 0.126 0.9390 0.0943 0.0379 0.9155 0.8713 0.3738 0.3605
M10 0.085 0.9584 0.0462 0.0166 0.9023 0.8538 0.3095 0.1271
M11 0.252 0.8816 0.0518 0.0189 0.9505 0.9200 0.4344 0.3333
M12 0.141 0.9317 0.0886 0.0294 0.6526 0.5675 0.4908 0.4334
M13 0.126 0.9391 0.0405 0.0116 0.8345 0.7600 0.4628 0.3048
M14 0.080 0.9607 0.0494 0.0145 0.8895 0.8283 0.3557 0.1869
M15 0.118 0.9428 0.0529 0.0158 0.9320 0.8863 0.3644 0.2036
M16 0.155 0.9255 0.0546 0.0130 0.7408 0.6462 0.4856 0.2575
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Table 4.14  Estimation Results of Double-log Model of Services’ Share of Real GDP Models
Dependent Variable: log of services’ share of real GDP
Variable Original 
Model 1
New 
Model 1 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16
Log of real total 
external debt stock
0.250*
(0.139)
0.020
(0.124)
-0.017
(0.017)
0.051
(0.102)
-0.051**
(0.021)
-0.021
(0.017)
-0.120
(0.119)
0.040
(0.102)
-0.053**
(0.021)
-0.128
(0.120)
Log of real long-term 
external 
debt stock
-0.194
(0.132)
-0.019
(0.116)
-0.018
(0.017)
-0.068
(0.100)
-0.043**
(0.019)
-0.022
(0.017)
0.063
(0.108)
-0.061
(0.100)
-0.045**
(0.019)
0.068
(0.108)
Log of real short-
term external debt 
stock
-0.027**
(0.012)
0.007
(0.012)
0.008
(0.009)
0.026**
(0.011)
0.022**
(0.010)
0.007
(0.009)
0.030**
(0.013)
0.025**
(0.011)
0.021*
(0.010)
0.030**
(0.013)
Log of total debt 
servicing as 
percentage of exports
-0.039**
(0.016)
0.027
(0.021)
0.017
(0.022)
0.023
(0.022)
0.023
(0.022)
0.014
(0.022)
0.022
(0.022)
0.020
(0.020)
0.019
(0.020)
0.020
(0.020)
Log of real workers’ 
remittances and 
compensation of 
employees received
0.027**
(0.012)
0.028**
(0.012)
0.015*
(0.007)
0.014*
(0.008)
0.027**
(0.012)
0.039***
(0.012)
0.026**
(0.012)
0.036**
*
(0.012)
0.027**
(0.012)
0.013
(0.008)
0.041***
(0.013)
0.026**
(0.012)
0.039***
(0.012)
0.035***
(0.012)
0.040***
(0.013)
Log of real foreign 
direct investment net 
inflows
-0.006
(0.007)
-0.006
(0.007)
-0.012
(0.008)
-0.006
(0.008)
-0.006
(0.007)
-0.015*
(0.007)
-0.002
(0.008)
-0.014*
(0.008)
-0.002
(0.008)
-0.009
(0.009)
-0.017*
(0.008)
-0.002
(0.008)
-0.011
(0.008)
-0.010
(0.008)
-0.013
(0.009)
Log of money and 
quasi money growth 
rate
-0.003
(0.008)
-0.003
(0.008)
-0.002
(0.007)
-0.001
(0.008)
-0.004
(0.008)
-0.007
(0.007)
-0.003
(0.008)
-0.006
(0.007)
-0.003
(0.008)
-0.002
(0.008)
-0.007
(0.007)
-0.003
(0.008)
-0.006
(0.006)
-0.006
(0.007)
-0.006
(0.007)
Log of total labour
force
0.506*
(0.266)
-0.326
(0.302)
-0.339
(0.294)
0.050
(0.240)
0.096
(0.295)
-0.301
(0.308)
-0.359
(0.276)
-0.140
(0.350)
-0.309
(0.273)
-0.149
(0.345)
0.178
(0.318)
-0.388
(0.284)
-0.126
(0.356)
-0.196
(0.320)
-0.150
(0.322))
-0.222
(0.328)
Log of real capital 
stock
0.108
(0.076)
-0.151
(0.097)
-0.156
(0.095)
-0.038
(0.072)
-0.020
(0.091)
-0.144
(0.099)
-0.186*
(0.090)
-0.097
(0.110)
-0.167*
(0.088)
-0.100
(0.108)
0.001
(0.096)
-0.198**
(0.093)
-0.094
(0.112)
-0.138
(0.102)
-0.120
(0.101)
-0.150
(0.105)
C -1.501***
(0.208)
-12.594*
(6.667)
9.062
(7.998)
9.433
(7.761)
-0.766
(6.136)
-1.988
(7.546)
8.416
(8.153)
10.754
(7.314)
4.430
(9.135)
9.288
(7.213)
4.650
(8.981)
-4.010
(8.117)
11.632
(7.579)
4.043
(9.297)
6.656
(8.388)
5.283
(8.397)
7.485
(8.616)
Adjusted R2 0.600 0.753 0.781 0.783 0.779 0.777 0.776 0.819 0.782 0.813 0.784 0.772 0.813 0.775 0.819 0.812 0.813
Notes:  Figures in parentheses are standard errors; ***99%, **95%, and *90%
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Table 4.15 Results of Johansen Cointegration Rank Tests
Null 
Hypothesis
Eigenvalue Maximum 
Eigenvalue 
Statistic
5 Percent
Critical 
Value
Probability Trace
Statistic
5 Percent
Critical 
Value
Probability**
r=0 0.949889 77.83141* 33.87687 0.0000 160.4160* 69.81889 0.0000
U 0.805165 42.52564* 27.58434 0.0003 82.58457* 47.85613 0.0000
U 0.600136 23.83238* 21.13162 0.0203 40.05894* 29.79707 0.0024
U 0.416239 13.99483 14.26460 0.0551 16.22655* 15.49471 0.0387
U 0.082255 2.231720 3.841466 0.1352 2.231720 3.841466 0.1352
*denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level                                                                                                                                                                                             
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values                                       
Table 4.16 Cointegrating Equations Based on the Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients
Number of 
Co-
integrating 
Equations
Log 
Likelihood
Dependent 
Variable of 
Interest
Growth rate 
of  
agriculture’s 
share of real 
GDP
Growth 
rate of
real total 
external 
debt 
stock
Growth rate of 
real long-term 
external debt 
stock
Growth rate 
of real short-
term external 
debt stock
Growth rate 
of total debt 
servicing as 
a percentage
of exports
1 144.945 Growth rate of  
agriculture’s 
share of Real 
GDP
1.000 0.221 
(0.263)
-0.414 
(0.242)
0.072 
(0.027)
-0.036  
(0.029)
2 166.207 Growth rate of  
agriculture’s 
share of real 
GDP
1.000 0.000 -0.405
(0.356)
0.712 
(0.302)
-3.192  
(0.491)
3 178.124 Growth rate of  
agriculture’s 
share of Real 
GDP
1.000 0.000 0.000 -0.413
(0.125)
2.303
(0.347)
Notes:  Figures in parentheses are standard errors
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Table 4.17: Results of Johansen Cointegration Rank Tests
Null 
Hypothesis
Eigenvalue Maximum 
Eigenvalue 
Statistic
5 Percent
Critical 
Value
Probability** Trace
Statistic
5 Percent
Critical 
Value
Probability**
r=0 0.935390 71.22384* 33.87687 0.0000 159.3717* 69.81889 0.0000
U 0.796586 41.40525* 27.58434 0.0005 88.14782* 47.85613 0.0000
U 0.591045 23.24791* 21.13162 0.0248 46.74257* 29.79707 0.0002
U 0.544899 20.46813* 14.26460 0.0046 23.49466* 15.49471 0.0025
U 0.109885 3.026533 3.841466 0.0819 3.026533 3.841466 0.0819
*denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level                                                                                                                                                                                             
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values                                       
Table 4.18 Cointegrating Equations Based on the Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients
Number of 
Co-
integrating 
Equations
Log 
Likelihood
Dependent 
Variable of 
Interest
Growth rate 
of  
industry’s 
share of 
real GDP
Growth 
rate of
real total 
external 
debt stock
Growth rate of 
real long term-
external debt 
stock
Growth rate 
of real short-
term external 
debt stock
Growth rate 
of total debt 
servicing as 
a percentage
of exports
1 145.448 Growth rate of  
industry’s share 
of real GDP
1.000 0.107 
(0.140)
-0.024 
(0.129)
-0.054
(0.015)
0.148 
(0.017)
2 166.150 Growth rate of  
industry’s share 
of real GDP
1.000 0.000 0.378
(0.052)
-0.177
(0.045)
0.240
(0.074)
3 177.774 Growth rate of  
industry’s share 
of real GDP
1.000 0.000 0.000 -0.046
(0.016)
0.295
(0.043)
Notes:  Figures in parentheses are standard errors
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Table 4.19 Results of Johansen Cointegration Rank Tests
Null 
Hypothesis
Eigenvalue Maximum 
Eigenvalue 
Statistic
5 Percent
Critical 
Value
Probability** Trace
Statistic
5 Percent
Critical 
Value
Probability**
r=0 0.931192 69.58730* 33.87687 0.0000 137.9502* 69.81889 0.0000
U 0.806655 42.72530* 27.58434 0.0003 68.36295* 47.85613 0.0002
U 0.531236 19.69906 21.13162 0.0783 25.63765 29.79707 0.1399
U 0.195668 5.661317 14.26460 0.6570 5.938580 15.49471 0.7028
U 0.010607 0.277263 3.841466 0.5985 0.277263 3.841466 0.5985
*denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level                                                                                                                                                                                             
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values                                       
Table 4.20 Cointegrating Equations Based on the Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients
Number of 
Co-
integrating 
Equations
Log 
Likelihood
Dependent 
Variable of 
Interest
Growth 
rate of  
the 
services’ 
share of 
real GDP
Growth 
rate of
real total 
external 
debt stock
Growth rate of 
real long-term 
external debt 
stock
Growth rate 
of real short-
term external 
debt stock
Growth rate 
of total debt 
servicing as 
a percentage
of exports
1 167.515 Growth rate 
of the
services’
share of real 
GDP
1.000 -0.063 
(0.114)
0.120 
(0.104)
-0.023   
(0.012)
-0.036 
(0.013)
2 188.878 Growth rate 
of  the 
services’ 
share of real 
GDP
1.000 0.000 0.047
(0.008)
-0.019 
(0.007)
-0.051 
(0.011)
Notes:  Figures in parentheses are standard errors
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Chapter 5
Vector autoregressive impulse responses of the growth rates of real 
GDP and sectoral real GDP shares
5.1 Introduction
This chapter extends the empirical literature on Pakistan’s external debt crisis by 
estimating real GDP Growth VAR Model, Agriculture’s Real GDP Share Growth 
VAR Model, Industry’s Real GDP Share Growth VAR Model, and Services’ Real 
GDP Share Growth VAR Model and using the VAR impulse responses of the growth 
rates of real GDP and sectoral real GDP shares for analysing the effects of external 
debt shocks on the growth rates of real GDP, agriculture’s share of GDP, industry’s 
share of GDP, and the services’ share of GDP.  This new empirical VAR analysis is 
expected to inspire further empirical research on the subject in the case of availability 
of a larger data set for an extended period of time, which can eventually help develop 
a better understanding of the nature and the transmission mechanism of the short-run 
and long-run effects of shocks of Pakistan’s external debt policy on the growth rates 
of her real GDP and sectoral real GDP shares.
This chapter uses the vector autoregressive (VAR) analysis of real GDP growth 
model and sectoral GDP shares’ growth models as the aim is to investigate the nature 
of the dynamic causal relationships between the pairs of the endogenous stationary 
growth time series (for example, the growth rates of real GDP and real total external 
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debt stock) while taking account of their dynamic properties, interdependences, and 
interactions by means of VAR models [(Sims, 1980), (Hill, Griffiths and Lim,
2008)].  The analysis follows the original VAR approach of Sims (1980) using the 
specifications of the vector autoregressive equations in which each variable is 
specified as a function of its own lagged values and the lagged values of all other 
endogenous variables (Fair, 1991, p. 199). As in Chapter 4, the above empirical 
VAR analysis is extended to the growth rates of real GDP shares in the agriculture, 
industry, and the services sectors, respectively, in sectoral real GDP share growth 
VAR Models 2, 3, and 4. VAR models have been used to examine the dynamic 
interdependence of economic variables and explain the transmission of shocks among 
the endogenous variables.
The empirical econometric literature has employed VAR models as a useful 
econometric technique. For example, VAR impulse responses were applied by 
macroeconometricians for determining the growth effects of oil price shocks (Hill,
Griffiths and Lim, 2008, p. 352). In the present study, VAR impulse responses are 
being applied for analysing the effects of the external debt shocks and their various 
long and short-run components on the growth rates of real GDP, agriculture’s real 
GDP share, industry’s real GDP share, and the services’ real GDP share.  
This chapter estimates one aggregate-level and three sector-level unrestricted VAR 
models (respectively, Real GDP Growth VAR Model 1, Agriculture’s Real GDP 
Share Growth VAR Model 2, Industry’s Real GDP Share Growth VAR Model 3, and 
Services’ Real GDP Share Growth VAR Model 4). These four VAR models and the 
VAR impulse responses of the growth rates of real GDP and sectoral real GDP shares 
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to both their own shocks, and to the individual shocks of the above four external debt 
growth rates are discussed in order to capture the qualitative features of the VAR 
models (Adebiyi and Adeyemi, 2008). The stationarity of all the time series used in 
the four VAR models ensures the reliability of the estimation results of the VAR 
model and its impulse response functions (Adebiyi and Adeyemi, 2008).
5.2.1 VAR analysis: Real GDP Growth VAR Model 1 
While following the VAR modelling approach of Hill, Griffiths and Lim (2008), this 
section presents empirical analysis of an unrestricted five-variable Real GDP Growth 
VAR Model 1 using stationary time series of the growth rates of real GDP, real total 
external debt stock, real long-term external debt stock, real short-term external debt 
stock, and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports248 (Hill, Griffiths and Lim,
2008, p. 347). On the basis of four VAR Selection Criteria, namely, Likelihood 
Ratio (LR), Final Prediction Error (FPE), Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), and 
Hannan-Quinn information criterion (H-QIC), three is selected as the optimum lag 
length, as shown in Table 5.1 in the appendix to this chapter.  Here it is also relevant 
to note that AIC is a widely-used information criterion. Following the arguments of 
Stock and Watson (2011), three as the selected optimum lag length is logically 
preferred to zero249 as the alternative optimal lag length, which is selected on the 
basis of the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC), which is also known as Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC), as shown in Table 5.1 in the appendix.  Therefore, an
                                                          
248 Stationarity of these five growth time series has already been determined by the results of the unit 
root tests for nonstationarity in the form of the Phillips-Peron test statistics, as presented in Table 3.3 
in the appendix to Chapter 3.
249 An optimum lag length of zero precludes the possibility of having a VAR system for estimation.
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unrestricted Real GDP Growth VAR Model 1 was estimated using three lags for each 
variable.
VAR coefficients are rarely reported partly, which is partly due to their poor 
estimation and partly due to the troublesome process of presenting all the VAR 
coefficients (Canova, 2007). Therefore, VAR analysis usually reports the more 
precisely estimated functions (for example, VAR impulse response functions) of the 
VAR coefficients because these functions are judged to have more economic 
meaning (Canova, 2007).  
On the basis of the estimation results of Real GDP Growth VAR Model 1, an 
analysis of impulse response functions for Real GDP Growth VAR Model 1 is 
presented in the next subsection, as the impulse response functions are the 
centrepiece of VAR analysis (Gujrati, 2003, p. 854).
5.2.1.1 Impulse response functions’ analysis of Real GDP Growth VAR Model 1
For exploring the dynamic structure of Real GDP Growth VAR Model 1, this 
subsection presents VAR analysis of impulse response functions250. Figure 5.1 in the 
appendix to this chapter portrays twenty-five responses to Cholesky one-standard 
deviation innovations for the above Real GDP Growth VAR Model 1.
Impulse response functions for Real GDP Growth VAR Model 1 illustrate the nature 
of the dynamic responses of the real GDP growth and the above four external debt 
growth variables to their respective own shocks, and to the shocks of their other 
                                                          
250 Impulse response functions portray the moving average of the system and, thereby, depict the 
nature of the response of the dependent variable to shocks in the error term.
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determinants. Technically, the impulse response functions are graphs depicting the 
reactions of each variable’s present and future values to a temporary unexpected unit 
increment in the present value of any one of the error terms of a VAR system. Each 
impulse response function is graphed within the 95% confidence interval (Stock and 
Watson, 2001).  
Here only the responses of the growth rate of real GDP to its own shock as well as to 
the shocks in the above four external debt growth variables are being highlighted. In 
Figure 5.1, the five figures in the first row illustrate the responses of the growth rate 
of real GDP, respectively, to Cholesky one-standard deviation positive shocks to the 
current growth rates of real GDP, real total external debt stock, real long-term 
external debt stock, real short-term external debt, and total debt servicing as a
percentage of exports over a time period of ten years. The first figure in the first row 
reflects the temporary significant large positive response of the growth rate of real 
GDP to its own positive shocks, which then subsides and ultimately becomes zero in 
the short-run with about a one-year lag.  In other words, innovations to the growth 
rate of real GDP temporarily increase the growth rate of real GDP but only in the 
short-run.  The second, third, fourth and fifth figures in the first row reflect neither 
significant positive nor significant negative responses of the growth rate of real GDP,
respectively, to the individual shocks of unexpected increases in the growth rates of 
real total external debt stock, real long-term external debt stock, real short-term 
external debt, and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports.  In other words, the 
individual innovations to the four external debt growth variables have neither positive 
nor negative effects on the growth rate of real GDP. 
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5.2.2 VAR analysis: Agriculture’s Real GDP Share Growth VAR Model 2
This analysis of Agriculture’s Real GDP Share Growth VAR Model 2 explores the 
nature of causal dynamic relationships between the pairs of stationary time series of 
the growth rates of agriculture’s share of real GDP, real total external debt stock, real 
long-term external debt stock, real short-term external debt stock, and total debt 
servicing as a percentage of exports251 (Hill, Griffiths and Lim, 2008, p. 347).   On 
the basis of two VAR Selection Criteria, namely, Likelihood Ratio (LR) and Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), three is the selected optimum lag length, as shown in 
Table 5.2 in the appendix, and is logically preferred to zero as the alternative optimal 
lag length, which is selected on the basis of three alternative information criteria 
(Final Prediction Error, Schwarz Information Criterion, and Hannan-Quinn 
Information Criterion), as shown in Table 5.2 in the appendix. Therefore, an
unrestricted Agriculture’s Real GDP Share Growth VAR Model 2 was estimated 
using three lags for each variable.
On the basis of the estimation results of Agriculture’s Real GDP Share Growth VAR 
Model 2, an analysis of impulse response functions for Agriculture’s Real GDP Share 
Growth VAR Model 2 is presented in the next subsection. 
                                                          
251 Stationarity of these five growth time series has already been determined by the results of the unit 
root tests for nonstationarity in the form of the Phillips-Peron test statistics, as presented in Table 3.3 
in the appendix to Chapter 3.
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5.2.2.1 Impulse response functions’ analysis of Agriculture’s Real GDP Share 
Growth VAR Model 2
For exploring the dynamic structure of Agriculture’s Real GDP Share Growth VAR 
Model 2, this subsection presents VAR analysis of impulse response functions.
Figure 5.2 in the appendix portrays twenty-five responses to Cholesky one-standard 
deviation innovations for Agriculture’s Real GDP Share Growth VAR Model 2.
Impulse response functions for Agriculture’s Real GDP Share Growth VAR Model 2
illustrate the nature of the dynamic responses of the growth rates of agriculture’s 
share of real GDP and four external debt growth variables to their respective own 
shocks, and to the shocks of their other determinants. In Figure 5.2, the five figures 
in the first row illustrate the responses of the growth rate of agriculture’s share of real 
GDP, respectively, to Cholesky one-standard deviation positive shocks to the current 
growth rates of agriculture’s share of real GDP, real total external debt stock, real 
long-term external debt stock, real short-term external debt, and total debt servicing 
as a percentage of exports over a time period of ten years. The first figure in the first 
row reflects the temporary significant large positive response of the growth rate of 
agriculture’s share of real GDP to its own positive shocks, which then subsides and 
ultimately becomes zero in the short-run with about a one-year lag.  In other words, 
innovations to the growth rate of agriculture’s share of real GDP temporarily increase 
the growth rate of agriculture’s share of real GDP but only in the short-run.  The 
second, third, fourth and fifth figures in the first row reflect neither significant 
positive nor significant negative responses of the growth rate of agriculture’s share of 
real GDP, respectively, to the individual shocks of unexpected increases in the 
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current growth rates of real total external debt stock, real long-term external debt 
stock, real short-term external debt, and total debt servicing as a percentage of 
exports. In other words, the individual innovations to the four external debt growth 
variables have neither positive nor negative effects on the growth rate of agriculture’s 
share of real GDP.
5.2.3 VAR analysis: Industry’s Real GDP Share Growth VAR Model 3
This analysis of Industry’s Real GDP Share Growth VAR Model 3 explores the 
nature of causal dynamic relationships between the pairs of stationary time series of 
the growth rates of industry’s share of real GDP, real total external debt stock, real 
long-term external debt stock, real short-term external debt stock, and total debt 
servicing as a percentage of exports252 (Hill, Griffiths and Lim, 2008, p. 347). On the 
basis of four VAR Selection Criteria [namely, Likelihood Ratio (LR), Final 
Prediction Error (FPE), Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), and Hannan-Quinn 
Information Criterion (H-QIC)], three is the selected optimum lag length, as shown in 
Table 5.3 of the appendix.  Therefore, an unrestricted Industry’s Real GDP Share 
Growth VAR Model 3 was estimated using three lags for each variable.
On the basis of the estimation results of Industry’s Real GDP Share Growth VAR 
Model 3, an analysis of impulse response functions for Industry’s Real GDP Share 
Growth VAR Model 3 is presented in the next subsection. 
                                                          
252 Stationarity of these five growth time series has already been determined by the results of the unit 
root tests for nonstationarity in the form of the Phillips-Peron test statistics, as presented in Table 3.3 
in the appendix to Chapter 3.
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5.2.3.1 Impulse response functions’ analysis of Industry’s Real GDP Share 
Growth VAR Model 3
For exploring the dynamic structure of Industry’s Real GDP Share Growth VAR 
Model 3, this subsection presents a VAR analysis of impulse response functions.
Figure 5.3 in the appendix portrays twenty-five responses to Cholesky one-standard 
deviation innovations for Industry’s Real GDP Share Growth VAR Model 3.
Impulse response functions for Industry’s Real GDP Share Growth VAR Model 3 
illustrate the nature of the dynamic responses of the growth rates of industry’s share 
of real GDP and four external debt variables to their respective own shocks, and to 
the shocks of their other determinants. In Figure 5.3, the five figures in the first row 
illustrate the responses of the growth rate of industry’s share of real GDP,
respectively, to Cholesky one-standard deviation positive shocks to the current 
growth rates of industry’s share of real GDP, real total external debt stock, real long-
term external debt stock, real short-term external debt, and total debt servicing as a
percentage of exports over a time period of ten years. The first figure in the first row 
reflects the temporary significant small positive response of the growth rate of 
industry’s share of real GDP to its own positive shocks, which then subsides and 
ultimately becomes zero in the short-run with about a one-year lag. In other words, 
innovations to the growth rate of industry’s share of real GDP temporarily increase 
the growth rate of industry’s share of real GDP but only in the short-run.  The 
second, third, fourth and fifth figures in the first row reflect neither significant 
positive nor significant negative responses of the growth rate of industry’s share of 
real GDP to respectively the individual shocks of unexpected increases in the current 
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growth rates of real total external debt stock, real long-term external debt stock, real 
short-term external debt, and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports. In other 
words, the individual innovations to the four external debt growth variables have 
neither positive nor negative effects on the growth rate of industry’s share of real 
GDP.
5.2.4 VAR analysis: Services’ Real GDP Share Growth VAR Model 4
This analysis of Services’ Real GDP Share Growth VAR Model 4 explores the nature 
of causal dynamic relationships between the pairs of stationary time series of the 
growth rates of the services’ share of real GDP, real total external debt stock, real 
long-term external debt stock, real short-term external debt stock, and total debt 
servicing as a percentage of exports253 (Hill, Griffiths and Lim, 2008, p. 347).  On the 
basis of one VAR Selection Criterion [namely, Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)], 
three is the selected optimum lag length, as shown in Table 5.4 of the appendix to 
this chapter, and is logically preferred to zero as the alternative optimal lag length,
which is selected on the basis of four alternative information criteria [Likelihood 
Ratio (LR), Final Prediction Error (FPE), Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC), and 
Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion (H-QIC)], as shown in Table 5.4. Therefore, an 
unrestricted Services’ Real GDP Share Growth VAR Model 4 was estimated using 
three lags for each variable.
                                                          
253 Stationarity of these five growth time series has already been determined by the results of the unit 
root tests for nonstationarity in the form of the Phillips-Peron test statistics, as presented in Table 3.3 
in the appendix to Chapter 3.
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On the basis of the estimation results of Services’ Real GDP Share Growth VAR 
Model 4, an analysis of impulse response functions for Services’ Real GDP Share 
Growth VAR Model 4 is presented in the next subsection.
5.2.4.1 Impulse response functions’ analysis of Services’ Real GDP Share 
Growth VAR Model 4
For exploring the dynamic structure of Services’ Real GDP Share Growth VAR 
Model 4, this subsection presents VAR analysis of impulse response functions.
Figure 5.4 in the appendix portrays twenty-five responses to Cholesky one-standard 
deviation innovations for Services’ Real GDP Share Growth VAR Model 4.
Impulse response functions for Services’ Real GDP Share Growth VAR Model 4
illustrate the nature of the dynamic responses of the growth rates of the services’ 
share of real GDP and four external debt variables to their respective own shocks,
and to the shocks of their other determinants. In Figure 5.4, the five figures in the 
first row illustrate the responses of the growth rate of services’ share of real GDP,
respectively, to Cholesky one-standard deviation positive shocks to the current 
growth rates of the services’ share of real GDP, real total external debt stock, real 
long-term external debt stock, real short-term external debt, and total debt servicing 
as a percentage of exports over a time period of ten years. The first figure in the first 
row reflects the temporary significant small positive response of the growth rate of 
the services’ share of real GDP to its own positive shock, which then subsides and 
ultimately becomes zero in the short-run with about a one-year lag. In other words, 
innovations to the growth rate of the services’ share of real GDP temporarily increase 
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the growth rate of the services’ share of real GDP but only in the short-run.  The 
second, third, fourth and fifth figures in the first row reflect neither significant 
positive nor significant negative responses of the growth rate of the services’ share of 
real GDP, respectively, to the individual shocks of unexpected increases in the 
current growth rates of real total external debt stock, real long-term external debt 
stock, real short-term external debt stock, and total debt servicing as a percentage of 
exports. In other words, the individual innovations to the four external debt growth 
variables have neither positive nor negative effects on the growth rate of the services’ 
share of real GDP.  
5.3 Conclusions and policy recommendations
VAR impulse response functions have been claimed by the practitioners to make 
economic sense for interpreting the empirical results of VAR models. The aggregate-
level VAR growth analysis was primarily concerned with measuring the effects of 
the growth rates of real total external debt stocks, real long-term external debt stock, 
real short-term external debt stock, and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports
on the growth rate of real GDP. Real GDP Growth VAR Model 1, which takes into 
account the dynamic properties and interactions of the above five stationary time 
series, provided a reliable consistent mechanism of describing the five time series as 
well as examining dynamic causal relationships between the pairs of the time series 
by means of their impulse response functions.
The analysis of the impulse response functions of the growth rate of real GDP 
reflected neither the significant positive nor significant negative responses of the
growth rate of real GDP, respectively, to the individual shocks of unexpected 
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increases in the growth rates of real total external debt stock, real long-term external 
debt stock, real short-term external debt, and total debt servicing as a percentage of 
exports. Moreover, only temporary significant large positive responses of the growth 
rate of real GDP to its own positive shocks were observed.  These responses reduced 
to zero in the short-run, thereby implying evidence of the inertia254 in the process of 
economic growth in the short-run. Hence, finally, it can be concluded from the 
empirical analysis of VAR Model 1 that the growth rate of real GDP was an inertial 
process in the short-run, and the individual shocks to four external debt growth 
variables were not significant determinants of the growth rate of real GDP within the 
dynamic framework of VAR Model 1.
At the sector-level, VAR analysis first focused on the explanation of the growth rate 
of agriculture’s share of real GDP in the framework of Agriculture’s Real GDP Share 
Growth VAR Model 2 for exploring the nature of the causal relationships between 
the pairs of stationary time series of the growth rates of agriculture’s share of real 
GDP, real total external debt stock, real long-term external debt stock, real short-term 
external debt stock, and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports.  The impulse 
response functions of the growth rate of agriculture’s share of real GDP reflected
neither significant positive nor significant negative responses of the growth rate of 
agriculture’s share of real GDP, respectively, to the individual shocks of unexpected 
increases in the growth rates of real total external debt stock, real long-term external 
debt stock, real short-term external debt, and total debt servicing as a percentage of 
                                                          
254 Inertia in the short-run means that own shocks to the growth rate of real GDP persist as well as 
positively affect the growth rate of real GDP but only in the short-run (Adebiyi and Adeemi, 2008).
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exports. Moreover, only temporary significant large positive responses of the 
growth rate of agriculture’s share of real GDP to its own positive shocks were
observed.  These responses reduced to zero in the short-run.  It can be concluded 
from the above empirical analysis of Agriculture’s Real GDP Share Growth VAR 
Model 2 that the individual shocks to four external debt growth variables were not 
significant determinants of the growth rate of agriculture’s share of real GDP in the 
dynamic framework of VAR Model 2, and that its own productivity shocks explained
most of the variance of the growth in agriculture’s share of real GDP in the short-run
within the dynamic framework of VAR Model 2.
Secondly, the sector-level VAR analysis focused on the explanation of the growth 
rate of industry’s share of real GDP in the framework of Industry’s Real GDP Share 
Growth VAR Model 3 for exploring the causal relationships between the pairs of 
stationary time series of the same above relevant growth rates. The impulse response 
functions of the growth rate of industry’s share of real GDP reflected neither 
significant positive nor significant negative responses of the growth rate of industry’s 
share of real GDP to respectively the individual shocks of unexpected increases in the 
growth rates of real total external debt stock, real long-term external debt stock, real 
short-term external debt, and total debt servicing as percentage of exports. Moreover, 
only temporary significant large positive responses of the growth rate of industry’s 
share of real GDP to its own positive shocks were observed in the short-run. These 
responses reduced to zero in the short-run. It can be concluded from the above 
empirical analysis of Industry’s Real GDP Share Growth VAR Model 3 that the 
individual shocks to four external debt growth variables were not significant 
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determinants of the growth rate of industry’s share of real GDP in the dynamic 
framework of the VAR Model 3. In fact, its own productivity shocks explained most 
of the variance of the growth in industry’s share of real GDP in the short-run within 
the dynamic framework of the VAR Model 3.
Finally, the sector-level VAR analysis focused on the explanation of the growth rate 
of the services’ share of real GDP in the framework of Services’ Real GDP Share 
Growth VAR Model 4 for exploring the causal relationships between the pairs of 
stationary time series of the same above relevant growth rates.  The impulse response 
functions of the growth rate of the services’ share of real GDP reflected neither 
significant positive nor significant negative responses of the growth rate of the 
services’ share of real GDP, respectively, to the individual shocks of unexpected 
increases in the growth rates of real total external debt stock, real long-term external 
debt stock, real short-term external debt, and total debt servicing as a percentage of 
exports. Moreover, only temporary significant large positive responses of the growth 
rate of the services’ share of real GDP to its own positive shocks were observed.  
These responses reduced to zero in the short-run. It can be concluded from the above 
empirical analysis of Services’ Real GDP Share Growth VAR Model 4 that the 
individual shocks to four external debt growth variables were not significant 
determinants of the growth rate of the services’ share of real GDP in the dynamic 
framework of VAR Model 4.  Its own productivity shocks explained most of the 
variance of the growth rate of the services’ share of real GDP in the short-run within 
the dynamic framework of VAR Model 4. In short, there is empirical evidence of a 
significant positive response of a variable of our interest (the growth rates of real 
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GDP and sectoral real GDP shares) to only its own shock and this positive response 
becomes reduced to zero after the very first year.
It is pertinent to note that in sharp contrast to the determination of short-run and long-
run effects of the external debt growth variables on the growth rates of real GDP and 
the sectoral real GDP shares of agriculture/industry/services in the framework of 
static models, the above empirical analysis of the VAR growth models, in which all 
variables are simultaneously and endogenously determined, and VAR impulse 
response functions explored and analysed the causal relationship between pairs of the 
above growth time series and determined their mutual short-run and long run-effects 
in the framework of dynamic VAR models, which inherently take into account the 
dynamic properties as well as the interactions of the above growth time series (Hill, 
Griffiths and Lim, 2008).
In spite of the obvious similarity of the above static empirical analytical frameworks
of chapters 3 & 4 and the dynamic empirical analytical framework of VAR models in 
terms of involving short-run and long-run effects, there were found neither 
significant short-run nor significant long-run effects of the growth rates of the 
external debt growth variables on the growth rates of real GDP and the growth rates 
of real GDP shares of agriculture, industry, and the services in the empirical analyses
of VAR impulse response functions. These empirical results depicted by the above 
VAR impulse response functions are in sharp contrast to the former empirical 
analyses of the static models, which showed significant short-run as well as 
significant long-run growth effects of certain external debt growth variables (for 
example, thee empirical evidence of robust positive short-run and long run effects of 
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the growth rate of real long-term external debt stock and robust significant negative 
short-run and long-run effects of the growth rate of the growth rate of total debt 
servicing as a percentage of exports).
In conclusion, the above empirical analyses of VAR impulse response functions have 
provided an additional important insight into the dynamic processes of the real GDP 
growth and the three sectoral GDP shares’ growth that the real GDP growth and the 
growth in the individual real GDP shares of agriculture, industry, and the services are 
inertial phenomena in Pakistan only and only in the short-run.  Against the 
background of the chronic economic inefficiencies and production losses caused by 
the endemic financial corruption and the prolonged crises of acute shortages of power 
(electricity) and water in Pakistan since the 1990s, this insight leads to a short-run 
policy recommendation for the Government of Pakistan that Pakistan can accelerate 
the growth rates of real GDP and three sectoral GDP share at least in the short run by 
introducing positive productivity growth shocks in her economic system by means of 
both the above systemic macroeconomic reforms-oriented anticorruption fiscal 
discipline and the proactive development policies of ensuring the requisite private 
and public investment in power generation, construction of new large dams and 
efficient irrigation networks, economic infrastructure, and human resource 
development by activating backward and forward inter-sectoral linkages. 
257 
 
Appendix to chapter 5
Table 5.1: VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria for the Five-Variable VAR Model 1a
Lag LogL LRb FPEc AICd SICe HQf
0 62.23 NA 8.43e-09 -4.40 -4.16* -4.33
1 77.30 23.19 1.89e-08 -3.64 -2.19 -3.22
2 104.61 31.51 2.01e-08 -3.82 -1.16 -3.05
3 157.03 40.33* 5.10e-09* -5.93* -2.056 -4.81*
Notes: a; VAR Model 1 consists of the growth rates of real GDP, real total external debt stocks, 
real long term external debt stock, real short term external debt stock, and total external debt 
servicing as percentage of exports, b; LR indicates the sequential modified Likelihood Ratio (LR) 
statistic (each test at 5% level), c;  FPE indicates final prediction error, d; AIC indicates Akaike 
information criterion, e; SIC Schwarz information criterion, f; HQ indicates Hannan-Quinn 
information criterion, * indicates lag order selected by the criterion.
Table 5.2: VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria for Five-Variable VAR Model 2a
Lag LogL LRb FPEc AICd SICe HQf
0 79.38 NA 2.25e-09* -5.72 -5.48* -5.65*
1 90.57 17.22 6.80e-09 -4.66 -3.21 -4.24
2 108.06 20.18 1.54e-08 -4.08 -1.42 -3.32
3 162.47 41.86* 3.36e-09 -6.34* -2.47 -5.23
Notes: a; VAR Model 2 consists of the growth rates of agriculture’s share of GDP, real total 
external debt stock, real long term external debt stock, real short term external debt stock, and 
total external debt servicing as percentage of exports, b; LR indicates the sequential modified 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) statistic (each test at 5% level), c;  FPE indicates final prediction error, d; 
AIC indicates Akaike information criterion, e; SIC Schwarz information criterion, f; HQ indicates 
Hannan-Quinn information criterion, * indicates lag order selected by the criterion.
Table 5.3: VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria for Five-Variable VAR Model 3a
Lag LogL LRb FPEc AICd SICe HQf
0 77.02 NA 2.70e-09 -5.54 -5.30* -5.47
1 93.14 24.80 5.58e-09 -4.86 -3.41 -4.44
2 117.87 28.53 7.25e-09 -4.84 -2.18 -4.07
3 177.78 46.09* 1.03e-09* -7.52* -3.65 -6.41*
Notes: a; VAR Model 3 consists of the growth rates of industry’s share of GDP,  real total 
external debt stock, real long term external debt stock, real short term external debt stock, and 
total external debt servicing as percentage of exports, b; LR indicates the sequential modified 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) statistic (each test at 5% level), c;  FPE indicates final prediction error, d; 
AIC indicates Akaike information criterion, e; SIC Schwarz information criterion, f; HQ indicates 
Hannan-Quinn information criterion, * indicates lag order selected by the criterion.
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Table 5.4 VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria for the Five-Variable VAR Model 4a
Lag LogL LRb FPEc AICd SICe HQf
0 98.41 NA* 5.21e-10* -7.19 -6.94* -7.12*
1 114.50 24.76 1.08e-09 -6.50 -5.05 -6.08
2 143.25 33.17 1.03e-09 -6.79 -4.13 -6.02
3 182.22 29.98 7.35e-10 -7.86* -3.99 -6.75
Notes: a; VAR Model 4 consists of the growth rates of services’ share of GDP, real total external 
debt stock, real long term external debt stock, real short term external debt stock, and total 
external debt servicing as percentage of exports, b; LR indicates the sequential modified 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) statistic (each test at 5% level), c;  FPE indicates final prediction error, d; 
AIC indicates Akaike information criterion, e; SIC Schwarz information criterion, f; HQ indicates 
Hannan-Quinn information criterion, * indicates lag order selected by the criterion.
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Figure 5.1 Impulse Responses in Case of Real GDP Growth VAR Model l
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Figure 5.2  Impulse Responses in Case of Agriculture’s Real GDP Share Growth VAR Model 2
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Figure 5.3  Impulse Responses in Case of Industry’s Real GDP Share Growth VAR Model 3
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Figure 5.4  Impulse Responses in Case of the Services’ Real GDP Share Growth VAR Model 4
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
A new wave of recent external debt crises of especially the European countries has 
slowed down national and global economies via the phenomenon of external debt 
overhang and their complete recovery is still problematic in spite of numerous 
national, regional, and global institutional remedial policy responses.  Because of the 
highly internationally integrated structures of contemporary national economies in 
the institutional framework of economic-cum-financial globalization, the 
contemporary external debt crises have triggered profound national, regional and 
global recessions, which are unprecedented in the modern history of numerous 
national external debt crises since the nineteenth century.  Earlier, like several other 
developing countries, Pakistan’s economy was also hit by her 1998 external debt 
crisis – a culmination of the process of fast accumulation of external debt of Pakistan 
since the 1980s.   
In contrast to the contemporary overwhelming global focus on the recent external 
debt crisis of certain European countries, Pakistan’s ongoing external debt crisis has 
not received as much global attention. Because of lack of substantial empirical 
research on the external debt crisis of Pakistan, this thesis focused on the empirical 
determination of the economic effects of the external debt crisis for Pakistan.  In this 
context, this thesis presented a brief history of the Pakistan economy, a detailed
literature review of the external debt crises in general and Pakistan’s external debt 
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crisis in particular, and an empirical econometric analysis of effects of accumulation 
of Pakistan’s external debt not only on her real GDP growth rate, but also on the 
growth rates of the real GDP shares of agriculture, industry, and the services using 
the World Bank data set for the period 1981-2010.   
Chapter 1 briefly described the evolution of the economy of Pakistan during the late 
1940s, the 1950s, the 1970s, the 1970s, the 1980s, the1990s, and the 2000s.  It 
highlighted the effects of Pakistan’s economic and external debt crises in the forms of 
fluctuating economic growth as well as poverty and rising inflation as well as 
unemployment.  It identified the role of the manufacturing sector as the driver of 
economic growth and structural change in Pakistan’s  economy.  Keeping in mind the 
fact of the prevalence of an external debt/foreign aid-dependent macroeconomic 
growth regime in Pakistan, it uncovered the vulnerability of Pakistan’s economic 
growth especially to the shocks of the external debt burden in the form of growing 
total external debt servicing as a percentage of exports.  It noted some improvement 
in the economic status of Pakistan from a low income developing country to a lower 
middle income developing country during the past sixty-five years of existence of 
Pakistan  
Chapter 2 surveyed the literature on Pakistan’s and other countries’ external debt 
crises. It highlighted a resemblance between Pakistan’s external debt crisis and the 
other countries’ external debt crises since the 19th century.  It also uncovered a 
remarkable similarity in the official policy responses (for example, cut in public 
expenditures on health and education) of the governments of almost all the debt 
crisis-hit countries – irrespective of whether they are developing countries like 
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Pakistan or they are the developed countries such as the United Kingdom – to their 
respective debt crises.  It highlighted the consensus of an overwhelming majority of 
Pakistani economists on the causes of Pakistan’s external debt crisis in the second 
half of the 1990s.  It made it crystal clear that Pakistan’s chronic fiscal deficits in the 
wake of very low rates of national savings and balance of trade and balance of 
payments deficits triggered Pakistan’s external debt crisis. It found that the burden of 
the external debt servicing has been a hindrance to the growth of economy as the 
fluctuations in external debt have been causing fluctuations in the growth rate of 
economy in Pakistan.  It highlighted the prospective solutions of the external debt 
crisis of Pakistan in the forms of actual achievement of significantly higher 
sustainable national saving and investment rates, sustainable budget surpluses, 
sustainable balance of trade and balance of payments surpluses, and implementation 
of effective austerity reforms. 
Chapter 3 examined the real GDP growth effects of the external debt growth 
variables during the era of external debt accumulation since 1981.  It used the unit 
root tests for nonstationarity, the method of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), OLS 
residual diagnostics (Jarque and Bera Normality Test, Breusch and Godfrey Serial 
Correlation LM Test, Breusch, Pagan and Godfrey Heteroskedasticity Test, and 
Heteroskedasticity Test for ARCH Effects), stability diagnostics                        
(Chow Breakpoint Test), and Johansen’s multiple cointegration tests for empirically 
determining the short-run and long-run effects of the growth rates of real total 
external debt stock, real long-term external debt stock, real short-term external debt 
stock, and total debt servicing as a percentage of exports on the growth rate of real 
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GDP using control variables.  In addition, the OLS-based double-log regression 
models of the dependent variable real GDP and the explanatory external debt 
variables were also estimated for determining the elasticities of the real GDP with 
respect to the explanatory external debt variables.   The empirical results confirmed 
the robustness of a significant positive real GDP growth effect of the growth rate of 
real long-term external debt stock and a negative real GDP growth effect of the 
growth rate of total debt servicing as a percentage of exports signifying external debt 
overhang in both short-run and long-run.  In general, overall empirical results of 
short-run real GDP growth model were robust to the inclusion of two additional 
control variables, the growth rate of total labour force and the first-differenced 
growth rate of real capital stock. This empirical evidence led to an important short-
run policy recommendation that Government of Pakistan should ensure a corruption-
free, merit-based efficient allocation of long-term external debt among all sectors of 
economy for realizing synergy among them for realizing the highest attainable 
growth rate of real GDP. A long-run policy recommendation based on the empirical 
evidence of the plausible significant positive short-run and long-run effects of the 
growth rate of real long-term total external debt on the growth rate of real GDP was 
that Government of Pakistan should accelerate the economic growth rate by 
simultaneously instituting a comprehensive fiscal austerity-oriented package of long-
term fundamental fiscal, constitutional, and administrative reforms.  On one hand, 
this reform package was recommended to be designed to impose constitutional 
ceilings on fiscal deficits/domestic debt/external debt for ensuring fiscal discipline 
and accountability of policy makers and policy executers, to increase the national 
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savings rate through fiscal incentives, and to institute a judicious and efficient policy 
mix of financing public expenditures by means of external debt finance and external 
equity finance. On the other hand, this reform package should reinforce the above 
short-run policy of promoting an equitable-cum-efficient allocation of real long-term 
total external debt stock among the prospective investors in both public and private 
sector investment projects. Because of the general tendency of Government of 
Pakistan to resort to fiscal deficits by incurring excessive amounts of external debt,
Pakistan’s economy has become a black hole economy for external debt as there is 
lack of transparency in the processes of external debt-related decision making and the 
use of external debt.  An alternative short-run policy implication of the external debt 
overhang caused by the Pakistan’s unsustainable burden of debt servicing is to 
radically reduce the external debt stock through comprehensive macroeconomic 
reforms. But the success of a short-run policy recommendation of external debt 
reduction is problematic. Therefore, on the basis of a comparison between the policy 
of accelerating real GDP growth by means of external debt stock, which inevitably 
involves the burden of debt servicing as well as the external debt overhang, and the 
policy of accelerating real GDP growth by means of increasing inflows of FDI, the 
policy of accelerating real GDP growth by increasing the inflows of FDI has a greater 
economic rationale.
Chapter 4 extended the analysis in Chapter 3 and the literature by estimating the 
relationships between the growth rates of sectoral shares of real GDP and the four 
external debt growth variables. There was found empirical evidence of the robust 
significant positive short-run effects of the growth rate of real total external debt 
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stock on the growth rate of agriculture’s share of real GDP in cases of both three and 
five control variables.  This empirical evidence led to a policy recommendation of 
accelerating the growth rate of agriculture in the short-run by promoting not only an 
equitable-cum-efficient allocation of real total external debt stock external stock 
between the majority of the needy small agricultural farm owners and a minority of 
resourceful large farm owners but also the actual investment of the real total external 
debt stock by its beneficiaries. In addition, it is recommended for the Government of 
Pakistan to ensure the equitable access of all economic agents to credit for 
eliminating their liquidity constraints and, thereby, breaking the exploitative vicious 
circle of interlocking factor markets prevalent within the agriculture sector of 
Pakistan by simultaneously launching an official program of effective credit reforms 
(Todaro and Smith, 2009). Empirical evidence was found of the robust significant 
negative short-run effects of the growth rate of real long-term external debt stock on 
the growth rate of agriculture’s share of real GDP in cases of both three and five 
control variables.  In contrast to no empirical evidence of any significant short-run 
effects of both the growth rates of real short-term debt stock and total debt servicing 
as a percentage of exports on the growth rate of agriculture’s share of real GDP,
there was mixed empirical evidence of both the significant negative and positive 
long-run effects of the growth rates of real short-term external debt stock and total 
debt servicing as a percentage of exports on the growth rate of agriculture’s share of 
real GDP. In the selected short-run agriculture’s share of real GDP growth models,
there was no evidence of any significant short-run effects of five control variables on 
the growth rate of agriculture’s share of real GDP. There was also empirical 
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evidence of a significant negative short-run effect of the growth rate of real total 
external debt stock on the growth rate of industry’s share of real GDP in the case of 
five control variables.  Moreover, there was empirical evidence of a significant 
positive short-run effect of the growth rate of real long-term external debt stock on 
the growth rate of industry’s share of real GDP in the case of five control variables.  
However, there was empirical evidence of significant negative long-run effects of the 
growth rates of real long-term external debt stock and total debt servicing as a 
percentage of exports and a significant positive long-run effect of the growth rate of 
real short-term external debt stock on the growth rate of industry’s share of real GDP.  
Out of five control variables, there was evidence of only a significant positive short-
run effect of the growth rate of real foreign direct investment net inflows on the 
growth rate of industry’s share of real GDP. This empirical evidence led to a policy 
recommendation of accelerating the growth rate of real foreign direct investment net 
inflows for ensuring growth in real GDP share of industry in Pakistan from the point 
of view of accelerating the pace of economic development-oriented structural change 
in Pakistan. There was also evidence of a significant negative long-run effect of the 
growth rate of real long-term external debt stock and significant positive long-run 
effects of the growth rates of real short-term external debt and total debt servicing as 
a percentage of exports on the rate of growth of the services’ share of real GDP.
Moreover, there was evidence of a significant short-run positive effect of the growth 
rate of real workers’ remittances and compensation of employees received on the 
growth rate of the services’ share of real GDP. This empirical evidence led to a 
policy recommendation of accelerating the growth rate of real workers’ remittances 
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and compensation of employees received for ensuring growth in real GDP share of 
the services in Pakistan from the point of view of accelerating the pace of economic
development-oriented structural change in Pakistan. The strength of this empirical 
study was attributable to the use a comprehensive set of the pertinent four distinct 
external debt time series as the main explanatory variables, along with a 
comprehensive set of control variables for separately determining their short and 
long-run effects on the growth rates of real GDP shares of the agriculture, industry, 
and the services sectors of Pakistan’s economy over the past thirty years (1981-
2010).  A limitation of this empirical study was the existence of a small number of 
the significant effects of the four external debt growth variables on the growth rates 
of the real GDP shares of the agriculture, industry, and the services in Pakistan.  This 
was mainly due to the absence of sufficient over-time variations in the above annual 
sectoral GDP share growth time series against the background of a stagnating 
developing country-specific characteristic of a very slow pace of annual change in 
the sectoral composition of Pakistan’s economy.
Chapter 5 estimated four unrestricted Vector Autoregressive (VAR) models: Real 
GDP Growth VAR Model 1, Agriculture’s Real GDP Share Growth VAR Model 2, 
Industry’s Real GDP Share Growth VAR Model 3, and Services’ Real GDP Share
Growth VAR Model 4.  It also analysed the VAR impulse responses of the growth 
rates of real GDP and three sectoral GDP shares to their own respective shocks, and 
to the individual shocks of the above four external debt growth variables.  There were 
significant large temporary positive responses of the growth rates of real GDP (in 
VAR Model 1), agriculture’s real GDP share (in VAR Model 2), industry’s real GDP 
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share (in VAR Model 3), and the services’ real GDP share (in VAR Model 4), which 
subsided and ultimately became zero in the short-run, to respectively their own 
individual positive shocks.  In contrast, the above impulse response functions 
reflected that there were neither significant positive nor significant negative 
responses of the growth rates of real GDP (in VAR Model 1), agriculture’s real GDP 
share (in VAR Model 2), industry’s real GDP share (in VAR Model 3), and the 
services’ real GDP share (in VAR Model 4), respectively, to the individual shocks of 
the unexpected increases in the growth rates of real total external debt stock, real 
long-term external debt stock, real short-term external debt, and total external debt 
servicing as percentage of exports. In short, there was found empirical evidence of a 
significant positive response of a variable of our interest (the growth rates of real 
GDP and sectoral real GDP shares) to only its own shock and this positive response 
became reduced to zero after the very first year. Against the background of the 
chronic economic inefficiencies and production losses caused by the endemic 
financial corruption and the prolonged crises of acute shortages of power (electricity) 
and water in Pakistan since the 1990s, this insight led to a short-run policy 
recommendation for the Government of Pakistan that Pakistan can accelerate the 
growth rates of real GDP and three sectoral GDP share at least in the short run by 
introducing positive productivity growth shocks in her economic system by means of 
both the above systemic macroeconomic reforms-oriented anticorruption fiscal 
discipline and the proactive development policies of ensuring the requisite private 
and public investment in power generation, construction of new large dams and 
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efficient irrigation networks, economic infrastructure, and human resource 
development by activating backward and forward inter-sectoral linkages.
Finally, it can be concluded that the history of Pakistan’s economy, pertinent 
literature review, and empirical evidence have confirmed that external debt, real 
workers’ remittances and compensation of employees received, and real foreign 
direct investment net inflows were significant determinants of Pakistan’s growth rate 
of real GDP.
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